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Abstract 
 
Stakeholder pressure, sector turbulence and crisis make up the troublesome 
agenda within the public hospital sector.  Sector deficiencies challenge the 
governance legitimacy and its organizational rationale.  On-going political 
and public debates call for organizational prescriptions revising traditional 
institutional configurations. The thesis identifies how a multitude of 
stakeholder groups influence organizational decision-making in public 
hospitals.   
 
Stakeholder analysis is based on the belief that certain reciprocal 
relationships exist between an organization and certain groups and 
individuals (Ginter, Swayne, and Duncan 1989).  These groups and 
individuals are so-called stakeholders as they are considered to have a stake 
or claim in the outcome of decision-making.  A lacking empirical foundation 
and an abundance of normative contentions mark the present state of affairs 
on stakeholder theory. This disparity in research focus curtails the 
formulation of descriptive and instrumental propositions tied to stakeholder 
management.  Although an instrumental justification for stakeholder theory 
originally has been established by Freeman (Freeman 1984), some 
commentators argue that these are inadequate to serve as a theoretical basis 
(Ogden and Watson 1999).  Donaldson advocates that managers should 
“acknowledge the value of diverse stakeholder interests and should attempt 
to respond to them within a mutually supportive framework, because that is a 
moral requirement for the legitimacy of the management function” 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995).  Recent normative developments in 
stakeholder theory tie philosophical views into operational contexts.  
Proponents of the latter may be found in the theory of the common good 
(Aragandona 1998) tied to Cludt’s (Cludts 1999) social system theorem, both 
arguing for a balancing of constituent interests relative to the organization’s 
societal relations and the nature of its services.   
 
The thesis presents a contextual analysis that makes an exposition of the 
structural contingencies of the Norwegian welfare state. A descriptive/ 
empirical analysis of the public hospital’s decision-making processes 
provides insight into how stakeholder groups shape the premises of the 
public hospital’s value creation-process. The thesis’ theoretical propositions 
are vested in hospitals’ efforts to achieve a stakeholder balance between 
competing constituent interests. A thesis proposal on descriptive/empirical 
stakeholder theory is exempt from normative prescriptions on the intrinsic 
value of all stakeholder groups. The “stakeholder theory of detachment”1 
                                                 
1 See thesis section 11.5.3 “Theoretical contributions”. 
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reflects thesis findings that stakeholder management takes place in a 
departmentalized fashion without an integrated operations perspective.  A 
conceptualization of “stakeholder compliance”2 is introduced and vizualises 
the embedded nature of stakeholder management in public hospitals.  The 
model is grounded in the empirical accounts on how stakeholder 
management employs differentiated decision processing techniques at 
different organizational levels to achieve an optimum balance between 
competing constituent interests. 
  
The thesis summary and conclusions culminate in a set of implications.  
These address the need for a renewed national discourse on the governance 
of public hospitals.  The thesis empirical findings on the consequences of 
non-integrated stakeholder management, call for reviews of governance 
models and managerial practices.  Empirical evidence confirms a pattern of 
decisional sedimentation in which executive-, operational- and ward hospital 
management work strategically detached on issues of overall strategic 
importance. The thesis contends that hegemonic and autonomous 
management make room for staged and manipulative stakeholder behavior.  
As generalized through this empirical field study, the operational practices of 
public hospitals exempts authorities from the exercise of rational choice.     
 
 
                                                 
2 See thesis section 11.5.3 “Theoretical contributions”. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Intent of the study 
“Throughout the last four years it has become even clearer to me 
that the public health services system may be characterized as a 
constituent “game” where the main actors are the patients, health 
personnel, administrators, politicians and the media” 3 
 
The objective of this thesis research project is to develop an understanding 
of public hospital stakeholder groups and how the nature of their vested 
interests impacts organizational decision-making in hospitals.  Stakeholder 
analysis is based on the belief that certain reciprocal relationships exist 
between an organization and certain groups and individuals (Ginter, Swayne, 
and Duncan 1989).  They are referred to as stakeholders, that is, actors 
having a stake or claim in the outcome of decision-making.  According to 
Ginter, some of these stakeholders are almost always powerful or influential, 
others influential regarding only certain issues, still others have little 
influence and power.   
In this thesis, stakeholders at three public hospitals will be identified and 
analyzed.  An important goal of the research project is to arrive at a 
stakeholder typology fitting the category of public hospital stakeholders.  To 
aid the understanding of how stakeholder groups influence organizational 
decision-making it is important to develop a conceptual model depicting 
their relative position and a framework visualizing their interaction.   
Field data has been collected through an exploratory research process by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with selected stakeholder informants. 
Archive data such as formal minutes from executive board meetings and 
from meetings between the hospital directors and ward managers and 
administrative directors in the respective case hospitals, has been collected.  
A theoretical platform has been developed to guide the empirical work, and 
as such constitutes the conceptual framework for the research model and 
design. 
 
Descriptive renderings evidenced by typologies, frameworks and models 
will be presented in a way so as to permit a conceptualization of the case 
hospitals’ organizational decision-making.  Traits and other leading ends, 
                                                 
3 Argument put forth by professor Jan Grund in the foreword to the 2nd edition of his 
book “Helsepolitikk.  Effektivisering, spill eller utvikling?”, Tano, Oslo, 1995.  
Grund’s statement is here considered a valid reference and introduction to the 
significance of stakeholder interests in hospital organizational decision-making. 
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progressively developed through a grounding method and extracted from the 
analysis of the empirical data, will be presented as propositions on the 
presence and prevalence of stakeholder groups.     
 
The changes in medical service delivery within the last 20 to 25 years are 
truly remarkable.  Following decades of what Scott refers to as “dynamics 
without change” (Scott et al. 1998 p. 1),  we are today, “undergoing a period 
of hyper turbulence; a time of revolutionary change within the industry” 
(Meyer, Goes, and Brooks 1993).  Such turbulence is manifested in our 
confrontation with new medical technologies, the changing nature of 
hospital health care, new financial mechanisms for the reimbursement of 
hospital performance, the introduction of cooperative and competitive 
mechanisms between hospitals and an institutionalization of new public 
management logics that govern leadership and organizational practices.  
These changes are occurring within a sector noted for its highly institutional 
character with established norms and values.  Significant political risks and 
public resources are attached to public hospital change processes in which 
the stakes are high and the outcome uncertain.  However, according to 
Greenwood, the prognosis may be better than that which history may tell us 
about institutional change processes;   “In an arena such as health care, 
change does not come easily; but when it does – when the existing structures 
and beliefs are undermined or severely challenged – profound change can 
also occur rapidly” (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
 
Understanding how organizations function is, according to Cyert and March 
(Cyert and March 1992), “more diffuse than the study of the economic 
activities of the firm; as a result it is harder to characterize briefly.”  The 
very nature of public health services, as generated and disbursed by the 
hospital institution, attracts many constituents with differing political, 
institutional and societal interests.  Grund’s (Grund 1995) rediscovering the 
relevance of hospital stakeholders, may represent a research vantage point 
from which stakeholder presence may be sought dichotomized.  Most 
notably, there is a frustrated patient or next of kin with the feeling of being 
supervised by norms and forces outside of his or her own immediate control.  
Then there are the numerous other “actors” internal and external to the 
hospital.  All seek to have their presence noted and their concern validated 
by the many organizational decision-makers operating within the framework 
of the public hospital.        
 
The thesis research represents a preliminary culmination of a personal 
engagement in, and a commitment to, enhancing the theoretical and practical 
understanding of the management of public hospitals. The present theoretical 
paradigm of stakeholder theory explains the dynamics of an organization’s 
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interaction with its operational environment.  The paradigm confirms a 
normative justification of the intrinsic value of all stakeholders with respect 
to organizational decision-making.  However, as hospital sector reforms 
pave the way for a greater influx of both public and private constituent 
interests, the research departs on exploring a possible paradigm anomaly4 
based on Kuhn’s (Kuhn 1962) assessment criteria of context of discovery and 
content of justification5. Through the thesis’ empirical/descriptive research 
the outcome may thus enhance our comprehension of the relevancy and 
merits of contributions to new stakeholder theory applicable to the public 
health organization within the context of the modern welfare state.  
1.2 Thesis outline 
The initial step in the thesis presentation is to introduce thesis focus and 
rationale.  Theoretical objectives and potential contextual merits serving 
public hospital governance are presented.  A rendering of the public hospital 
field identifies sector ramifications critical to comprehending the nature and 
outcome of the research project.  Key stakeholder groups are introduced 
representing recognized constituents of governance and value creation 
processes.  A subsequent presentation of the history of public hospitals that 
leads up to the present-day modern health care institutions provides 
comprehensive insight into the thesis’ empirical field.  The literature review 
introduces a framework for the thesis’ theoretical foundation and is followed 
by a concretization of the research question.   
In outlining the thesis’ empirical work, its epistemological position 
rationalizes its research strategy and serves to qualify its selection of 
research model and design. 
A chapter on research methodology details empirical sampling strategies, 
instrumentation and fieldwork implementation. The thesis analysis interprets 
field data gathered through a data triangulation process.  The research 
                                                 
4 In explaining the concept of paradigm, Kuhn (Kuhn 1962) speaks of  “normal 
science”, which means to suggest that “some examples of actual scientific practice, 
provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific 
research” (p. 10).   
5 In a second edition to his original 1962 (1st edition) publication on The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1970), Kuhn speaks further on the subject of a “pre-
paradigm period” (Postscript: p. 179).  Faced with an admittantly paradigm 
anomaly, the scientist’s task is first to isolate the “paradigm embryo” (p. 26) for 
further analysis where the purpose is to provide incremental data necessary to 
identify any fundamental paradigm shift.  Kuhn goes on to underscore his theoreme 
that “to reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject 
science itself” (p. 79).  Thus, there is no such thing as research in the abscence of a 
paradigm. 
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question is answered through descriptive renderings and conceptualizations 
that depict the presence and interactions of stakeholder groups in case 
hospital decision-making.  The thesis’ contribution to a furtherance of 
stakeholder theory is being discussed within the contextual framework of the 
welfare state.  The thesis’ contributory consequences are being evaluated 
relative to both theoretical and contextual properties. 
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2 Thesis focus and rationale 
2.1 Introduction 
Classical organization theorists have historically decomposed the 
organizational environment to permit the formulation of tangible 
instrumental propositions on organizational behavior.  The interest in 
establishing an instrumentality connection between firm behavior and 
stakeholder interests seems to have remained attractive to academics and 
management practitioners alike.  While the exact propositions seem to differ, 
modern stakeholder theorists seem to have a common interest in establishing 
a theory of the firm that is fundamentally different from the neoclassical 
theories depicting participants as utility maximizing constituents.  Brenner 
and Cochran (Brenner and Cochran 1991) are concerned about stakeholder 
related issues in order to help predict organizations’ behavior, as Donaldson 
and Preston (Donaldson and Preston 1995) wish to explain and guide 
operations of the established organization.  McDaniel (McDaniel 1997) also 
follows the lead of instrumentalist objectives, pointing to organizations’ 
sense-making needs in order to comprehend their environment thus to 
maintain operational stability and predictability.     
When focusing on organizational decision-making conduct and accounting 
for the presence of stakeholders’ vested interests, the largely normative 
philosophical/ethical assumptions seem insufficient for any instrumental 
intentions.  Objections are increasingly voiced on the lacking recognition of 
the intricacies of the organizational context in stakeholder theory building. 
Proponents of contextualization advocate a stricter delineation along the 
lines of Cyert’s (Cyert and March 1992) “nature of the firm”6.  Cyert notes 
that the decision-making research approach has developed a “substantial 
theory of decision-making processes in an organizational context, but has not 
applied the theory to specific environmental conditions in which the business 
firm operates, nor utilized the theory in detail to the particular decision-
variables that characterize the firm’s operation” (Cyert and March 1992 p. 
19).  
  
When analyzing organizational behavior in public service organizations, the 
research community seems to advocate the relevance and accord of 
institutionalism.  This is confirmed by DiMaggio (DiMaggio and Powel 
1991), noting that the theory of institutions is concerned with political 
decision-making, especially the ways in which political structures or 
                                                 
6 Book title of Cyert and March’s 1992 seminole textbook publication on the nature 
and relevancy of business organizations. 
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institutions shape political outcomes through their governance mechanism.  
The classical institutional theorists view the process of internalization of 
policies, ideas and values as governed by an organization’s norms and 
myths, conditioning the formal organization’s cognitive rationale (March 
and Olsen 1989).  The internalization of these common behavioural patterns 
creates organizational stability over time and serves to resist change 
processes and intervention efforts incited by environmental stakeholders.  
New-institutional theory, however, introduces the concept of an active 
institutional environment enhancing its particular set of values and norms 
rooted in its cognitive interpretive patterns related to knowledge, 
professions, procedures and products.  Through a cognitive based imitation 
of prevalent values and customs, new institutionalised myths may develop to 
form an isomorphism or alikeness between organizations, parties, groups and 
individuals (Christensen 1994).   
The application of institutionalism and new institutionalism in analyzing the 
effects of organizational changes introduced by political governance in 
public health organizations thus implies the relevance of both internal and 
external stakeholders as change agents.  Their very presence transcends 
elements of new values and norms through their continual interaction.  
According to Meyer (Meyer and Rowan 1991), isomorphism with 
environmental institutions and institution agents, has some crucial 
consequences for organizations’ continual change processes.         
This chapter will introduce the public hospital sector as the thesis’ empirical 
field representing the contextual arena for the study of the presence and 
prevalence of stakeholder groups.  Recognized stakeholder groups in the 
public hospital field will be identified and discussed.  The conceptualization 
and discussion of the public hospital stakeholder forces will represent a 
logical framework for the ensuing thesis research.  It will furthermore serve 
as a rationale for subsequent models and frameworks developed that may 
depict stakeholder interactions with organizational decision-making. 
2.2 A stakeholder rationale for the public hospital 
2.2.1 The dynamism of the stakeholder “fit”7    
There seems to be a common understanding between modern welfare states 
and welfare societies that health services policies should be a political 
responsibility even though both private and public institutions may render 
such services (Hallandvik 1998).  Hallandvik defines politics as a system 
securing a distribution of a nation’s scarce resources.  Accordingly, goods 
                                                 
7 Term applied by Ogden in his article seeking to explain the balancing of customer 
interests in the US privatized water industry (Ogden and Watson 1999). 
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distributed through political processes are goods in scarce supply and critical 
to the health and welfare of the individual.  The very nature of market 
mechanisms implies that as someone receives more of an item others will 
receive less.  Much of the political debate centers around which goods 
should be allocated by the state and which goods should be distributed 
through open market processes.  Public goods are represented by a 
distribution not governed by the market forces of supply and demand but by 
an allocation in accordance with a predefined health policy.  The established 
prerequisites for public goods distribution is that the services should be 
allocated in a just and efficient manner and that the quality of services 
should be as good as possible (Hallandvik 1998).  There is generally a 
uniform agreement about these service objectives.  However, when seeking 
to specify the exact level of service, processes replace agreements where 
vested interest groups seek to influence priorities.   
 
Within the conceptual confines of stakeholder theory, it is important to have 
a clear definition of the term stakeholder as it applies to the context of the 
public hospital.  Freeman (Freeman 1984) defines a stakeholder as “any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization’s objective” (Brenner & Cochran, 1991).  By this definition, 
management choice is a function of stakeholder influences. Thus, in a 
generic sense of the stakeholder perspective organizations are required to 
address a set of stakeholder expectations.  Freeman’s fundamental 
assumption of the stakeholder model, however, is that the ultimate objective 
of organizational decisions is a marketplace success.  Firms view their 
stakeholders as part of an environment that must be managed in order to 
assure revenues, profits, and ultimately, returns to shareholders.  Attention to 
stakeholder concerns may thus help a firm avoid decisions that might prompt 
stakeholders to undercut its objectives.  This possibility arises because it is 
the stakeholders who control resources that can facilitate or enhance the 
implementation of corporate decisions.  In short, stakeholder management is 
a means to an end (Berman et al. 1999).  However, the end may have 
nothing to do with the welfare of stakeholder interests in general.  
Instrumental strategic ethics enter the picture only as “an addendum to the 
rule of wealth maximization for the manager-agent to follow” (Quinn and 
Jones 1995).     
 
According to Ogden (Ogden and Watson 1999), having studied the 
privatization of public utility companies in the UK; “the transfer of the 
stakeholder concept from a private to a public sector, involves significant 
changes in the composition of stakeholders and in the consideration of how 
the interests of the different stakeholders are to be balanced” (Ogden and 
Watson 1999).  Ogden makes reference to the organizational mandate of a 
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public organization to secure some “fit” between the values of its 
governance and its management and the expectation of its stakeholders and 
societal issues “to permit an achievement of optimum resource efficiency” 
(Ogden and Watson 1999).  This balance between normative societal values 
and the vested interests of its environmental stakeholders is sought 
established through legislative measures and its sector governance.  Though 
this argument is conceptually clear, it is particularly difficult to perceive of a 
stakeholder model applicable to the public service firm.  Such a model needs 
to convert stakeholder dualism of the private sector.  The latter dualism is 
balancing the governing forces of company shareholders with the 
expectations of the market place.  The patient, as an end user of hospital 
medical services, is requesting and receiving free and unlimited medical 
care8.  The presence of any open market mechanisms providing the 
opportunity for client measures to establish a client negotiating position with 
potential impacts on price, product, or service levels, is principally void.  
The contextual arena of the public hospital representative of its ideology, 
culture and institutional norms, is not conditioned to the modes of 
intervention expected in a truly competitive environment.  According to 
Freddie “the institutional and stylistic contexts that illuminate and denote the 
redistribution of decisional power in the medical services delivery system, 
follows the rule and logic of public intervention” (Freddi 1989 p. 2).  As 
such, the public hospital owner becomes an important stakeholder agent 
amidst other organizational and environmental constituents. All such 
constituent parties interact to strike a balance or “fit” in the composition of 
medical services afforded patients.   
2.2.2 The conditional governance 
Our public health system is subject to continual national scrutiny.  
According to Grimen (Grimen 2000), such focus on a major societal 
institution is culturally vested.  “In any society, normative arguments on 
national values and ethics, center on the selection and maintenance of its 
social institutions” (Grimen 2000 p. 273).  Health policy and our national 
health services are therefore of concern to all of us.  It is grounded in our 
modern national history and mirrors our culture, the ethical values we wish 
to uphold, and in sum provide us with a sense of security and predictability.  
                                                 
8 Norwegian residents are ensured free hospital services based on a social insurance 
model principally built on the concept of an active State and a passive market 
(Erichsen 1996).  The Norwegian public health model is generally referred to as 
“The Beveridge Model” (named after the architect of the British national health 
services, William Beveridge), providing universal coverage through taxation, 
entrusting its means of production in public ownership and governance (Erichsen 
1996).  
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According to Erichsen (Erichsen 1996), a public health system also contains 
and exhibits much of society’s conflicts, possibilities and dilemmas.  As 
such, its implications attract many and diverse constituents with interests 
vested in the very presence, purpose and priorities of our public health 
resources. 
 
The expressed political objective of the public health system in Norway is to 
ensure access to good medical and health care services for all inhabitants, 
irrespective of age, gender and residence (St.meld. nr. 50 (1993-94): 
Samarbeid og styring). According to these same provisions, such services 
are to be furnished within the framework of a publicly owned and governed 
health care system (St.meld. nr. 50 (1993-94): Samarbeid og styring).  The 
overriding obligation is “to provide all residents with the opportunity to 
uphold one’s freedom and independence safeguarded from illness and 
disease through a just distribution of medical health benefits governed within 
a welfare framework that ensures public control of funds allocation and its 
management” (St.meld. nr. 50 (1993-94): Samarbeid og styring)9.   
The ensuing governance10 of the public hospitals within this framework of 
national public health generates an evolving constituency of formal and 
informal stakeholders, all with a vested interest in how the hospital 
organization allocates its resources.  As such, the various stakeholders seek 
to exert their influence on decision-making issues facing the organization, 
competing for its share of the resources to be allocated (Blair and Buesseler 
1998).  Given the nature of its product and its associated constituency, 
managers at the various organizational levels within the hospital have to 
satisfy a number of public and private concerns to meet the anticipated 
formal and informal performance standards.  An economically successful 
public organization will necessarily be one in which management adopts 
policies and applies governance strategies that facilitate the maintenance of 
                                                 
9 Translated by the thesis author from the original Norwegian wording (St.meld. nr. 
50 (1993-94): Samarbeid og styring).  
10 Governance is commonly defined as the relationship between the owner and the 
management of an organization (Preker and Harding 1999).  Good governance is 
said to exist when managers are closely pursuing the owner’s objectives or when the 
principal- agent problems have been minimized.  Public hospitals are said to 
experience bad governance when there are (a) problems with the objectives of the 
hospital, (b) problems with the supervisory structure, or (c) problems with its 
competitive environment (Preker and Harding 1999). 
Governance structure is meant to represent the formal and judicial organizational 
make-up of public hospitals.  Williamson, in his “The Mechanics of Governance”, 
quotes Lon Fuller’s definition of “eunomics” to be representative of Willliamson’s 
“spirit of governance”, namely “the science, theory or study of good order and 
workable arrangements” (Williamson 1996). 
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an appropriate balance between different stakeholder interests (Ogden and 
Watson 1999).  In the context of the hospital, the sensible manager will seek 
to maximize the present utility of medical services for its patients.  However, 
as the public hospital is financed partly based on its resource efficiency 
(ISF)11, the hospital management may consider reducing expenditures not 
directly linked to diagnostic measures or treatment regimen. Such measures 
may indeed be applied to all cost and investment categories that do not 
ensure measurable and immediate cost savings.  Hospital stakeholders are 
aware of this continuous resource imbalance between over all goals and the 
need to prioritize operational objectives.  Hence, stakeholders will seek to 
monitor hospital operations to safeguard their vested interests. 
 
Within stakeholder research, the descriptive/instrumental focus is on 
explaining and predicting how an organization functions with respect to the 
relationships and influences exerted by its environment (Rowley 1997).  
Incorporating the sphere of governance as part of the public hospital’s 
organizational environment, calls for the recognition of the socio-political 
dimension in stakeholder research and analysis.  An interpretation of hospital 
owner representatives as both a shareholder and a stakeholder is supported 
by Erichsen (Erichsen 1996).  Erichsen defines the development of public 
health services in its broadest context as the sum of all of those activities and 
services performed by the various health professions.  When confined to the 
context of the public hospital, this latter definition may be somewhat 
unconventional.  It offers an interpretation of public health services that 
constitutes both the services performed by the health institution itself as well 
as the formal political-administrative structure.  The stakeholder mandate 
administered by the hospital’s governing bodies, is expressed in legislated 
principles of equal rights, fairness in practice and public governance.  This 
public obligation and its singular vein of financing get confronted with the 
needs and expectations of other public accounts.  The issue of competing 
relative merits hence limits the resource access.  Hence, the hospital is put 
into a position to argue its needs opposite its governing bodies to ensure its 
vested interests.  Hospital management promotes its constituent interests 
rooted in its operational mandate through goals and strategies.  Here it seeks 
                                                 
11 Incentive supervised financing (“Innsatsstyrt finansiering”; ISF) was introduced in 
1997 (St.meld. nr. 50 (1993-94): Samarbeid og styring) as part of the total hospital 
financial system establishing a cost refund scheme based on the merits of the DRG-
system (Diagnosis Related Group).  The DRG-system is a cost refund system 
linking the hospital’s cost reimbursement to pre-defined cost scales developed for a 
range of commonly occurring patient diagnosis and associated medical regimen in 
somatic hospitals.  The system was originally developed in the 1970s at Yale 
University, USA (Rønning 2000). 
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to claim its share of scarce resources to facilitate organizational decision-
making.    
The present scope and magnitude of funds allocated public hospitals 
represents a relatively large share of the nation’s national health services 
program.  In 2000 the somatic hospital sector accounted for NOK 34,0 
billion (mrd.) (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2000) or a 42 % share of the NOK 87,5 
billion (mrd.) sum total spent on public health services.  The societal 
dimensions are equally compelling.  As many as 721.45812 patients were in 
2001 discharged13 from our 89 (Hansen 2001) public hospitals (Rønning 
2000). Obviously, treatment and rehabilitation regimen carries significant 
personal and public implications.  With as many as 59.53014 man-years 
completed in the public hospital sector alone (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2000), 
this underscores the magnitude of human resources required to fulfill the 
political commitment to public hospitals in the context of public health 
services.      
2.2.3 The omnipresence of professions 
In an integrated public health services system, the hospitals are said to be 
representative of what Mintzberg labels “a professional organization” which 
is “dominated by skilled workers who use procedures that are difficult to 
learn yet are well defined” (Mintzberg 1989 p. 181).  Mintzberg’s structural 
description is hardly adequate, however, to expose the complexity of the 
social and professional context within which the hospital functions.  An 
ecological explanation of the hospital organization may include a whole 
array of elements broadly classified as structural, cognitive, institutional and 
cultural (DiMaggio and Powel 1983).  Erichsen (Erichsen 1996) provides a 
more pragmatic assessment  when she labels to-day’s “late modern 
hospitals”15 as huge, complex organizations providing bureaucratically 
administered and distributed services.  Additionally, hospitals are identified 
as “mostly curative rather than facilitating preventive care; technologically-
oriented and suppressing personal qualifications and views if not originated 
and prescribed by the medical profession alone” (Erichsen 1996).  This latter 
proposition by Erichsen on the nature of public hospitals, serves to highlight 
the sometimes conflicting nature of the relationships said to exist between 
members of professions employed in a hospital.  In the public debate on 
hospital management, the position of professions is perceived as constituting 
                                                 
12 Statistisk årbok 2000, table no. 136, p. 137. 
13 This number does not include day care patient consultations.  In all 324.652 day-
care patients were treated in 2001 
(http://www.ssb.no/emner/03/02/speshelsesom/main.html) 
14 http://www.ssb.no/emner/03/02/speshelsesom/main.html 
15 See thesis chapter 3, section 3.1.2 “From pre-modern to late modern hospitals”. 
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both a problem and a source for better solutions to health services 
development and administration.  Therefore, being cognizant of the 
significance of professions is important when seeking to understand 
stakeholders’ influence on organizational decision-making in public 
hospitals. 
The most general ideas underlying the concept of professions is the belief 
that certain work is so specialized that it is inaccessible to those lacking the 
required training and experience and the belief that it cannot be standardized, 
rationalized or, as Abbot puts it; “commodified” (Abbot 1988 p. 146).  The 
concept of profession is generally associated with professional fields 
enjoying a great deal of autonomy or independence in their conduct and 
performance (Hallandvik 1998).  Professional people generally enjoy special 
privileges of freedom from the control of outsiders. In Freidson’s view 
(Freidson 1970 p. 137), their privilege is justified by three claims:   
 
“First, the claim that there is such an unusual degree of skills and 
knowledge involved in professional work that non-professionals is not 
equipped to evaluate or regulate it.  Second, it is claimed that 
professionals are responsible; i.e., that they may be trusted to work 
conscientiously without supervision.  Third, the claim is that the 
profession itself may be trusted to undertake the proper regulatory 
action on those rare occasions when an individual does not perform his 
work completely or ethically”.    
 
“Thus, the profession is the sole source of competence to recognize deviant 
performance, and it is also ethical enough to control deviant performance 
and to regulate itself in general.  Its autonomy is justified and tested by its 
self-regulation” (Freidson 1970 p. 137).   
Freidson (Freidson 1970) labels medicine as one of the major professions of 
our time.16  Among the traditional professions established in the European 
universities of the middle ages, medicine alone developed a systematic 
connection with science and technology.  “Unlike law and the ministry, 
which have had no important connection with modern science and 
technology, medicine developed into a very complex division of labor, 
                                                 
16 To-days medical doctors originate from two schools; the ones educated at a 
university, the medici, and the more vocationally trained surgeons (Larssen and 
Berge 1993).  As late as in the early 18th Century, the general public in the 
Federation of Denmark-Norway had no opportunity to locate any trained doctor for 
its need for medical treatment.  Hence, help was sought from local, untrained 
“doctors”.  The few formally educated and trained doctors that did exist were tied to 
the royal military; the latter group succeeding in 1794 in promoting the passage of a 
law against the malpractice by local healers; i.e.,  “Quaksalbere” (original meaning: 
“bad ointment”).   
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organizing an increasingly large number of technical and service workers 
around its central task of diagnosing and managing the ills of mankind” 
(Freidson 1970 p. xvi).   
The profession of medicine is thus organized around the knowledge system 
it applies (Abbot 1988).  The status within the profession simply reflects the 
degree of involvement with this organizing knowledge.  According to Abbot,  
“the more one’s professional work employs that knowledge alone – the more 
it excludes extraneous factors – the more one enjoy high status” (Abbot 
1988).  Abbot even professes that “since professionals draw their self esteem 
more from their own world than from the public’s, this status mechanism 
gradually withdraws entire professions into the purity of their own worlds” 
(Abbot 1988).  In this latter “professional regression” (Abbot 1988) the 
members tend to withdraw themselves away from the task for which they 
claim public jurisdiction.  Professionals who receive the highest status from 
their peers are those who work in the most purely professional environments. 
“They are the professionals’ professionals who do not sully their work with 
non-professional matters” (Abbot 1988 p. 118).   
 
In today’s modern hospitals, the doctor is in charge of medical practice with 
the nurse subordinated as his assistant (Hallandvik 1998).17  Below the 
nurses there has been a gradual build-up of semi-skilled nurses aids and 
other groups providing a great variety of technical and administrative 
services18.  The many new occupations established in the hospital and the old 
occupations such as nursing, subordinated relative to the medical profession, 
have in recent years consolidated their position through two processes.  The 
first of these was public certification procedures governing rights to practice 
(nurses in 1948 and nurses aids in 1978) (Erichsen 1996).  The second step 
taken to safeguard its professional status was the transfer of its educational 
supervision from the hospital to the public college/university system 
(Erichsen 1996).  With the exception of the medical doctors and the nurses, 
most of these professions have come into being with the emergence of the 
modern welfare state (Hallandvik 1998).  While doctors and nurses today 
constitute a relative small segment of the total hospital population19, they 
                                                 
17 The first Nordic historical reference to “nurses” is found in the saga of “Viga 
Glum” (935-1003) where women were encouraged to care for the men hurt in battle 
irrespective of which side these victims came from.  Modern nursing has its 
professional roots tied to the Crimean War (1853-56) and the work of Florence 
Nightingale (Larssen and Berge 1993). 
18 The first Norwegain learning institution, educating nurses, Diakonhjemmet, was 
established in 1868.  The National Association of Nurses (Norsk sykepleierforbund, 
NSF) was established in 1912. 
19 Of a total number of somatic hospital “man-years” (m/y) in 1999 mounting to 
58.907, medical doctor-m/y constituted 11.7% of the total, while the representative 
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still represent the core of medical professions employed.  As such, they are 
responsible for generating the resources and providing the competence 
necessary for the medical regimen administered.  The presence of these two 
professions permeates the institutional structure and processes in public 
hospitals.  This is confirmed through the hierarchical organization and 
functionally mandated services.  One of the consequences of this latter a 
priori proposition of hierarchical order, is expressed by Selznick (Selznick 
1957) in his theorem of an informal rank order system in organizations made 
up of highly skilled professionals.  Organizations with a high representation 
of members of professions develop what Selznick labels “natural 
organizational reasoning” (Selznick 1957 p. 122).  Selznick’s view is that 
intentionality and formal organizational structure remain in force, but are not 
central and foremost in the actors’ interpretation of events occurring in the 
organizations.  Christensen (Christensen 1994) professes that this “natural” 
organizational reasoning limits the formal organization’s effectiveness.  
Therefore, in order to understand the hospital organization with its 
embedded professional structure, one needs to interpret events within the 
moral framework of norms, values and attitudes unique to the professions 
(March and Olsen 1989).  Neo-institutionalism which focuses on field 
populations within an organization, emphasizes the contextual dynamics that 
link the organizational fields of professions and exert institutional pressure 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996).  Borum (Borum 1999) transgresses this 
logic of professions when he points out the management problems entailed 
with the hospital’s multiple professions.  Strong professional groups are 
characterized by their embedded norms, integrative forces and complex 
linkages that exist between agents of professions dominating the hospital 
organization.   
2.3 The influx of societal “medicalization” (Illich 1974 p. 39) 
As individuals we are concerned first and foremost with the availability and 
quality of medical treatment and convalescence care, as this influence 
longevity and the quality of our lives.  As residents, each one of us is a 
constituent with a vested interest or stake in the public hospital.  The 
ultimate solution is not, according to Larssen (Larssen and Berge 1993), to 
make available unlimited resources for all to the expressed needs of the 
                                                                                                                   
m/y number for nurses was 36.2 %.  Other occupational groups with work tasks 
related directly to patient treatment and care amounted to 5.928 or 10.1%; while 
“other medical service personnel” stood at 7301, or 12.4% of the total sector m/y, 
with “other personnel” accounted for 17.424 m/y, or 29.6%.  Source: Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå:  Nøkkeltall for somatiske sykehus 1990 – 200 
(http://www.ssb.no/emner/03/02/speshelsesom/main.html) 
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public health sector.  In Larssen’s view, the demand for medical services 
will always increase corresponding to the residents’ expectations at any one 
time as to what services may be available.   Lian (Lian 1996) is supporting 
Larssen’s contention by connecting the issue of stakeholder expectations to 
certain traits within our cultural norms.  According to Lian, our ideological 
foundation, on which the public health system is based, carries significant 
implications as to our national perception of health matters.  Our 
expectations are reflecting society’s responsibility for bringing about 
solutions to our national health care issues.  These societal expectations to 
prioritize health care issues and associated expenditures may be explained by 
what Illich (Illich 1974 p. 39) labels the “medicalization” of society.   Illich 
defines medicalization as a broad and complex societal process leading to 
extensive patient consultations by medical expertise.  The general public’s 
adoption of medical terminology thus results in peoples’ lives increasingly 
becoming defined as relevant for medical intervention.  In scientific 
terminology, Illich views medicalization as a consequence of modern 
society’s promotion of an instrumental rationality.  Citizens are led to 
believe that most ailments occurring in peoples’ lives may be medically 
resolved (Lian 1996).  Such a utilitarian value trait is what Berg (Berg 1987) 
refers to as heterotelic; i.e., their very presence serving to promote 
individuals’ efforts to improve one’s material living standards such as good 
health20.   
 
Perhaps also serving to explain the increased demand for public health 
services that creates and support Illich’s instrumentality proposition, are the 
many recent technological advances in medical research (Lian 1996).  The 
medical profession itself may therefore be said to promote society’s 
medicalization process through the profession’s own dominating role in the 
continuous development of broader and better health services (Hansen 
1979).  As such, the development and growth of public health may be 
interpreted in a socio-cultural framework in which modern medicine evolves 
and aggregates in scope and execution (Måseide and Gjestland 1985).  One 
may therefore say that society’s medicalization processes serve to augment 
stakeholder calls for still better and more accessible medical services. 
                                                 
20 In Berg’s normative reasoning, an individual’s consciousness of the availability of 
relative cost free medical assistance; i.e., the presence of public health, serves in 
itself as a disease preventive measure (“sykdomsforebyggende”) (Berg 1987 p. 153).    
 30
2.4 The presence of “Corporatism” and other proxy 
agents 
The presence of stakeholder groups outside the formal governance system 
but with a recognized mandate to interact with the hospital sector’s resources 
administration are the corporate channel constituents (Hallandvik 1998).  
Corporatism21 implies a constituent or stakeholder interest mandated through 
bona fide organizations and utilizing their formal communication channels to 
safeguard vested stakes.  In the context of the public health sector, 
communication is maintained with governance system representatives where 
their vested interests are promulgated.  Within the public hospitals, 
corporatism is recognized through the presence of employee federations 
representing the interests of the professions.  
 
While not fitting into the bona fide mode of corporate channels tied to the 
public hospitals, chronic ailment and disability groups represent the 
constituent interests of the chronically ill.  Membership is made up of 
individuals with a confirmed medical diagnosis22 for which no complete cure 
is known and or where a person is suffering from a disabling condition.  The 
constituencies of the chronic ailment and disability groups may be dependent 
on permanent medication, rehabilitation and care regimen “to permit the 
fullest participation in all aspects of society”23.  Periodic hospital 
readmission may be necessary.  Thus the diagnosis, ailment and disability 
group members represent a set of stakeholders with specific expectations 
from the public hospital services provider.  In a listing obtained from the 
Internet web page24 of The Norwegian Medical Association (Den norske 
lægeforening), May 06th, 2002,140 chronic ailment/disability groups were 
listed. As many as 62 of these groups make up the constituency of “the 
Norwegian Federation of Organizations of Disabled People” (FFO i.e., 
Fuksjonshemmedes Fellesorganisasjon).  The FFO-memebership represents 
260.000 disabled and/or chronically ill individuals, making it the single 
                                                 
21 Corporatism is commonly described with references made to state governance 
levels.  However, corporative tendencies are also to be found in local governance 
administrations (Fylkeskommuner; By-kommuner) and in institutions such as 
hospitals” (Hernes and Selvik 1981). 
22 Groups are also established for people suffering from ailment symptoms not 
medically confirmed through blood sample testing or radiology (X-ray) evaluations.  
These conditions are labeled “diffuse ailment conditions” (“diffuse lidelser”) and 
require specialist’s evaluation before qualifying for health welfare payments.  
23 Quoted from the mission statement of he Norwegian Federation of Organizations 
of Disabled People (“Funksjonshemmedes Fellesorganisasjon”) http://www.ffo.no; 
02.07.2002. 
24 http://www.legeforeningen.no 
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largest stakeholder group working on behalf of past, present and future 
patients.  Permanent staffs in 19 counties (Fylker) and 50 communes 
(Kommuner) provide for a resourceful organization actively working to 
influence the national public health agenda.  The chief objective of the FFO 
related to the public health sector, calls for the public health sector 
governance to  “Provide for relevant and user-induced medical services”.  As 
a stakeholder group, the FFO recognizes the importance of a national 
profiling of its causes and grievances, as confirmed in its “Working 
Methods”25; confirming that: “the media in all its aspects and visible 
demonstrations can contribute to focusing attention on the problems and 
injustices experienced by the disabled people in Norway”; and where; “the 
ultimate goal of FFO’s coordinating function is to influence policy decisions 
by utilizing the strength of members through unity”26.     
An effective channel for the chronically ill has proved to be the media27.  
The media is said to function in the capacity of a proxy agent representing an 
incumbent’s “stake” opposite the governance systems and sector 
administration of public health institutions.  In a report on media 
effectiveness, Hallandvik (Hallandvik 1998), quotes the average frequency 
of public health issues making headlines in the newspapers, to ten single 
case personal health and medicine-issues a week.  The analysis furthermore 
shows that a major national newspaper in Norway carries on average one 
major medicine related feature pr. week.  Additionally, the analysis shows 
that one editorial review a month is being produced on the matter of 
medicine and personal health (Eide and Hernes 1987).  There is no empirical 
evidence, however, to accurately determine the exact degree of media’s 
influence on the public health sector’s governance.  However, implications 
of media impact may be attached to Hallandvik’s reference to analysis, 
documenting that half of the case questions entered into the formal debates 
in the Norwegian parliamentary chamber (Storting), originated from issues 
having first appeared in the media (Eide and Hernes 1987).   
Traits of media’s ability to influence the public health sector agenda, is 
particularly evident in cases where a patient’s life-threatening situation may 
appear not to have been given requested medical treatment, justified either 
by medical judgment and/or by authorities’ reference to insufficient 
resources28.  Common to all the cited cases is the fact that media coverage 
                                                 
25 Quoted from the “Working Methods” of he Norwegian Federation of 
Organizations of Disabled People (Funksjonshemmedes Fellesorganisasjon) 
http://www.ffo.no; 02.07.2002. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Plural for medium; i.e., “means of mass communication” (Morris 1969). 
28 Reference made to the cases of: “Lasse Liten Saken” 1987 (Førde and Vandvik 
1998); evidence-based denial of treatment of hypoplastic left ventricle heart 
chamber; “Sandberg-saken” 1990 (Karlsen 1993); denied transfer of bone marrow 
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seems to have served to facilitate a reversal of the initial hospital decisions 
(Askildsen and Haug 2001).   
2.5 The value chain of the public hospital   
Stakeholders converging on public hospitals include not only those having a 
stake in its services as an end user, patient or his/her immediate family. 
Included are also those stakeholders maintaining their constituent interests 
tied to what Porter (Porter 1980) labels an organization’s value chain29 along 
which medical services are developed and deployed. Constituent interests 
are nested into every step and process along this value chain, where 
resources are allocated and judgment passed that impact professional 
selection and choice of medical regimen.  The concept of value shop, has 
been developed by Stabell (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998)30 as an extension to 
Porter’s conceptualization of the value chain.  Stabell maintains that 
professional service organizations such as hospitals, fit the value shop 
metaphor “where intensive technologies or skills are applied and directed at 
a unique and delineated class of problems” (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998).  
The significance of the professions employed in the hospital has been 
mentioned.  However, by relating medical services performed in the hospital 
theatre to another of Stabell’s conceptualizations connected to Porter’s value 
chain methaphore, namely the value network, one illustrates perhaps better 
the hospital’s broad and diverse links to its external stakeholders.  This 
interpretation is substantiated by Stabell’s application of Thompson’s 
(Thompson 1967) “mediating technology” tied to value network 
organizations.  Hospiptals’ close liaison with subcontractors of medical 
services, suppliers of technology and strategic alliances provide required 
support for the totality of hospital services.  Relative to these external 
mediating technology suppliers, the public hospital represents an important 
clinical arena within which equipment, drugs and medication are evaluated 
                                                                                                                   
due to lack of budgeted resources; “Matheson-saken” 1996 (Borud 1996); evidence-
based denial of core cell, “high dosage” cancer treatment. All are nationally profiled 
confrontations between hospitals and patients, the latter supported by 
diagnosis/ailment groups culminating in hospitals reversing their original position, 
thus providing for the requested treatment. 
29 Porter conceptualizes elements of the value chain to represent building blocks in 
the value added process.  
30 Stabell and Fjeldstad’s “Value network” links professional medical services to 
their “Value Shop” conception in which one relies on “intensive technology” 
(Thompson, 1967) to solve a client problem.  The value creation logic of Stabell and 
Fjeldstad rests on the presumption of “value information asymmetry” between 
doctor and patient, and as such does not look at the institutional processes of the 
hospital creating the network of stakeholder connections.   
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and employed.  External constituents within a hospital value network arena, 
therefore have a strategic interest in the hospital related both to research and 
to business development.   
 
The concept of value change management implies the totality of decision-
making processes related to determining the direction of an organization 
(Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece 1994). Rumelt refers to this as the 
organization’s strategic responsibility.  The presence of constituent interests 
within a value network arena generates a dynamic and evolving operational 
arena within which the hospital navigates and balances its mandate, 
objectives and strategies in day-to-day operations.  In the context of a public 
hospital, the totality of the value chain management influences the choice of 
products and level of services offered and the strategic positioning within a 
quasi-market environment of public health (Fottler, Blair, and Whitehead 
1989).  The success of the hospital’s value chain operations is thus 
determined by its ability to integrate such choices within the operational 
sphere of its value network.   
2.6 Organizational decision-making in hospitals 
The public hospital is the continuous meeting place and interaction point 
between all stakeholder groups recognizing a vested interest in hospital 
activities. The interests of management, professional fields and other 
participants along the service value chain, are directed towards the decision-
making agenda, its processes and priorities. This distribution of public health 
services therefore carries with it traditional traits of power in its broadest 
sense.  An ability to gain influence and impact the outcome of an 
organization’s decision-making is recognized by Morgan (Morgan 1988) as 
a common source of power.  Within organization theory, the conceptual 
definition of power is oftentimes drawn from the American political science 
author Robert A. Dahl (Dahl 1958), who purports that a stakeholder’s power 
is the ability to make another party perform contrary to his original 
objectives. In his dissemination of the concept of power, Morgan 
distinguishes between the premises, the processes, the topics and goals of 
decision-making. These matters Morgan recognizes as important to 
comprehend the presence and degree of power exercised in what he labels 
“pluralistic organizations” (Morgan 1988 p. 205).  Pluralistic frames of 
reference emphasize the presence of differing vested interest parties, conflict 
situations and sources of power that all have an impact on organizational 
decision-making (Morgan 1988).  While Morgan contends that the concept 
of power is paramount in understanding exchange processes between people 
or parties, Østerud (Østerud 1999) has a more differentiated perception of 
such a uniform application.  The concept of power in scientific research has, 
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according to Østerud (Østerud 1999), proven insufficient as a singular 
construct variable in studies of political governance.  According to Østerud’s 
1999 preliminary paper on the “Analysis of Power and Democracy (“Makt- 
og demokratiutredningen”) (Østerud 1999), the concept of power may be 
analyzed either in terms of actor-agent intentions; structurally through the 
organizational context of actor agents; hermeneutically through the 
interpretations of actor agent intentions or post-structurally through a 
discursive structure exhibiting all social relations.  Freeman’s (Freeman 
1984) stakeholder concept may be said to incorporate Østerud’s delineated 
approach in his search for an empirical foundation supporting an 
instrumentality objective.  Stakeholder theory explains and predicts how an 
organization functions with respect to the relationships and influences 
existing in its environment (Rowley 1997).  Decision-outcome results from 
selection and retention operating on internal variation associated with 
decision-making initiatives (Burgelman 1991).  Variations in such initiatives 
come about, in part, as a result of individuals seeking to express their special 
skills and promote their special interests.  According to Burgelman, the 
selection, or decision-making outcome, works through administrative, 
cultural and cognitive mechanisms regulating the allocation of attention and 
resources to the different areas of initiative.  In this latter perspective, an 
organization may be viewed as an ecology of organizational initiatives 
which emerge in patterned ways, and compete for limited organizational 
resources so as to increase their relative importance within the organization 
(Burgelman 1991).       
 
In a national health system, the decision-making processes are according to 
Hallandvik (Hallandvik 1998) of a dualistic nature.  On one hand, the 
processes may be viewed in a professional sense in which the objective is to 
clarify goals, describe allocation needs and identify resource priorities.  On 
the other hand, as modern organization research shows, goals and objectives 
are ultimately arrived at as a result of compromises made between various 
interest groups with competing vested stakes (Flaa et al. 1985).  Issue 
conflicts between such vested interest groups become increasingly visible as 
issue consequences become apparent to the parties concerned (Hallandvik 
1998). Mintzberg (Mintzberg 1994) in his analysis of organizational 
decision-making, points to the stakeholder process dynamism describing 
decision-making as accomplished through formal and informal bargaining 
among participants.  Over time, the objectives of the organization evolve and 
change as coalition membership is altered, as the interaction among 
members change, and as the goals are fulfilled or not fulfilled (Mintzberg 
1994).   
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The presence of issue conflicts and arbitrations is common in any operation, 
whether public or private.  According to Freidson (Freidson 1970), every 
organization, no matter what the nature of its character and no matter how it 
is governed and by whom, must assign differential priorities in its allocation 
of resources.  In a bureaucracy such as a hospital, decision-making authority 
may perhaps reflect the dualistic state of affairs.  On one side, the managerial 
official expects to be obeyed by subordinates by virtue of their formal 
positions, not necessarily due to their personal qualities or even their 
competence.  On the other side, however, health professionals may insist on 
being autonomous and self-directing, subject only to the constraint of 
knowledge and skills related to their task (Freidson 1970).  The empirical 
issue is to investigate the operational reality of the hospital’s decision-
making as representative of either a Weberian (Weber 1947) rational 
bureaucracy or to find evidence of authoritative processes that deviate from 
the representations of the legal-rational organization.  Since Weber’s (Weber 
1947) emphasis on the rationality of the bureaucratic organization, numerous 
attempts have been made to bridge the gap between classical economic 
assumptions and philosophical ethics (Shankman 1999).  According to 
Shankman, “no single approach, argument or model has yet been set forth to 
effectively integrate competing perspectives of classical economic theory 
with the wider movement of sociology and politics to reassert the struggle 
between constituent agendas” (Shankman 1999).  Etzioni (Etzioni 1971) 
deviates from the issues of conflict in an organization’s decision-making, 
pointing to the significance of a mutual dependency between stakeholders 
calling for a participant compliance necessitated by the organization’s 
specificity, size, complexity and effectiveness.  The thesis focus on 
organizational decision-making will thus need to identify levels of decision-
making authority and to determine presence of compliance or conflict in 
bridging the various constituent concerns.  
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3 The public hospital  
3.1 A historical review of the hospital organization 
3.1.1 Introduction 
  According to Erichsen (Erichsen 1996); “Having an understanding of the 
purpose and functioning of the hospital relative to place and time, may 
permit a better understand of the working mechanisms of its governance” 
The famous historian, J. Buckhardt (Carr 1961) refers to such a perspective 
as the dual function of history as a subject and a source of inquiry.  
According to Buckhardt;  “The past is intelligible to us only in the light of 
the present; and we can fully understand the present only in the light of the 
past” (Carr 1961).  Also Foucault supports the need for historical reviews in 
order to better understand the development of our public sector.  Foucault 
calls for the need to consider under what ethical conditions it became 
possible for different governing authorities to consider it legitimate, feasible 
and even necessary to have conducted its interventions (Miller and Rose 
1993).  In Miller’s analysis, Foucault is credited with arguing that a certain 
mentality, which he terms “Governmentality” has become the common 
ground of all modern forms of political thought and action.  According to 
Miller (Miller and Rose 1993), Foucault’s conception of “Governmentality” 
addresses political power in terms of “political rationalities” and 
“technologies of government” evident in regulatory mechanisms that link 
conduct of individuals and organizations to political objectives.  Thus, 
governance as a conditional force influences public hospitals.  It operates 
within a kind of political a priori fashion that is evident in its policy-making, 
supervision and administration.   
 
To this end, this chapter will present a historical review of our medical 
hospital system as an outcome of our nation’s “Governmentalism”.  It 
evolves into the operational context of our public hospitals within which 
stakeholder groups act and interact to influence organizational decision-
making.  
 
3.1.2 From pre modern- to late modern hospitals 
Turner (Turner 1987) dates hospitals as care taking institutions as far back as 
to the year 400.  These early hospitals, or hospitale31, were originally set up 
by various religious orders for traveling pilgrims.   Later, during the Middle 
                                                 
31 A Latin word connoting the meaning of guesthouse (Morris 1969). 
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Ages32, there were also hospitals caring for leprosy patients and indigents.  
These pre-modern hospitals, as Erichsen (Erichsen 1996) labels them, had a 
minute role in what we today may consider health care, as treatment was 
limited to providing food and shelter but in a relatively clean environment.  
With the emergence of Modernism33 in Europe around the 16th Century, the 
societal role of hospitals increased in prominence as religious orders and an 
aspiring middle class made up of bureaucrats and business traders, 
challenged the old ruling class by displaying an interest in a broader role of 
hospitals.  The early patients were still poor people, and doctors were only 
infrequently associated with these early hospitals as their only therapeutic 
role was limited to simple care measures (Erichsen 1996).  The clergy rather 
then the medical people were the administrators of these pre-modern 
hospitals. 
 
According to Erichsen (Erichsen 1996) the inception of Norwegian modern 
institutionalized medical care dates back to the establishing of our national 
constitution in 1814.  Erichsen’s contention is that this historical event 
represented the actual beginning of Modernism in Norway following the 
paths of early 16th and 17th Century European enlightenment, trade growth, 
industrialization and significant scientific breakthroughs.  This emergence of 
Modernism generated a societal shift towards political and cultural 
independence, paving the way for university-based medicine with hospitals 
becoming the educational centers for the teaching of medicine34.  According 
to Løchen (Lian 1996), the science of medicine was considered one of the 
cornerstones of a modern society, symbolizing the importance and 
attractiveness of Modernism.  With the emergence of the 19th Century and 
                                                 
32 “The period in European history between Antiquity and the Renaissance, often 
dated from A.D. 476, when Romulus Augustulus, the last emperor of the Western 
Roman Empire, was deposed, to A.D. 1453, when Constantinople was conquered by 
the Turks (Morris 1969). 
33 The use of the term Modernism generates much uncertainty as to its actual 
meanings, not the leased caused by differing interpretations within various academic 
fields (Fürst and Nilsen 1998). In this thesis modernism connotes institutional 
conditions within a society as opposed to the expressions of culture or esthetical 
values within the society. There is also a bridging of the two fields of application as 
modernism connotes the populace’ awareness and significance of individual 
freedom, rationality and scientific progress (Østerberg 1999).  Confirmed by studies 
of Italian and Swiss locations, modernism in Europe is said to have ranged from as 
early as the late 14th Century, later generally accepted to have generally emerged in 
Central Europe between the 16th  and  17th Century. 
34 The period of the Early Modern Hospitals still entails what Berg (Berg 1987) 
labels pre-scientific medicine.  Modern medicine or scientifically based medicine 
emerges following WW II (1945) with the early advances in diagnostic medicine 
applying biochemical and biophysical processes. 
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the period of the early modern hospital in Norway (Erichsen 1996), 
university based medical teaching and training was strengthened.  Erichsen 
traces the characteristics of the early modern hospitals up until the early 20th 
century.  Throughout this period, Norway followed the path of the larger 
European countries, systematically mapping diseases and symptoms and 
recording the paths and patterns of illness and diseases35.   As new and 
improved diagnostic tools and techniques were developed, hospitals became 
the arena for developing and endorsing still better clinical skills.  This 
development served to strengthen the medical profession’ position in the 
hospital.  The rising domination of the medical profession manifested itself 
in an initial principal disparity between hospital administrators and the 
medical staffs.  From having patients drawn to the early teaching hospitals 
mostly from the society’s elites and occasionally from the welfare 
administrations’ assigned indigents, pressure now came from the medical 
profession to select more of the interesting cases (Erichsen 1996).   With the 
later introduction of national mandatory insurance schemes in the late 20th 
Century 36, the class-based system that had previously been evident in the 
admission and treatment of hospital patients became gradually abandoned, as 
did the medical profession’s ability to influence patient admissions by mere 
reference to scientific merit.   
 
The period of the modern hospital (Erichsen 1996) lasted from 1945 and up 
until the early 1980’s, and was marked by a strong institutionalization of 
medical services.  Public hospitals had gradually developed into large 
institutions with complex organizations that required rigid administrative 
structures and procedures37.  Calls for an increased number of hospital beds, 
                                                 
35 This type of medically rooted mapping and evaluation is today referred to as the 
science of epidemiology (Latin: epidemia; “(illness) prevalent among 
people”(Morris 1969)).   
36 A State-based medical and hospitalisation insurance scheme was first introduced 
in 1911 (A precursory program to “Folketrygden” made universal in 1956).  
Autonomous County based medical insurance programs (Sykekassen; later labelled 
Trygdekassen) represented localized schemes distinguishing between regionalized 
conditions.  
37 Foucault (1914 – 1986) ties the development of modern societal institutions to the 
governing states’ call for efficiency and control.  In an analysis of Foucault’s 
writings, Dingstad (Fürst and Nilsen 1998) connects a Panoptic logic (From Jeremy 
Bentham’s  (1748 – 1834) design of a new type prison called Panopticon) to the 
emerging modern hospitals seeking to contain the spreading of contagious diseases, 
the confinement of indigents, and the mentally ill.  The “Panoptic logic” manifested 
itself in the institutions’ architectural design stressing the interest in close 
governance systems, supporting a Weberian bureaucratic administrative control 
pattern (Fürst and Nilsen 1998).   
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laboratories, outpatient treatment areas, examination and treatment facilities 
contributed to further expansion of the physical structures.  It was also a 
generally accepted theorem at the time that larger scale hospital units were 
the most cost effective structural solutions to institutionalized medical 
treatment (Hansen 2001).38 The simultaneous transition of medical 
knowledge from the previous pre-scientific level of medicine to a scientific 
based level,39 (Berg 1987) opened up for medicine to become a precision-
based applied science.  Consequently, an increasing relative share of medical 
doctors became tied to the hospitals as the increase in the number of medical 
specialty fields and corresponding sub-specialties were recognized and 
departmentalized within the hospitals.  In the latter part of era of the modern 
hospital, hospital medical doctors emerged as the elite within the medical 
profession.  The national health financing, now channeled through the public 
hospital system, further served to strengthen the public hospitals’ already 
unique position for medical practice, research and teaching.   
With the emergence of the modern hospital came the growth of nursing as a 
profession increasingly recognized in its own right.  As the hospitals catered 
to a diversified and growing elite of the medical profession, there was a 
corresponding growth in the need for qualified nurses.  This latter claim is 
supported by the findings of Erichsen (Erichsen 1996).  She draws a parallel 
between the Norwegian and British National Health Service (NSH), siting 
Stacy’s (Stacy 1988) contention that the modernization of medicine and 
hospitals was  contingent upon the growth in the number of nurses and in the 
enhancement of the profession of nursing. 
 
While the modern hospitals grew in scope and scientific significance, 
hospitals came to represent an important factor in the operationalization of 
what Halvorsen labels (Halvorsen 1996) societal engineering.  According to 
Halvorsen, “social engineering” signifies the relationship between expertise 
of certain professions and the societal governance.  Hirdman (Hirdman 
1989) depicts societal governance as the relationship between populace 
education, science and politics during the early pioneering stages of 
establishing the Scandinavian welfare model. The inception of a bona fide 
societal engineering philosophy is credited Alva and Gunnar Myrdal’s work 
in which they express a need for having politicians and expert professions 
                                                 
38 Quoting Aletras’ survey from 1997 (Aletras 1997), Hansen (Hansen 2001) implies 
that such benefits of scale seem no longer to apply in hospitals with more than 200 
beds, and generally records a negative cost efficiency to scale in hospitals with more 
than 600 beds. 
39 Berg (Berg 1987) defines the pre-scientific period of medicine to be represented 
by “a low level of decomposition of the patients and his environment as opposed to 
the modern medicine applying a sub-cellular level of medicine in which somatic 
processes could be specified bio-chemically and bio-physically” (Berg 1987 p. 78). 
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unite, developing social political reforms to secure the welfare and 
continuity of society (Myrdal and Myrdal 1936)40.  Halvorsen (Halvorsen 
1996) exemplifies the relevance of  Myrdals’ theorem at the time, by making 
reference to the period’s increased political initiatives to govern housing, 
health, education and family planning.  Here, the knowledge and schools of 
thought of architects, medical doctors, teachers and psychologists were 
incorporated in the political planning process and the development of 
subsequent control schemes.  The Scandinavian governance model inspired 
by trains of thought from social engineering follow the traits of European 
Modernism.  According to Dingstad (Fürst and Nilsen 1998), the people in a 
modern society, with its transformative behavioral tendencies, need to be 
supervised closely.  The conformance must be encouraged and promoted, 
non-conformance confined, freedom structured and creativity channeled and 
standardized41.  In Norway, social engineering influenced the governance of 
public health through its focus on hygiene and associated disease-preventing 
public health measures.  Within the science of medicine, the new focus was 
seeking not only to diagnose illness in the patient but also to identify disease 
within the social soma; i.e., the society.  The difference between illness and 
health, previously understood in terms of medical diagnosis and scientific 
categorization, now became integrated and judged in political terms as to 
what constituted good and evil, right or wrong for the society.  The modern 
hospital became an important building block in what Dworking (Munson 
1979) refers to as social paternalism.  Social engineering engaged the 
capacity of the medical profession and major hospitals to develop standards 
and norms for public health and its governance.  While social engineering 
represented a new political trait in the 1930’s, its influence on public health 
policy and hence, its impact on hospital governance, is evident well past 
WW II and into the present period of the late-modern hospital.   
 
The hospital institution as we know it today in Norway is referred to as the 
period of the late modern hospital (Erichsen 1996).   These hospitals were 
essentially shaped through the 1960’s when increased medical specialization 
caused hospital capacity growth fuelled by a centralization of health services 
production (Hallandvik 1998).  A strong impetus in this development was 
the national government’s promotion of new hospital construction in its 
policy of securing its geographically disbursed national population pattern 
                                                 
40 See particularly chapter no. 7: “”Sosialpolitikken og folkets kvalitet”, p.p. 258-
337. 
41 Reference is here made to Dingstad’s  Panoptic logic drawn on Foucault’s 
“Discipline and Punish” (Foucault 1977).  Foucault’s interest in hospital architecture 
came out of his study of  how “the medical gaze was institutionalised, how it was 
effectively inscribed in social space, how the new form of the hospital was at once 
the effect and the support of a new type of gaze” (Foucault 1980). 
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(distriktspolitikk).  In this societal perspective of the modern welfare state, 
the public hospital is the foremost arena where ideology and national policy 
convene and manifest itself into practice.  To perform the expected services 
of a medical hospital within the national ramification as prescribed, today’s 
late modern hospitals have been developed along a functional and a 
geographical dimension (Hansen 2001).  The functional dimension addresses 
the hierarchical structure and differences in specialization and differentiation 
between hospitals, whereas the geographical dimension addresses questions 
of geographical distances and accessibility (Hansen 2001).  It was not until 
1970, however, when the first national law on hospitals (LOV av 19. juni 
1969 nr. 57. Om sykehus (Sykehusloven) 1969)42 was implemented, that the 
national coordination of hospitals along this structure was made possible.  
This new law confirmed the principal responsibility for hospital 
development to be placed with the County administrations 
(Fylkeskommunene).  As late as at the beginning of the 20th Century, most 
hospitals were owned and managed by city communities (By-kommuner).  
Additionally, there were a small number of hospitals run by independent 
humanitarian and religious organizations (Hansen 2001).  This early 
differentiated and fragmented structure complicated any effort to develop a 
coherent national medical hospital services system.  With the legislated 
expansion of county governance and a broadening of their geographical 
scope, the counties assumed ownership and supervisory control of all public 
hospitals.  A government provision43 introduced in 1975 (St.meld. nr. 9 
(1975): Sykehusutbygging i et regionalisert helsevesen) subdivided the 
public hospital functional distribution system into five regions within which 
medical services specialization became distributed between the respective 
county hospitals.  Any effective governance of county hospitals, however, 
did not take place until1976, when all the respective county administrations 
become independent political entities (Hansen 2001).    
                                                 
42 The Ministry of Health- and Social administration (Sosial- og helsedepartementet) 
is vested the executive rights of supervising laws governing public health 
administration.  This executory responsibility is mandated through the Law on 
Public Governance (Forvaltningsloven 1970) safeguarding the individual’s right of 
expedient administration and due process.  
43 A government provision is here defined as a Government proposal submitted to 
the legislature containing either a proposed constitutional amendment; i.e., 
“Odelstingproposisjon” (Ot.prop. no.), or another proposed non-constitutional 
governance prescription submitted the parliamentary open/plenum session 
(“Stortinget”) ; i.e., “Stortingsmelding” (St.meld. no.); “provision” = “preparatory 
measure” (Morris 1969).   
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3.2 The governance model 
Providing health services in Norway is a legally established responsibility 
with its executive power vested within the Government’s political 
administrative system.  All public health related services are therefore 
organized, financed and administered by the State through its public 
agencies set up for that purpose.  While the State retained the over all 
governing responsibility established through laws, regulations and control 
mechanisms, the majority of its operational management was delegated to 
the administrative units of the counties (Fylkeskommuner) and cities (By-
kommuner) as supervised by the corresponding political governance 
structure 44 (Larssen and Berge 1993).  The Department of Social- and 
Health Services (Sosial- og helsedepartementet SHD) represented the State’s 
executive arm in the governance of the public health system and its 
mandated functions.  The mandate of the SHD entails conducting several 
auditing programs such as county disease prevention programs, hospital 
efficiency and effectiveness schemes and continuously assessing new 
measures and methods to improve institutional public health services.  The 
State did also, prior to January 1, 2002, through the SHD, retain a direct 
management role of twelve (12) specialized medical clinics, amongst them 
Det norske radiumhospital (an oncology clinic) and Rikshospitalet (one of 
the country’s five regional hospitals and incorporating Oslo University’s 
medical school).  Through the National department of health and its office of 
the National Board of Health (Statens helsetilsyn) and its County doctor 
general (Fylkeslegen), all county and city commune hospitals and their 
certified medical officers are audited with respect to state board 
certifications, performance records, facilities’ standards and clinical 
procedures.  As this thesis research project addresses issues within the public 
hospital sector during 2001, the public hospital law and its governance 
structure in force at that particular time, shall apply45.   
The inception of a new law on public hospital ownership became effective 
January 1, 2002 (LOV av 15. juni 2001 nr. 93 (Helseforetaksloven) 2001).  
The reform measure transferred public hospital ownership from County and 
                                                 
44 Reference is here made to governing statutes as outlined in Government 
provision: No. 9 1974/75 (St.meld. nr. 9 (1975): Sykehusutbygging i et regionalisert 
helsevesen). 
45 Reference is here made to the new health law proposals put into law January 1, 
2001: (1) Ot prp Nr 10  (1998-99) “Om lov om spesialisthelsetjenesten m.m.” (law 
governing the somatic health services); (2) Ot prp Nr 11 (1998-99) “Om lov om 
etablering og gjennomføring av psykisk helsevern (Psykiatriloven)”; (3) Ot prp nr. 
Nr 12 1998-99) ”Lov om pasientrettigheter (Pasientrettighetsloven)”; (4) Ot prp Nr 
13 (1998-99) ”Om lov om helsepersonell m.v. (Helsepersonelloven)”. 
 44
City Communes to a system of State based hospital governance46.  The thesis 
empirical/descriptive data may thus provide for a later comparative analysis 
of possible consequences generated by the structural reform.  It may here be 
important to heed the words of Christensen (Christensen 1994), who 
questions the impact and effectiveness of institutionalized change processes 
due to low integrative abilities of public organizations.  March and Olsen 
(March and Olsen 1989) contend that all organizational change processes 
take place through slow integrative processes due to strongly embedded 
institutionalized norms and values.  As documented herein, the development 
of the public hospital system has engaged interactive public and political 
processes through nearly 150 years.  The ideas for a nationally governed 
regionalized public hospital system, were first proposed as early as in 1934, 
when professor Johan Holst made his academic inauguration speech as a 
professor at the University of Oslo (Holst 1935).  Holst’s ideas seem to have 
strongly influenced the ensuing political legislation on hospital governance.  
According to Hansen (Hansen 2001), the core of the ideas introduced by 
Holst, was not principally different from the structural scheme implemented 
in 1970 (LOV av 19. juni 1969 nr. 57. Om sykehus (Sykehusloven) 1969) 
and the later provision about a regionalized hospital structure (St.meld. nr. 9 
(1975): Sykehusutbygging i et regionalisert helsevesen).  The reference to 
Holst’s promotion of the regionalized distribution of institutionalized 
medical services may serve to demonstrate the diffusion of a new 
governance logic (Hansen 2001).  Applying Kuhn’s (Kuhn 1962) metaphor 
of scientific paradigms, one may say that it took between 30 to 35 years to 
operationalize the paradigm of a regionalized public hospital structure 
(Erichsen 1996).      
3.3 Organizing for medical services 
3.3.1 Hospital services functions 
It is generally accepted that public hospitals are to serve three main 
functions, namely: (1) performing diagnostic and medical treatment 
services, (2) educating medical staff and (3) conducting medical research 
and development (NOU 1997:2: Pasienten først! Ledelse og organisering i 
sykehus)47.  Outside the specific mentioning of patient diagnostic treatment 
                                                 
46 The new structural reform establishes health regions and hospitals within them 
into special public health corporations as outlined in: Ot prp nr 66 (1998-99) “Om 
lov om helseforetak m.m. (“Helseforetaksloven”)”.  
47 An “NOU” is the abbreviated form of  “Norwegian public assessment”; i.e., a 
report requested by the Government (Regjeringen) and later handed over to the 
executive branch of the Government (Departementene) for an assessment.  The 
executive Government may later submit its recommended course of action on the 
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(§ 7) and the education of health staff (§8), the original law on hospitals 
(1969) is not specific on public hospitals’ research and development duties.  
The law does, however, provide for prescriptions on specific additional 
functions to be assigned  (§9a.).  Sector prescriptions following over the next 
thirty years all make mention of the need for hospitals to be involved in 
medical research and development programs48.  These prescriptions do not 
distinguish between type of hospital, location or scope of operations49.  
However, it is generally understood that research and development and the 
education of medical specialists and other medical support staff are vested 
particularly in hospitals with university clinic activities50.  The inclusion of 
medical research in all public hospitals is finally confirmed in the new law 
on public hospitals effective January 1, 2002 (LOV av 2. juli 1999 nr. 61: 
Om spesialisthelsetjenesten (Spesialisthelsetjenesteloven)). 
The regionalized public hospital system as introduced in 1975 (St.meld. nr. 9 
(1975): Sykehusutbygging i et regionalisert helsevesen) distinguished 
between four hospital categories determined by their functional scope; i.e., 
each hospital being responsible for either (1) national functions 
(landsfunksjoner); and/or (2) regional functions (regionsfunksjoner); and/or 
(3) county- or central hospital functions (sentralsykehusfunksjoner); and/or 
(4) community – or local hospital functions (lokalsykehusfunksjoner).  As a 
general rule, the national, regional and central medical services are vested in 
the largest hospitals, such as the regional hospitals and the county hospitals, 
whereas the community hospitals perform general medical services 
(lokalsykehusfunksjoner).  One will see that the local hospitals are the most 
numerous whereas the regional and central hospitals treat the greatest 
number of patients 51. 
                                                                                                                   
particular issue matter as either a “Stortingsmelding” or an “Odeltingsproposisjon” 
(See footnote no. 35, page 45).  
48 Particular reference is here made to St.meld. nr. 41 (1987-88) “Helsepolitikk mot 
år 2000. Nasjonal helseplan”, chapter 9, “Styrking av forskning”, p.p. 88-90; 
St.meld. nr. 50 1993-94 ”Samarbeid og styring.  Mål og virkemiddel for en bedre 
helsetjeneste”, chapter 4.3 ”Forskning og utviklingsarbeid (FoU) i et styrings- og 
prioriteringsperspektiv”, p.p.69-70. 
49 NOU 1997: 2 “Pasienten først! Ledelse og organisering i sykehus” specifically 
states that research and development (R&D) are the responsibilities of all classes of 
public hospitals (section 5.5.3 “Forskning og utvikling”, p 32.).  However, only 
hospitals with university and regional functions, as well as some county hospitals 
are provided the special funds to support their R&D activities. 
50 This is evident also in the interpretation provided in NOU 1997:2, “Section 5.5 
“Sykehusenes oppgaver i Norge”, p.p. 31-32. 
51 Pls. view NOU 1997:2, Chapter 5, “Sykehusenes funksjoner, organisering og 
ledelse”, p. 29.  Numbers listed here are reported by SINTEF/UNIMED, 1995. 
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3.3.2 Professions employed 
Even though the hospitals may vary in size in specialist functions offered 
and in the number of wards52, hospitals are organized quite similar around 
their functional operations (NOU 1997:2: Pasienten først! Ledelse og 
organisering i sykehus) 53.  According to the latter NOU, public hospitals are 
commonly organized around the functions of (1) medical services; (2) hotel 
services and technical functions and (3) the administrative, economic and 
other functional support units.  The following table shows the personnel 
categories commonly found in a public hospital and reflects the large 
number of professions and vocations represented in the organization. 
 
Table No. 1: Personnel employed in a public hospital54 
Medical functions Service and technical 
functions 
Administrative functions 
• Medical doctors 
• Nurses 
• Nurses aids 
• Child care staff 
• Midwives 
• Dieticians 
• Physiotherapists 
• Psychologists 
• Social workers 
• Ergo-therapists 
• Social workers 
• Pharmacists 
• Bioengineers 
• Radiographers 
• Ambulance 
personnel 
• Kitchen 
personnel 
• Dietician 
economists 
• Ward Facilities’ 
staff 
• Laundry staff 
• Cleaning 
personnel 
• Engineers 
• Technicians 
• Maintenance 
staff 
• Transportation 
staff 
• Warehouse staff 
• Security staff 
• Managers 
• Accountants 
• Personnel staff 
• Purchasing staff 
• Organizational 
staff 
• Auditors 
• Office staff 
• EDP-and IT-staff 
• Switchboard staff 
• Messengers 
• Priests 
• Education office 
personnel 
• Librarians 
3.3.3 The medical services 
The medical services provided by the hospital constitute the hospital’s core 
activities.  These services are conducted within the clinical wards, intensive 
care units and the medical services departments.  A clinical ward commonly 
includes bed units, outpatient units (normally day care treatments; i.e., not 
requiring over-night stays) and medical examination rooms.  The purpose of 
the clinical ward is to conduct specialized medical services that correspond 
                                                 
52 The ward is ”A division in a hospital for the care of a particular group of patients” 
(Morris 1969). 
53 See specifically section 5.6 “Sykehusenes interne organisering”, p. 33. 
54 (NOU 1997:2: Pasienten først! Ledelse og organisering i sykehus p. 33). 
 47
with its specialist medical field or sub-specialties contained within the 
medical services framework of the ward.   
The clinical wards produce the services as prescribed by the hospital law; 
i.e., to examine, treat and care for patients.  Within a particular ward there 
are staffs representing a number of different professions and vocations from 
both health professions and administrative support functions.  The intensive 
care units are wards providing medical care for the critically ill patients.  The 
medical services departments are specialized units supporting the clinical 
wards in the examination and/or treatment of patients.   Medical services 
departments may include a radiology (x-ray) unit, a clinical-chemical unit 
(laboratory services), a microbiological unit, a pathology unit, a physio-
medical unit, a pharmacy unit, reception and specialized surgery units. 
3.3.4 The hotel- and technical functions 
As the hospital caters to patients or clients with various durations of stay and 
medical diagnosis, the hotel- and technical functions (HTF) are organized to 
provide the clinical wards with equipment, facilities and related services.  
The continuing development of improved medical technology and 
administrative technology solutions call for personnel qualified to employ 
and service costly and complex equipment.  The HTF-services also include 
building maintenance, security services, postal and courier services, kitchen 
and cafeteria services and the linen and laundry services.   
3.3.5 Hospital management and the administrative functions 
As hospitals have developed into large and complex institutions employing a 
large number of employees representing a range of medical services and 
professions, the relative share of administrative staff has increased (NOU 
1997:2: Pasienten først! Ledelse og organisering i sykehus)55.  The 
administrative departments today include personnel with professional 
expertise on salary administration, personnel management, accounting, 
purchasing, and information services.   
Until the mid 1970’s, the Norwegian public hospitals were managed through 
a shared management model (“todelt ledelse”).  Here the chief medical 
officer supervised the hospital’s core medical functions while an 
administrative manager was in charge of administrative matters.  Since that 
time, most hospitals employ one managing director (enpersonsledelse), 
selected for his/her administrative and managerial qualifications.  Within the 
clinical wards one has largely retained a consensus management model 
(konsensusmodellen) where the medical doctor and the chief nurse have been 
accountable for their respective professional service functions and speaking 
                                                 
55 See specifically section 5.6.3, “Administrative, økonomiske og andre funksjoner”, 
p. 37. 
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with a unified voice within the ward and in reporting to top management 
(Hallandvik 1998).    
The question of managerial staffing has been an issue highlighted between 
the various health professions arguing in favor of their members’ unique 
qualifications vested in their particular professions.  Based on recurring and 
serious staffing conflicts, particularly within the regional hospitals56, the 
SHD published a white paper on the organization and management in public 
hospitals recommending the implementation of unitary line management 
(enhetsledelse) at all supervisory levels within the hospital (NOU 1997:2: 
Pasienten først! Ledelse og organisering i sykehus).  Candidate selection 
should not be based on mere health professional group association 
(profesjonsnøytralitet). 
As laws and regulations have opened up for the posting of non-medically 
trained management candidates within the hospital, a new medical advisor 
function has been established.  Within the hospital management regime prior 
to 2002, the chief medical director (sjeflegen) and the chief nurse 
(sjefsykepleier) were placed within the administrative staff reporting directly 
to the managing director.  The role of the chief medical director is to advice 
the managing director on medical matters, as the role of the chief nurse is to 
advice on professional nursing matters (NOU 1997:2: Pasienten først! 
Ledelse og organisering i sykehus).  The future role of these latter two staff 
positions was, prior to the introduction of the new hospital law, unclear as to 
both their functional merit and reporting relationships.  
3.4 The emergence of a corporate logic 
As public health care budgets over the past two decades have routinely 
exceeded inflation, cost containment ideologies based on efficiency and 
effectiveness have increasingly gained prominence.  This development is 
parallel to that which has taken place in all industrialized societies where this 
new logic has become the driving force in changes introduced in health care 
management (Takagi 1999).  Within the public health sector in general, and 
in the hospital sector in particular, efforts have been made to align itself 
more with the wider societal ideology of the effectiveness of market forces 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996).  Many of these ideas are based on new 
models drawing on deregulation and privatization (Bentsen et al. 1999).  
Hunter (Hunter 1994) cites the following distinctive features or doctrines of 
                                                 
56 Particularly the ward management staffing project at Tromsø Regional Hospsital 
in 1989 and the reorganization project of Rikshospitalet in 1996 (Hallandvik 1998). 
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New Public Management (NPM)57, as “the model of management to which 
government have become wedded” (Hoggett 1991):  (1) explicit standards 
and measures of performance; (2) greater emphasis on outputs and results; 
(3) de-segregation of public bureaucracies into agencies operating on a user-
pay basis: (4) greater competition through use of quasi-markets and 
contracting; (5) subscription to private sector styles of management 
practices; (6) emphasis on performance incentive for managers; (7) 
discipline in resource use and cost improvements; (8) recognizing the user of 
public services as a client or customer.  According to Hunter, managers are 
seen as the agents of central government and derive their legitimacy from the 
requirements on them to do the Government’s bidding aided by various 
instruments at their disposal.   
Proponents of NPM hold public administration to be inefficient, overly 
bureaucratic and poorly managed.  While NPM is not recognized as either a 
theory or a model, it is generally considered a strategy incorporating a 
number of different mechanisms rooted in theoretical economic rationality 
and cost inducement methods (Pettersen and Stenland 1999).   
 
As a consequence of this ideological transformation process, partially set in 
motion by the governance system as well as by managerial actions, the 
political dimension of the hospital organization is changing character as well 
(Borum and Bentsen 1998).  In Norway, the political measures to supervise 
hospital capacity growth and capital spending have been a national concern.  
The law on hospital governance introduced in 1970 (LOV av 19. juni 1969 
nr. 57. Om sykehus (Sykehusloven) 1969), was both a measure to secure the 
planning of hospital capacity coverage as well as to supervise operational 
spending.  Initially, the law provided for strong incentives for operations 
growth separated from the planning side of the law calling for over-all 
longer term public health considerations (Hansen 2001).  However, 
lawmakers soon came to realize the need for stricter measures to curb capital 
expansion and to contain cost expenditures. Throughout the 1970’s 
Norwegian hospitals were refunded operational expenditures based on a rate 
per patient-day spent in the hospital (Pettersen 2000).  In 1980, a revised 
funding system was implemented.  The objective was here to curb spending 
through a demographically linked lump-sum budget allocation 
(rammefinansiering) combined with an activity based refund scheme 
(kurpenger). In an effort to improve patient treatment output, the 
Government introduced in 1997 an incentive based cost refund measure.  
Here one combined hospital financing (Innsatsstyrt finansiering; ISF) using 
                                                 
57 Sognstrup (Sognstrup 1999) professes that the term: “New Public Management” 
(NPM) is a commonly applied nomenclature of this new wave of measures for 
improved governance.   
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a patient diagnosis refund scheme (Diagnoserelaterte grupper; DRG) along 
with a lump sum budget allocation58.   
Other, more market-based NPM-measures have been introduced.  A trial-
based regulation introduced in January 2001, opened up for patients to 
choose the institution for a particular medical treatment or intervention.  
Recent structural measures see the merging of county hospitals and the 
subdivision and incorporation of county hospitals.  Through this reform, 
hospitals are placed outside the direct political-administrative control of the 
county (Hagen, Iversen, and Magnussen 2001).   
 
In a major governance revision effective January 1, 2002, the ownership and 
governance of all public hospitals were transferred from city and county 
governance (By- og fylkeskommuner) to the State level (Staten).  This latest 
reform has been partly justified by an argued political uncertainty 
concerning the ultimate financial responsibility of the public hospital sector 
(Hagen, Iversen, and Magnussen 2001).  Frequent cost deficits have 
periodically rendered counties unable to guarantee continued financing, 
thereby creating calls for State funding guarantees.  Also adding an 
uncertainty to the counties’ governance capabilities has been a presumed 
lack of interest in guaranteeing an effective resource allocation across 
counties and across public hospital regions (Hagen, Iversen, and Magnussen 
2001).  Furthermore, the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in force prior to 
the State taking over hospital ownership, has invited county strategies 
undermining the intent of the public hospital system through either (1) 
patient “skimming”, i.e., electing patients based on best possible 
reimbursement options; (2) “skimping”, i.e., downgrading treatment options 
or (3) “dumping”, i.e., defer or reject patient treatment to avoid unfavorable 
cost/refund rates (Hagen, Iversen, and Magnussen 2001).        
 
Today’s debate on public hospitals is lesser a discourse on the fundamental 
views of national health policies, as it is arguments on how public hospitals 
may become more cost effective.  Hildebrand (Hildebrandt and Schultz 
1997) here argues the significance of hospital management.  According to 
Hildebrand “To-days limited resources, changes in patient demographic 
makeup, shift in medical technology, advances in medical knowledge and 
the development of new skills along with higher patient expectations, 
dramatize the need for reviewing the conceptual foundations of hospital 
management” (Hildebrandt and Schultz 1997).  While few have questioned 
                                                 
58 A detailed account of the development of the DRG system is presented in 
Government white paper NOU 2003:1 “Behovsbasert finansiering av 
spesialisthelsetjenesten”; see chapter 9: “Finansiering av pasientbehandling i 
helseforetakene”, p.p. 88-113.  
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the need for competent management, however, the debates have reflected 
differing views as to how management should be interpreted in the context 
of the public hospital and hence how one should improve its governance 
structure and leadership role.   
3.5 Prioritizing health resources 
The objective of Norwegian health policy is detailed in “Nasjonal 
helseplan” (St.meld. nr. 41 (1987-88): Helsepolitikk mot år 2000), 
representing the Government’s provisions for the national public health 
program and its governance.  The document outlines the national goals for 
improving the public health services.  If one was to define health as the 
individual’s ability to sustain and fight disease, then it is evident that all 
available health services may only marginally serve to enhance the health of 
the population (Larssen and Berge 1993).  However, only a small portion of 
our resources is applied towards supporting peoples’ own ability to prevent 
disease and to develop resistance towards contracting illness and developing 
disabling conditions.   The major share of the nation’s resources is allocated 
to general health maintenance and the development of curable measures for 
already diagnosed illness and its continued treatment and care (Larssen and 
Berge 1993).   
Within the law on hospitals (LOV av 19. juni 1969 nr. 57. Om sykehus 
(Sykehusloven) 1969) and the law supervising its governance 
(Forvaltningsloven 1970), the public hospitals constitute an important 
building block to secure the realization of the objectives of the national 
public health plan.  Hospital services performed influence people’s living 
conditions and have significant socio-economic implications.  However, the 
health policies governing the allocation of resources develop within an arena 
made up of competing vested interest.  The outcome is determined by the 
constituents’ relative power (Hallandvik 1998).  The thesis does not address 
the democratic processes leading up to legislation and regulations governing 
public health and hence, supervising hospital management.  Rather, the 
thesis objective is to identify and to analyze how stakeholder groups 
influence the respective hospital’s organizational decision-making relevant 
to its vested interests.   
 
The focus of decision-making in public hospitals centers on the allocation of 
resources channeled through the organizational decision-making processes.  
According to Larssen, the issue is not how much is spent, but how resources 
are being allocated (Larssen and Berge 1993).  The nature and background 
of health resource allocations are seldom distinctively segmented along the 
bureaucratic axis of public hospital governance. The political issue of 
prioritizing public health resources in Norway has centered on what medical 
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services to perform and which patients or patient groups to be prioritized 
(Hallandvik 1998).  Wildavsky (Wildavsky 1977) argues that health 
institutions counts only for 10% of the population’s well being, while 90% is 
determined by other factors.  Another issue health resources prioritizing is 
represented by the funds allocations made between the various health 
services sectors.  Hallandvik’s (Hallandvik 1998) proposes that such 
decisions may actually be influenced by the general popularity of a 
particular diagnosed ailment.  Such popularity is largely determined by the 
professional merits a particular disease may be attracting (Album 1991).  
Hallandvik (Hallandvik 1998) professes that there is a correlation between 
the prestige associated with a particular disease and the priority of resources 
allocated by the health sector administration.  Still a third health resources 
priority level is engaging special patient characteristics.  A common 
governing policy is to weigh the patient’s demographic profile and to 
calculate the likelihood of successful rehabilitation and re-entry into the 
working ranks of society.  Finally, the issue of prioritizing health resources 
is also addressed at a fourth level, when health personnel considers patient 
regimen based purely on the medical merits of recovery (Tranøy 1992).  
However, according to Hallandvik (Hallandvik 1998), even the medical 
officer’s professional judgment at the hospital level may be influenced by 
any one of the above mentioned priority concerns, acting singularly or in 
union as priority judgment conditioners.   
 
Scott (Scott 1992) views organizations as rational-, natural- or open systems.  
The rational organization is governed by a goal orientation in which all 
resources are allocated to support prioritized objectives.  In a natural systems 
organization goals may be contradictory and/or vague with a little reliance 
on formalized systems.  Here operations may be sustained by strong 
organizational cultures with a firm desire to succeed and survive.  However, 
it is Scott’s contention that within both the formal and natural systems, the 
organization may become a closed system where all participating actors are 
easily identifiable. The need for modern organizations to consider 
themselves part of an open and a dynamic system, calls for continuous 
negotiation processes with its stakeholders. Clients, employees, sub-
contractors and other constituents must agree on terms and conditions.  
Scott’s open system definition of organizations is “a system of 
interdependent activities linking shifting coalitions of participants who are 
dependent on continuing exchanges with the environments in which they 
operate” (Scott 1992 p. 28). 
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4 Literature review 
4.1 The emergence and direction of stakeholder theory  
Modern stakeholder theory owes its intellectual development to Freeman’s 
seminal work:  “Strategic management: A stakeholder Approach” (1984). 
(Shankman 1999).   According to Freeman, the word stakeholder was used 
for the first time in 1963 in an internal memorandum at the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI); when the much quoted SRI definition of 
stakeholders was reported to be: “those groups without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist”. (Donaldson and Preston 1995).   
However, as early as 1950, Robert E. Woods, at that time Chief Executive 
Officer of Sears & Robuck Co., in Chicago, listed “four parties to any 
business in order of their importance”: “customers, employees, community, 
and stockholders” (Hummels 1998). Wood maintained that if the appropriate 
needs and interests of the first three groups were looked after effectively, the 
company’s stockholders would benefit in the long run.  Freeman did not 
originally appear to portray the stakeholder concept from a broader 
philosophical or ethical basis. He has later pointed out that the term 
“stakeholder” actually was meant to generalize the notion of stockholder as 
the only group to whom management needed to be responsive (Freeman 
1984).  Freeman was of the opinion that the modern organization is affected 
by a large set of forces.  At minimum, these forces comprise stockholders, 
customers, employees, suppliers, and management, which summarily are 
referred to as the primary stakeholders.  Characteristic for these groups of 
stakeholders is that they are vital to the survival and success of the 
organization.  He enlarged, however, the list of stakeholders with other 
possible secondary stakeholders, such as the local community, the media, 
the courts, the government, special interest groups, the general public, and 
society (Hummels 1998).  From this observation, Freeman (Freeman 1984) 
derives his contention from the belief that “the responsibility of management 
is to take into account the different views and interests of any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s purpose” (Hummels 1998). Freeman stated that systematic 
managerial attention to stakeholder interests is critical to firm success, a 
claim, however, not yet tested in the literature (Berman et al. 1999).  
According to Berman (Berman et al. 1999), Donaldson and Preston 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995) have best framed much of the recent dialogue 
on stakeholder theory.  Donaldson’s and Preston’s taxonomy of stakeholder 
theory, where they distinguish between normative, instrumental, and 
descriptive/empirical theories, has required other authors to become more 
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precise in their terminology and more coherent in their thinking about 
stakeholder theory (Berman et al. 1999). 
4.2 A taxonomy of stakeholder theory 
According to Donaldson, one of the central problems in the evolution of 
stakeholder theory has been confusion about its nature and scope (Donaldson 
and Preston 1995).  Brenner and Cochran (Brenner and Cochran 1991) 
offered a stakeholder theory of the firm for two purposes; namely: (1) to 
describe how organizations operate and (2) to help predict organizations’ 
behavior.  In Donaldson’s broader perspective, he contends that stakeholder 
theory differs from other theories of the firm in fundamental ways.  Different 
theories have different purposes and therefore different validity and different 
implications.  For example, according to Cyert and March (Cyert and March 
1963), the neoclassical theory of the firm attempts to explain the economic 
principles governing production, investment, and pricing decisions of 
established firms operating in competitive markets.  Aoki’s cooperative 
game theory of the firm (Aoki 1984) attempts to explain internal governance, 
particularly the balance between owners’ and workers’ interests.  In contrast, 
Williamsons’s (Williamson 1987) transaction cost theory of the firm 
attempts to explain why firms exist; i.e., why economic activities are 
coordinated through formal organizations rather than simply through market 
contacts (Donaldson and Preston 1995).    
According to Donaldson, stakeholder theory differs from these and other 
theories of the firm in fundamental ways.  It views the organization as an 
entity through which numerous and diverse participants accomplish multiple, 
and not yet always entirely congruent purposes.  Donaldson’s typology of 
stakeholder theory as being either descriptive/empirical, instrumental or 
normative in nature, is an important contribution towards clarifying the dual 
purposes intended both to explain and to guide the structure and operation of 
the established organization. 
4.2.1 Normative stakeholder theory 
The normative basis for stakeholder theory involves its connection with 
more fundamental philosophical concepts.  Here, the theory is used to 
interpret the function of the corporation, including the identification of moral 
or philosophical guidelines for the corporation and the management of it.  
According to Donaldson, the correspondence between theory and the 
observed facts of corporate life is not a significant issue, nor is the 
association between stakeholder management and conventional performance 
measure a critical test.  Instead, the normative theory attempts to interpret 
the function of, and offer guidelines for the organization on the basis of 
some underlying moral or philosophical principles. 
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4.2.2 Descriptive/empirical stakeholder theory  
This particular vein of stakeholder theory is used to describe, and sometimes 
to explain, specific organizational characteristics and behavior; i.e., the 
nature of the firm, the way managers think about the firm, how board 
members think about the interests of corporate constituencies, and how some 
corporations actually manage.  The descriptive aspect of stakeholder theory 
reflects and explains past, present and future states of affairs of organizations 
and their stakeholders.   
4.2.3 Instrumental stakeholder theory 
This version of stakeholder theory, in conjunction with descriptive/empirical 
data, where available, is used to identify connections between stakeholder 
management and the achievement of corporate objectives.  Many 
instrumental studies of corporate social responsibility make explicit or 
implicit references to stakeholder perspectives.  Instrumental uses of 
stakeholder theory make a connection between stakeholder approaches and 
commonly desired objectives such as profitability.   
4.3 Connecting the organizational paradigms  
Employing stakeholder theory in seeking an understanding and an 
explanation of managerial behavior in the public service organization, 
requires an awareness of the evolution of organization theory paradigms.  
Three of the most prominent of these paradigms are particularly relevant.  In 
the rational-economic paradigm the organization members are viewed as 
utility-maximizing individuals.  The assumption of the social man paradigm 
is that people are motivated primarily by their social needs, and that people 
need to find satisfaction and build their identities in their work place through 
their relationships (Cludts 1999).  Argyris (Argyris 1964), McGregor 
(McGregor 1960) and Likert (Likert 1961) all support a paradigm that man 
by nature needs to realize himself and to use his skills in a mature and 
productive way; i.e., assuming the need for personal growth and self-
actualization (Cludts 1999).  
As these static assumptions of the past are being questioned, individuals and 
organizations are now viewed as complex, dynamic networks, and are 
assumed to live in a state of permanent ambiguity (Cludts 1999).  According 
to Grielens, “Individuals are conceived of as polyphonic, speaking different 
voices according to the varying contexts and narratives of which they are a 
part” (Grielens and Berg 1983).    
These leadership and organizational paradigms suggest that hospital 
managers may need to pay more attention to sense-making through learning 
and designing relational patterns rather than only focusing on planning, 
organizing and controlling (McDaniel 1997).  Because the world is 
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unpredictable, meaning cannot be gained through efforts of rational 
behavior.  Rather, meaning must come through the making of sense.  “The 
goal of organizations, viewed as sense-making systems is to create and 
identify events that recur and to stabilize the environment and make it more 
predictable.” (McDaniel 1997).  
Within the hospital sector, the sense-making process has been one of 
rationalizing and making predictions about the future based on various 
internal models of the world (McDaniel 1997).  The models of relationships 
among health care professionals may serve to determine which professional 
groups are involved in which decision situations.  Legitimizing myths or 
institutional logic is embedded in the institutional environment.  According 
to Takagi (Takagi 1999), institutional environments give support and 
legitimacy to an organization when it conforms to rules and other 
requirements determined by environmental elements.  Stakeholder 
participants make up such an environment.  
Within systems theory attempts are made to model the sense-making 
complexity on an organizational level.  Here the corporation is said to be a 
social system, in which people individually and collectively play the major 
roles.  Behavior of individuals, subsystems and total organizations are 
interrelated, and each part in the set can affect the behavior or properties of 
the whole (Cludts 1999).  When conceptualized exclusively as a social 
system, the business’s functioning is no longer assessed by the growth of its 
input or profits, but by the capacity to adapt and maintain itself through the 
development of the capabilities of its parts (Cludts 1999).  This latter 
theorem ties in with post-modern ethics theory (Yuthas and Dillard 1999).  
According to Yuthas, the post-modern perspective is of particular relevance 
to the normative stakeholder theory of business ethics, as the proponents 
reject the perspective which privileges reason and rationality over values, 
emotion and desire.  A modern perspective relies on the capacity to reflect, 
represent, or model the world without presuppositions.  Postmodernists 
reject the belief that the world can be objectively represented or measured 
and suggest that interpretations of facts are not objective.  Such 
interpretations are guided by the beliefs and attitudes of the social systems in 
which they are embedded.  Postmodernists also reject the notion that the 
universal theories can be developed and applied on the basis of reason but 
are seen to be contextualized by their historical and cultural natures.  
Therefore the skeptical postmodernists tend to view the world as chaotic and 
uncertain.   
Another group of postmodernists, the affirmative group, agrees that 
modernity has reached a point where it can no longer equate economic and 
technological progress with social and moral progress (Yuthas and Dillard 
1999).  Yuthas proposes a postmodern stakeholder theory of enabling as one 
way to make the risks and moral concerns associated with business more 
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visible.  From the affirmative postmodern perspective, being able to 
understand the interests and concerns of others, being in a face to face 
interaction with others, and being able to experience others as part of  “us” 
allows us to empathize with those “Others” (Yuthas and Dillard 1999).   
4.4 Extending stakeholder theory; a discussion 
4.4.1 Intrinsic value of stakeholders 
The effort to strengthen the theoretical foundation of the stakeholder theory 
of the firm has lead to a taxonomy of multiplicity perhaps negating its 
original drive for precision and contextualization.  It is therefore important to 
view modern stakeholder theory from the theoretical view mentioned by 
Donaldson and Preston (Donaldson and Preston 1995).  In their view, all of 
the three major aspects of stakeholder theory, the deterministic/empirical, 
instrumental and normative/ethical ones are nested within each other.  The 
external shell of the theory is its descriptive aspect; the theory presents and 
explains relationships that one observes in the external world.  The theory’s 
descriptive accuracy is supported by its instrumental and predictive value.  
However, the central core of the theory is the normative dimension 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995).  The descriptive validity of such a theory 
presumes the truth of the core normative conception, insofar as it presumes 
that managers and other agents act as if all stakeholder interests have 
intrinsic value.  A recognition of these ultimate moral values and obligations 
give stakeholder management its fundamental normative base. 
Donaldson’s view of justifying the integration of descriptive, instrumental 
and normative aspects of stakeholder theory of the firm is also supported by 
Goodpaster who sees stakeholder theory expressed in a firm’s operational 
context (Goodpaster and Holloran 1994).  Goodpaster talks of three levels in 
the stakeholder theory: (1) The strategic level, in which he advocates “taking 
into account the non-owner stakeholders’ interests as a means of achieving 
the company’s economic goals but without any moral content. (2) The 
multiple-trustee approach which, on a moral level, attributes a fiduciary 
responsibility to the company’s managers towards all of the stakeholders 
alike, whether they be owners or non-owners. (3) The “new synthesis” 
which distinguishes between certain fiduciary responsibilities towards 
owners and other restricted, non-fiduciary responsibilities towards other 
stakeholders. 
Goodpaster’s normative justification is taken from the background of the 
theory of the common good (Aragandona 1998).  It is possibly within this 
aspect of the common good theory that one may see a possibility for 
extending stakeholder theory to encompass the complexities of the public 
hospital.  According to Argandona, the concept of the common good extends 
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beyond the ramifications of the firm. Aragandona contends that if the 
common good comes from human sociability, all the company’s 
relationships will carry an element of common good.  Subsequently, one has 
to extend the list of stakeholders to include customers (patients), suppliers, 
banks, unions, the local community, the public authorities at different levels, 
interest groups, real and potential competitors, and so on, until it 
encompasses all men of all times (Aragandona 1998).  The important thing is 
to consider what kind of social relations the company and its internal 
members maintain with the various internal and external stakeholders, in 
order to identify the common good of the society (Aragandona 1998).   
A stakeholder theory of the firm as approached from the basis of the theory 
of the common good is in agreement with Donaldson’s view that all 
stakeholders have an intrinsic value to managers, and Goodpaster’s “new 
synthesis” of fiduciary and non-fiduciary stakeholder responsibilities of 
managers giving stakeholder management its fundamental normative base.  
Argandona, supporting this latter view, states that:  “The theory of the 
common good offers a sufficiently solid basis for the theory of stakeholders, 
and also the means for determining, in each specific case, the rights and 
duties of the participants, in accordance with the common good of the 
company, of the particular society it has with its stakeholders, and of society 
as a whole” (Aragandona 1998). 
In summary, one may state that a stakeholder theory encompassing the 
common good perspective becomes even more affirmative when heeding 
Cludts’ social system theorem (Cludts 1999) and Yuthas’ (Yuthas and 
Dillard 1999) affirmative post-modern perspective of a stakeholder theory of 
enabling.   
4.4.2 Watching out for paradigm anomaly 
In seeking to develop a typology of public hospital stakeholders and to 
determine the nature of stakeholders’ influence on organizational decision-
making, it is important to remain attentive to the very nature of prevailing 
paradigms.  Heeding the warnings of Kuhn, it is particularly important for all 
researchers to be cognizant of the context of discovery and the content of 
justification (Kuhn 1962).  This literature review suggests that the prevailing 
stakeholder paradigms are nested closely to organization theory models.  The 
emphasis is on justifying a balance between normative/philosophical 
stakeholder theorems supporting on the one hand, the intrinsic values of all 
stakeholders with the organization’s members’ need for sense making 
through established logic and legitimizing myths, while on the other hand 
trying to appease the uncertainty created by the changing and the temporary.  
This situation may appear somewhat paradoxical and may call for research 
follow-up to examine the largely normative principles governing present 
paradigms. 
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Particularly, in the present context of public hospitals, it is also important to 
address Borum’s contention of the emergence of a new hospital archetype 
(Borum 1999).  As current stakeholder theorems lack any precise and far 
reaching implications which take into account ongoing organizational 
transformations, such as those recorded in the hospital field, the situation 
could in the words of Kuhn, be an indicator of anomaly in existing 
paradigms (Kuhn 1962).    
4.5 Cognition and organizational decision making  
4.5.1 Relevance of judgmental logic 
Looking at organizational decision-making in hospitals from a stakeholder 
perspective presupposes an analytical approach going beyond the theories of 
rational, anticipatory, calculated and consequential action.  This is in part 
implied by Mintzberg, when he describes that the hospital as a professional 
type organization, is “distinguished by the fact that the determination of the 
basic mission, the specific services to be offered, and to whom, in good part 
is left to the judgment of professionals as individuals” (Mintzberg 1989 p. 
184).  However, other writers have traditionally associated professional 
organizations with a collegial model, where decisions are made by a 
community of individuals and groups, all of whom may have different roles 
and specialties, but who share goals and objectives (Mintzberg 1989 p. 186).  
Both sides of the argument as to how management is practiced in a 
professional organization need to consider cognitive implications.  
In Guillen’s (Guillen 1994) analysis of organizational paradigms, it is 
claimed that varying structural and institutional conditions governed by 
industry and ownership have historically produced different models of 
organizational management.  Guillen’s main contention is that models of 
organizational management do not necessarily follow from their scientific 
credibility and are not solely determined by economic and technological 
factors. Rather, managers perceived as practitioners of management may 
express their ideas by acting, by implementing policies, and by applying 
knowledge to practical situations.  One may also find, in the words of 
Guillen, a few management intellectuals or true believers in a prevailing 
dominant managerial and organizational ideology.  Guillen is professing that 
“most practicing managers will subscribe to an ideology as a matter of 
course in order to promote their own interests and facilitate cognition” 
(Guillen 1994, p. 5)  .   
In the view of Austin (Austin 1997), cognitive theory supports the 
contention that managers apply greater contextual awareness in assessing 
decision making situations where established mental models or schemas are 
unable to fit a situation into any of their existing schemas (Austin 1997).  
 60
Therefore in analyzing issues identified by stakeholders as critical to the 
hospital organization, it is important to determine the significance of the 
judgmental logic behind constituent perceptions. 
4.5.2 Epistemology of cognitive science 
Over the last decade cognitive researcher has sought to develop a viable 
alternative to the rational explanations of firm performance, which 
traditionally has dominated instrumental stakeholder theory and stakeholder 
management (Stimpert 1999).  According to Eden (Eden and Spender 1998 
p. 47), our cognitive processes mediate significantly between what we take 
to be the facts and our behavior.  “Since the facts alone do not determine our 
perceptions, the cognitive problem is to find out what else influences their 
shape” (Eden and Spender 1998).  Organization theorists seeking to find out 
how organizations work and reflect management’s intentions, do so by 
clarifying the implications of cognition.  The objective is to find 
“conceptually related representations of objects, situations, events and of 
sequences of events and actions explaining managerial action” (Eden and 
Spender 1998 p. 47).   
The theoretical background of cognitive science in organizational theory 
dates back to Kenneth Craik (Posner 1989).  In his book, “The Nature of 
Explanation” (Craik 1943), he argued that human beings translate external 
events into internal mental models and reason by manipulating their 
symbolic representations.  Most cognitive scientists following Craik have 
adopted the basic tenet that the mind is a symbolic system.  According to 
Johnson-Laird (Posner 1989), explanations of visual perception, the 
comprehension of discourse, reasoning, and their representation of 
knowledge and expertise, have invoked versions of the mental-model 
hypothesis.  Johnson-Laird here defined a model as any physical or chemical 
system, which has a similar relational structure to that of the process it 
imitates.  Hence, for Craik, a mental model was a dynamic representation or 
simulation of the world. 
The epistemological basis for today’s cognitive science evolved, according 
to Posner and Kaplan (Posner 1989), around various exclusive theories.  In a 
psychometric sense, cognitive science is the study of intelligence and 
intelligent systems, with particular reference to intelligent behavior such as 
computation.  Neurophysiology brought knowledge of the biological 
structures that supported thought. Experimental psychology brought in 
information about speed and limitations of simple sensory, perceptual, motor 
and memory processes. Gestalt psychology brought hypothesis about 
processes that occur in complex thinking.  The shift came with the so-called 
information processing period of the 50’s and the 60’s which viewed 
thinking as a symbol-manipulating process and used computer simulation as 
a way to build theories of thinking (Posner 1989). In economics and 
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statistics, one saw, during the same period, the rapid development of formal 
theories professing the right reason in the form of the theories of utility 
maximization and of Bayesian inference (Posner 1989).  Posner regards 
these theories of rationality from logic, economics, and statistics as forming 
an important part of the normative theory of intelligence and hence of 
cognitive science. 
4.5.3 Cognitive mapping and decision-making 
Different approaches to decision making are by Kleindorfer (Kitchin and 
Freundschuh 2000) labeled normative, prescriptive, and descriptive. The 
normative theories exemplified by economic choice theory aim at 
determining optimal decisions.  The goal of prescriptive theories is to advise 
decision makers about how to make optimal decisions given that they 
possess a limited cognitive capacity to do so.  Descriptive theories have 
centered on human decision-makers as adaptive systems with limited 
capacity to adapt.  Because of this limited capacity, adaptation is achieved 
by approximation, or heuristic methods. Gärling and Colledge (Kitchin and 
Freundschuh 2000) make a distinction between structural and process 
models of decision-making.  The structural models focus on how observed 
choices or preference judgments are related to the attributes of the different 
choice alternatives, characteristics of the decision maker, and possibly 
situational factors.  In contrast, process models attempt to specify the 
different cognitive and affective processes regulating the choice. 
The thesis project has a research question that makes it particularly relevant 
to concentrate on the process of decision-making measured in terms of the 
stakeholders’ rationales.  A crude representation of this process includes the 
stages of generating the decision alternatives by (a) retrieving information 
about the environment (b) evaluating the decision alternatives and (c) 
implementing the decision (Kitchin and Freundschuh 2000).  Gärling and 
Golledge labeled this the hierarchy or stages of spatial decision-making. 
In its original conception, cognitive mapping concerns how we think about 
space, and how those thoughts are used to be reflected in human spatial 
behavior (Downs and Stea 1973). Cognitive mapping research seeks to 
comprehend how one comes to understand spatial relations gained through 
primary experience and secondary media such as maps.  In other words, how 
people learn, process and use spatial information that relates to the 
environment which surrounds them (Kitchin and Freundschuh 2000).  The 
term cognitive mapping has been used in three different ways.  First as a 
descriptive title for the field of study that investigates how people learn, 
remember and process spatial information about an environment.  Second, it 
has been used as a descriptive phrase for the process of thinking about 
spatial relations. Third, it has been used as a descriptive name for a 
methodological approach to understanding cognition in general, consisting 
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of the construction of “maps” of cognitive processes (Swan and Newell 
1994).  Toleman (Toleman 1948) who was the originator of the term 
cognitive maps hypothesized that we construct a map-like representation 
within the “black box” of the nervous system, which is then used to guide 
our everyday movements.  In this instance, the representation is structured in 
the same way as a cartographic map (Kitchin and Freundschuh 2000).  The 
implication, then, is that the cognitive map acquires geometric properties 
with repeated experience.  Toleman applied this conceptual view of 
cognitive mapping as an analogical device where spatial knowledge was 
assumed to be like a cartographic map and as a metaphorical device to label 
spatial knowledge as functionally equivalent to a map.  We act as if we have 
a map-like representation in our minds, although it is acknowledged that 
here a map is a hypothetical construct (Moore and Golledge 1976; 
Newcombe 1985; Eerbaum 1985).   Finally, in some cases the term cognitive 
map has been used as a descriptive term for a conceptual drawing of an 
individual’s cognitive processes. 
In trying to trace the cognitive reasoning of organizational decision-making 
of key stakeholder groups in a cross-sectional research as the one outlined in 
this thesis proposal, the question becomes one of using comparative causal 
or cognitive mapping.  According to Lukkanen (Lukkanen 1994), causal 
mapping studies have no direct objective access to the neuro-physiological 
representations of the subjects’ knowledge or thinking, irrespective of 
whether one terms them cognitive or mental maps, rule systems, ideology or 
knowledge systems.  Therefore  “the medium of natural language must serve 
as a proxy and provide the raw data of the unseen target phenomena” (Eden 
and Spender 1998). 
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5   Research question 
There is presently a widespread academic recognition of the complexities of 
organizational behavior.  In parallel, one may say that there also is a great 
deal of frustration within the public sector as regards the operationalization 
of public health policies. Cost overruns, system inefficiencies and resource 
deficiencies call for a continuous re-examination of sector governance.  The 
commitment to general health maintenance and curable measures always 
needs to be balanced against limited resources.  As such, the struggle to 
match scarce funds with organizational objectives and expectations 
represents the epitome of stakeholder management.  The organizational “fit” 
sought to recognize constituent expectations (Ogden and Watson 1999), 
presupposes a comprehension of the significance of stakeholder presence.  
The present paradigm of philosophical/ethical views within the field of 
stakeholder theory provides little descriptive insight into the importance of 
stakeholder representation.  Certainly, a universal theory of the public 
service organization in lieu of the classical “A Behavioural Theory of The 
Firm” (Cyert and March 1992),  would have been useful when seeking to 
comprehend organizational decision-making in public institutions.  Thus, 
where health services are developed and distributed within a framework of 
public governance, the sensitivity to stakeholder influence needs to be 
evaluated.   
 
The thesis is seeking an understanding of how stakeholder groups are being 
recognized in the public hospitals’ decision-making.  The underlaying 
premises of this latter issue concern stakeholder influence.  The governance 
of public hospitals is exercising its mandate governing hospital operations.  
By virtue of its position and vested authority, decisions are being made that 
discriminate between issue matters relevant to hospital functions.  However, 
governance actions are also conditioned by the presence of a diversity of 
constituent interests.  Such interests range from the positions of governance 
representatives themselves to the interests of constituent group interests 
external to the hospital.  Within public health institutions influence is sought 
through issue promotion or by investing in measures opposing the 
implementation of decisions (Guldbrandsen et al. 2002).   
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In order to gain an understanding of stakeholder group influence, the 
following research question has been formulated: 
 
“How do stakeholder groups influence organizational  
decision-making in public hospitals?”59 
 
In approaching the rich and complex empirical field of public hospitals, the 
thesis draws its research contention from Burrell (Burrell and Morgan 1979) 
who suggests that all approaches to social sciences are based on interrelated 
sets of assumptions regarding ontology, human nature, and epistemology.  In 
delineating a research approach along the axis polar points of the 
subjectivistic and objectivistic approaches, Morgan’s (Morgan and Smircich 
1980) core ontological assumption, considers “reality as a contextual field of 
information”; human nature to be representative of “man as an information 
processor” and the basic epistemological stance to signify the need “to map 
context” (Morgan and Smircich 1980).  Morgan’s position emphasizes the 
importance of understanding the empirical context in a holistic fashion.  
Emphasis is placed upon participant actors or actor groups, their vested 
nature and integrative processes.   
 
As the research question addresses the problem of explaining how 
stakeholder groups influence decision-making, the descriptive analysis 
applies the prescriptive logic of hermeneutics.  Hermeneutics addresses the 
issue of what understanding is and how one should go about attaining it60.  
The natural sciences hypothesize that causal processes govern construct 
interaction. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, considers constructs as 
meaningful inputs into a process that ultimately leads to an explanation 
about people and groups existing within a special context.  The principle of 
hermeneutics considers the empirical field’s actors and constructs as 
meaningful input. Actor agent language, symbol systems and other 
contextual characteristics are viable proponents within the hospital field.  
Hermeneutics, presupposes a contextual understanding.  Thus, in order to 
answer the research question, the thesis will identify key stakeholder groups 
with vested interests in hospital decision-making.  To understand the nature 
and position of these constituents, it becomes necessary to learn the true 
nature of their vested interests as expressed by the groups’ formal objectives 
and records of interaction.  Consequently, in order to fully explain how their 
influence is attained, it becomes necessary to find out the type of power they 
                                                 
59 Decision-making levels relevant for the thesis research are identified in thesis 
section no. 8.3.3 “Decision-making levels”. 
60 Hermeneutic is the science and methodology of interpretation.  (Føllesdal and 
Walløe 2000). 
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represent through their structural and/or relational positions opposite 
organizational decision-making levels.   
 
Thus, from a hermeneutical position, one may surmise that the 
instrumentality of influence, or the how in the research question, is explained 
by the nature and application of stakeholder power in hospital decision-
making. 
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6 The importance of the study 
6.1 A state of mutual dependency 
Stakeholder pressure, sector turbulence and crisis are common denominators 
within the public health arena in all Scandinavian countries as well as within 
the modern industrialized world (Vrangbæk 1999).  This turbulence and 
dynamism in hospital environmental conditions serve to impact the public 
hospital’s legitimacy and archetypical organizational structure (Borum 
1999).  According to Borum, the public hospitals are already undergoing an 
organizational transformation that may bring into being a totally new 
institutional configuration.  Vrangebæk’s contention is that the on-going 
political-ideological debate will produce entirely new governance models 
perhaps as a precursor to this new hospital archetype.  The emergence of 
changing governance is already evident.  Exemplifying this latter contention 
is the fact that the established political/administrative system rationale is 
yielding to market-induced mechanisms to secure an improved maximization 
of public health (Vrangbæk 1999).   
 
All governance actors are presumed to work in order to fulfill their 
respective mandates and to meet constituent expectations.  The research 
community has an interest vested in the nature of their occupation to 
observe, investigate and to promulgate its findings and contentions.  The 
thesis aspires to contribute in these two distinct, but still mutually dependent, 
arenas.   
 
Within the field of public governance, the analysis and findings are 
attributable to the sector of public hospital governance.  Current descriptive 
accounts on the management of stakeholder relationships are attractive to all 
governance actors wishing to improve their performance.  Within the 
community of researchers, development of descriptive/empirical stakeholder 
theory represents a much called for contribution.  Instrumental propositions 
on public sector governance are in minority in an organizational field 
dominated by normative/philosophical/ethical prescriptions.  The nature of 
mutual dependency is apparent in the application of contextual accounts.  
Practitioners request guidance by concepts, models and theories rooted in 
relevant observations and analysis.  The nature of instrumental organization 
research presupposes access to and comprehension of the empirical richness 
of the organizational environment. The nature and scope of stakeholder 
theory is to describe how organizations operate and to help predict the 
organization’s behavior (Brenner and Cochran 1991).   
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6.2 A pathway to a new paradigm on public hospital 
governance 
The governing rationale of the hospital sector in Norway may reflect an inert 
faith in Weberian (Weber 1947) prescriptions for the rational bureaucracy.  
According to Christensen (Christensen 1994) public health authorities in 
Norway have consistently over the past 150 years relied on organizational 
measures at ministerial levels to best ensure a constituent balance.  In his 
analysis, Christensen shares his findings of a governance preoccupation with 
structuralism.  Here, the formal organization is considered a critical part in 
controlling decision-making behavior.  However, Christensen’s (Christensen 
1994) analysis of the public health administration concludes that governance 
through structural measures alone is difficult.  Williamson (Williamson 
1996) in his enrichment of transaction cost economics, professes that the 
study of hierarchical failures is seriously underdeveloped.  Quoting Herbert 
Simon, Williamson subscribes to the former’s promulgation that nothing is 
more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research 
methods than the view of the nature of the human beings, whose behavior 
we are studying.   
 
The recognition of the nuances the organizational field, contradicted with the 
record of reliance on structural governance, may make the hospital sector 
susceptible to what Borum (Borum 1999) refers to as a learning paralysis or 
panic reactions in its reform initiatives.  The recent public health reforms in 
Norway, in which structural measures represent core change properties, have 
generated a national debate on their ideological justification and operational 
relevance.  In a newspaper article published in Aftenposten, 13th July, 2002, 
Kjell Møller Pedersen at the Syd-Danske Universitet, is quoted as calling the 
recent Norwegian structural reform an outcome of political panic and 
lacking any relevant descriptive/empirical reference (Vogt 2002). 
 
The issue of reform measures in the public hospital sector is a classical one 
in terms of its prescriptive intent to fairly allocate scarce public resources.  
Funds distribution and its management are constantly evaluated in terms of 
how stakeholder demands are satisfied.  At the core of any public and 
political debate, is an interest to determine if one practices what one 
preaches.  All public health policies as expressed in the modern laws on 
hospitals and public governance, advocate a normative/ethical approach 
promoting the intrinsic value of all stakeholders.  Given the essential nature 
of the product, one would therefore expect that all governance measures be 
designed to have public hospitals consider all stakeholders in their decision-
making.  However, the institutional governance system presumes otherwise.  
Present-day sector governance rewards resource efficiency and clinical 
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production.  The incentives and sanctions are all designed to operate on the 
assumption that hospitals act opportunistic and in conflict with the sector 
interests.          
The thesis research provides a descriptive/empirical basis of how public 
governance impacts the mechanics of public health value creation.  As such, 
the thesis findings may serve as a pathway to generating an improved 
rationale for future governance interventions.  An empirical reference to 
stakeholder influence may furnish an account of the costs of opportunism in 
terms of how decision-makers depart from altruistic behavior.  Findings 
confirming stakeholder influence will provide a basis for developing 
stakeholder management in line with sector objectives while balancing the 
interests of stakeholder merits.  The thesis findings may thus serve to make 
public policy actors cognizant of the governing mechanics of the hospital 
institution as induced by the many and diverse constituent interests.  As 
such, a set of empirically documented stakeholder theory propositions on the 
instrumentality of organization behavior, may shift the present governance 
discourse.  A subsequent broadened public and political debate may bridge 
the gap between classical institutional assumptions and the importance of the 
theories of decision-making behavior.  The thesis’ intellectual and 
operational contributions are depicted in the following table.  
 
Table No. 2: Importance of the study.  A shift in discourse 
Contributory  
Focus 
Contributory  
Aspect 
Contributory  
Insight 
Contributory  
Outcome 
Contributory 
Consequences 
Governance 
audit 
The mechanics 
of institutional 
governance 
Costs of 
instrumental 
sector 
governance 
Shift in 
discourse on 
hospital sector 
governance 
A new 
paradigm on 
public hospital 
governance 
 
6.3 Entering: A theory of the public service organization 
A lacking descriptive/empirical basis and an abundance of contributions on 
the relevancy of normative/philosophical theorems mark the present state of 
affairs in stakeholder theory. This disparity in research focus curtails any 
theoretically sound instrumental propositions tied to stakeholder 
management.  Although an instrumental justification for stakeholder theory 
originally has been established by Friedman (Freeman 1984), some 
commentators argue that that these are inadequate to serve as a theoretical 
basis (Ogden and Watson 1999).  Donaldson advocates that managers should 
“acknowledge the value of diverse stakeholder interests and should attempt 
to respond to them within a mutually supportive framework, because that is a 
moral requirement for the legitimacy of the management function” 
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(Donaldson and Preston 1995). Recent normative developments in 
stakeholder theory seek to lock the philosophical views into an operational 
context.  Proponents of the latter may be found in the theory of the common 
good (Aragandona 1998) tied to Cludt’s (Cludts 1999) social system 
theorem,  Both argue for a balancing of constituent interests relative to the 
organization’s societal relations based on the nature of its services.  Still, a 
relevant descriptive account on the instrumentality of stakeholder 
management is lacking.   
 
The instrumental perspective of stakeholder theory carries its contextual 
references to a public health framework different from the Norwegian public 
health system.  The socially insured distributive system characteristic of the 
Scandinavian welfare state differs from the corporate and liberal societal 
welfare systems found in other European countries.  Our universal coverage 
of hospital costs is secured through general tax funds, public ownership and 
public sector governance.  This is contrasted with social insurance models 
requiring universal membership and where the financing of hospital costs is 
secured through employer contributions and mandatory hospitalization 
insurance. In the latter model, sector governance diverges between public 
and private solutions, as does the extent of mandatory medical insurance.  
The universal generalizability of stakeholder theory arising out of an 
organizational field vested in the societal characteristics of the “Beveridge 
Model”61 is at best marginal and has yet to be proven in the research 
literature.  It is presumed that theoretical discussions must be rooted in a 
logic corresponding with the public sector model rationale.  Thus the 
revelations of new organizational configurations (Vrangbæk 1999) or a new 
hospital archetype (Borum 1999) may not effectively evolve outside the 
socio-cultural framework in which the sector system is embedded, unless 
governance authorities resort to the “panic actions”, as cautioned by Borum 
(Borum 1999). 
   
A targeted stakeholder typology is intended to measure phenomenon 
characteristics and their interrelationships in the epistemological context of 
the public service organization.  The Norwegian public hospital sector has 
since the early 80’s continuously been seeking workable solutions to 
accruing sector governance problems.  Institutional measures vested largely 
in classical theoretical assumptions on institutional governance, have proven 
inadequate to curb the imbalance of output costs relative to the adequacy of 
patient treatment and care. Politically induced measures to govern the 
management of hospital resources are vested in classical theories on 
contractual relationships. The contemporary forms of such prescriptions 
                                                 
61 Pls. View thesis section 2.2.1 “The dynsmism of the stakeholder fit”. 
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materialize in NPM-type governance initiatives. According to Eisenhart 
(Eisenhart 1989), NPM has as its moral discourse that of classical 
economics: self-interest versus duties, thus prescribing to the contractual 
principles rooted in agency theory.  Agency theory, as part of New 
Institutional Economics, assumes that economic actors are motivated by self-
interest, and will act opportunistically towards each other whenever such 
behavior is possible or profitable (Eisenhart 1989).  The focus of the theory 
is on deciding the organization of a particular relationship, provided the 
characteristics of the relationship and the parties involved (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).   
Sector governance interests in contract-management principles governing 
hospital budgets and patient treatment requisitions are all remanence of 
contractual prescriptions.  The normative condition here is that managers, as 
agents, must act only in such a way as to maximize cost efficient behavior, 
since that is presumed to be the goal of the sector governance, or the 
principal.  Kenneth H. Wathne (Wathne 2001), in his recent doctoral thesis 
at the Norwegian School of Business BI, notes that incentive and monitoring 
systems rewarding prerequisite behavior and/or penalize non-compliance, 
are limited to governance relationship in a dyadic context.  According to 
Wathne (Wathne 2001), agency based contractual relationships do not 
presuppose governance of a larger network context within which such 
dyadic relationship exist.  An important thesis contribution may thus be to 
document how multiple dyadic relationships are being managed between 
decision-makers and multiple stakeholder groups.   
 
The significance of the public hospital sector both in terms of the nature of 
the product as well as the scope of resources involved, calls for an active 
engagement by organizational researchers.  Reform measures nested closely 
to classical institutional theories and lacking the complexities of multiple 
exchange relationships, may point to a paradigm anomaly within the content 
of discovery (Kuhn 1962)62. Lacking deterministic theories rooted in relevant 
descriptive/empirical accounts, call for a paradigm audit within the context 
of justifications (Kuhn 1962)63.  New descriptive/empirical theory on 
stakeholder management represents an important step towards developing 
theoretical propositions on the nature of the public service organization.  The 
thesis contribution towards such an end is depicted in the following table. 
 
                                                 
62 See thesis section 4.4.2 ”Watching out for paradigm anomaly”. 
63 Ibid. 
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Table No. 3: Importance of the study.Theory development 
Contributory  
Focus 
Contributory  
Aspect 
Contributory  
Insight 
Contributory  
Outcome 
Contributory 
Consequences 
Theory 
development 
Stakeholder 
typology 
Descriptive/ 
empirical 
findings on 
stakeholder 
influence on 
organizational 
decision-
making 
Propositions on 
stakeholder 
theory 
Future research 
towards 
developing  “A 
theory of the 
public service 
organization” 
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7 Research strategy 
7.1 Towards operationalizing the theoretical constructs 
While the thesis research process is put together by means of a combination 
of data collection techniques, the research procedure remains vested in a 
comprehensive theoretical framework.  According to Judd (Judd, Smith, and 
Kidder 1990), theoretical constructs represent the starting point for all 
research measurement.  The thesis challenge is to operationalize selected 
constructs to permit measurements as they relate to organizational decision-
making.  The thesis’ theoretical vantage points is in the following model 
depicted as constructs pivoting round the hospital’s organizational decision-
making, here representing the thesis research focal point: 
 
Illustration No. 1: Model of theoretical templates 
Organizational
decision-making
Stakeholder
theory
Cognitive
theory
Organization
theory
Strategy
theory
 
In seeking to explicate the relationship between stakeholder groups and 
organizational decision-making in public hospitals, one has followed the 
recommendations of Smith and Heshusius (Smith and Heshusius 1986) who 
advise that procedural focus be placed on the elaboration of logical issues 
and not on a single research method or technique.  While heeding the 
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cautions made against rigorous methodology, one remains cognizant of the 
fact that the crafting of research procedures should not be done in an 
epistemological vacuum (Piantanida and Garman 1999).  A research 
approach along the lines of Piantanida’s “logic of justification” (Piantanida 
and Garman 1999 p. 105) is here subscribed to in order for the results of the 
empirical inquiry to be generated and supported.   
The following statements as shown in Table 4, emphasize the sequential 
nature of the fieldwork, implicating the need for a differential approach to 
data collection and analysis.  The theoretical vantage point, column (1): 
theoretical template connects with column (2): construct selection to be 
operationalized and validated through statement made in column (3): logic of 
justification.  The degree, to which the theoretical templates serve to answer 
the research question, reflects the selected constructs’ validity.   
 
Table No. 4: Construct selection 
(1) 
Theoretical 
templates 
(2) 
Construct selection  
(3) 
Logic of justification 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Stakeholder presence The research question addresses the 
issue of how constituent interests 
influence organizational decision-
making by virtue of stakeholder 
presence. 
Organization 
theory 
Contextual character Information critical to answering the 
research question will be collected from 
within the selected hospitals 
representative of its institutional or 
contextual character.   
Cognitive theory Stakeholder 
perception 
The empirical data and other field 
information will be interpreted within a 
theoretical framework seeking to 
determine stakeholder cognition. 
Strategy theory Strategizing 
framework 
Stakeholders’ cognition employed in 
organizational decision-making may 
become revealed when applying a 
strategizing framework that exposes 
stakeholder reasoning. 
 
To visualize the above selected theoretical constructs in terms of measurable 
operations, the following “nomological net” (Judd, Smith, and Kidder 1990 
p. 46) has been established.  A nomological net, as advocated by Judd, 
displays the interrelationship of the relevant thesis constructs and represents 
an important vantage point towards establishing the thesis research model of 
operationalized constructs.  A conceptually well related set of constructs 
makes reference to their operational validity (Peter 1981).    
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Illustration No. 2: Nomological net 
Organizational
decision-making
Stakeholder
presence
Stakeholder
perception
Contextual
character
Strategizing
framework
 
As is evident from this latter model, an operationalization of the theoretical 
constructs contained in the nomological net, requires the development of an 
integrated set of research procedures.  The challenge is to establish a 
methodological framework that manifests the informants’ rationale as it 
pertains to hospital issue matters. The relevance of the nomological net is 
evidenced by the constructs’ integrative qualities as is later sought 
incorporated in the thesis’ empirical research model.  
 
7.2 Developing a research model 
7.2.1 Procedural prerequisites  
Before transporting the justifying logic of the nomological net into a final 
research model, the sequence of empirical fieldwork needs to be established.  
In illustration no.3, stakeholder informants are representatives of the thesis’ 
unit of analysis.  Stakeholder informants are to be analyzed both within a 
particular hospital and as units of analysis between hospitals.  To avoid what 
Judd labels an “ecological fallacy” (Judd, Smith, and Kidder 1990 p. 405), 
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the unit of analysis needs to be at the same level as what is to be generalized.  
A brief procedural review safeguards this concern as follows. At the research 
project’s level of analysis, construct variables are applied that identify issue 
matters relevant to stakeholders’ vested interests in the hospital decision-
making environment. The stakeholder informants’ informant  characteristics 
are established to help trace the stakeholders’ perception relevant to issue 
matters.  Finally, to ascertain construct interrelationships, stakeholder group 
cognition is to be analyzed in terms of how these differ as units of analysis, 
within and between case hospitals.   
 
This procedure is visualized in the following illustration: 
 
Illustration No. 3 Procedural steps in field data development 
Unit of 
analysis
Level of
analysis
Informant
characteristics
Interrelation-
ships
Stakeholder
groups
Decision-
making
Contextual
perception
Cognitive 
patterns
 
7.2.2 The logic of spatial decision-making 
The challenge of working with field informants is one of replicating a real 
life contextual setting.  If successful, the ensuing responses may portray a 
perceptual process representative of how constituents may act in decision-
making situations.  Explaining such a process may be accomplished by 
applying what Gärling and Golledge (Kitchin and Freundschuh 2000) refer 
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to as spatial decision-making. Spatial decision-making offers an instrumental 
promise of projecting stakeholder action.  Cognitive maps are considered 
metaphors of cartographic or spatial maps.  In the thesis research model one 
has applied the logic of spatial decision-making.  A successful mapping of 
the informants’ patterned perceptions thus implies how people reason to 
respond to certain decision issue matters.  Individuals are believed to have 
some type of cognitive structure in which information is assimilated and 
organized, operating as interpretative frameworks.  According to Hellgren 
(Hellgren and Melin 1993), organizational research supports a tight 
connection to exist between actors’ mental structures, their interpretations of 
the world, and their actions.  Thus, responses to questions put forward in the 
interviews, may be representative of the informants’ “wayfinding” (Golledge 
1999) pathway logic. The so-called “spatial products” (Liben 1982) 
representative of construct variables are modified by the informant’s 
screening abilities.   
 
The research model that addresses informant field data is developed based 
on the logics of cognitive strategizing.  Here, decision-making situations are 
sought replicated where the informants are exposed to issue matters relevant 
to hospital operations. Cognitive strategizing recognizes actor agents’ 
limited cognitive capacities when faced with complex issue matters.  
Informants’ perceptual abilities may, according to Simon (Simon 1957), be 
governed by a bounded rationality representative of how an individual may 
cope with complex and dense environmental matters.  Still, there is much 
uncertainty as to an actors’ ability to handle problem issues.  In the opinion 
of Roos (Roos, Krogh, and Roos 1994) this uncertainty might be rooted in 
the shortcomings of research methods rather than in the incumbent’s ability 
to handle information.  Thus to arrive at a workable research model, the 
thesis has as its first step transposed Golledge’s (Golledge 1999) cognitive 
pathway into a perceptual process replicating a cognitive strategizing 
framework, as presented in Illustration no. 4.  This cognitive framework is in 
this model remnant of Selznick’s ’s (Selznick 1957) design school structure, 
emphasizing the mental process of organizational decision-making. 
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Illustration No. 4:  Processing pathway 
Recognize
Acknowledge
Prioritize
Make
decisions
Goal
Retrieval of alternatives
Evaluation of alternatives
Choice of alternatives
Implementation
Cognitive pathway Perceptual processes
In converting the structure of the cognitive pathway into a perceptual 
process structure, the stakeholder informant will, in the interview be exposed 
to relevant hospital issue matters as follows: 
 
 On Recognition 
o The informant is confronted with critical issue matters 
generated by the hospital environment.  The objective is to 
bring about the informant’s attentiveness to competing 
stakeholder issues relative to the hospital’s operating 
environment. 
 On Acknowledgement 
o The informant is confronted with operational issues related 
to hospital resources management.  The objective is to bring 
about the informant’s awareness of stakeholder expectations 
perceived relative to the hospital’s operating objectives. 
 On Prioritizing 
o The informant is challenged to share his/her stakeholder 
preference on issue matters critical to hospital operations.  
The objective is to bring about a stakeholder selection based 
upon a synthesis of issue matters raised in the interview. 
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 On Decision-making 
o The informant’s preferred position on the hospital’s 
organizational decision-making situation is identified.  The 
objective is to learn the informant’s position representative 
of the particular stakeholder group being represented. 
 
According to Downs and Stea (Golledge 1999), cognition is a process 
“composed of a series of psychological transformations by which an 
individual acquires, codes, stores, recalls and decodes information about 
relative locations and attributes of phenomena in the everyday spatial 
environment”.  The research instrument developed for the informant field 
data collection seeks to take on these properties.  It replicates the mental 
process of cognition through a series of questions that emphasize an urgency 
to express one’s perceptual preferences.  The procedural logic draws on 
Selznick’s (Selznick 1957) contention to the effect that commitments to 
ways of acting and responding have been built into the organization, intrinsic 
to its very character.  Thus, the induced process of perceptual selection 
established in the interview, replaces the rigor of real life planning in order 
for the process of cognition to evolve and manifest itself.   
 
7.2.3 Thesis research model 
7.2.3.1 Informant interviews 
Collecting informant data through empirical fieldwork requires a heuristic 
model that mobilizes the informant’s cognitive processes when introduced to 
complex issue matters.  The thesis research model combines structural and 
process approaches to facilitate informant feedback.  A structural logic has 
been interjected in the informant questioning precisely to expose informant 
rationale.  The model applies its process qualities when introducing and 
bridging cognitive and affective issue matters.  The approach of triggering 
both the informant’s cognitive rationale and affective perception is supported 
by Hellgren (Hellgren and Melin 1993).  In the latter’s opinion, individuals 
do not act purely as cognitive beings in the narrow meaning of rationale 
logic.  Stakeholder informants are influenced by both patterned values and 
other factors triggering their emotions.  Choice or action therefore takes 
place in the interplay between rationale and emotions.  As is evident in 
Illustration no. 5, one has superimposed the structure and logic of Selznick’s 
(Selznick 1957) design school model of strategizing onto the perceptual 
process framework.  The uniqueness of this approach is that it challenges the 
informant to think and respond in a holistic framework, and not to be driven 
by any single map or scheme (Hellgren and Melin 1993).  The thesis 
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research model thus conceptualizes the cognitive and emotional structures 
represented by competing stakeholder issues within the public hospital.   
 
The thesis research model illustrated next, identifies constructs connected to 
the cognitive processing pathway. 
 
Illustration No. 5: Thesis research model: Informant interviews 
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The issue matters raised in the informant interviews will consist of “thematic 
sets of values” (Hellgren and Melin 1993). These are composed of 
assumptions, beliefs, ideas, and thoughts relevant to the public hospital. All 
are believed to be representative of today’s contextual field and commonly 
known to all stakeholder group representatives. Dominating informant 
orientations may be representative of stakeholder groups’ “way-of-thinking” 
(Hellgren and Melin 1993). 
7.2.3.2 Archival records information 
As part of the fieldwork, the thesis will also collect hospital archival data.  
This will consist of formal records documenting organizational structure, 
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managerial processes and process outcomes. Such data is considered 
important to the thesis as it provides insight into the nature of a hospital’s 
formal decision-making.  Participant actors will be identified and their 
priorities analyzed as records of formal management meetings confirm the 
decision-making agenda and the ultimate priorities.  Efforts are made to 
delineate records obtained from the various archival data base sources to 
depict contextual nuances at different decision-making levels.  Properly 
construed, the combined analysis of informant data and archival records may 
bring the thesis closer to an answer as to how stakeholder groups influence 
organizational decision-making in the public hospital.   
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8 Research design and methodology 
8.1 Research orientation 
The project work design as shown in illustration no. 6, outlines the major 
research phases leading up to thesis closure.  The model draws its schematic 
support from Yin’s (Yin 1994) single case replication logic, visualizing a 
preference for theory development prior to data collection.  Yin’s contention 
is that theory development, as part of the research design phase is essential 
in case studies. 
 
Illustration No. 6: Project work design 
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Conducting a study of stakeholder groups in a public hospital, conceptually 
qualifies as a within-case research approach.  Adding multiple cases, as the 
thesis research will, permits between-case analysis.  This is expected to add 
confidence to findings, strengthening validity and stabilizing generalizations.  
Thus, the thesis research subscribes to a strategy of employing multiple 
comparison groups (Miles and Huberman 1994).  The mere use of multiple 
cases still does not provide for any stronger grounds for improved 
generalization per se.  However, as will be shown from the thesis’ selection 
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of sampling boundaries, the choice of cases is to be made on conceptual 
grounds, not based on statistical merits.       
 
Yin’s emphasis on the role of theory development prior to collecting data, is 
opposed to the theory building approaches as prescribed in grounded theory 
(Bryman and Burgess 1994).  However, according to Bryman, there are few 
genuine cases of “grounded theory” using the approach as originally 
conceptualized by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser 1967) and Strauss and Corbin 
(Strauss 1996).  The relative position of theory preceding research design 
has in this thesis project been applied as an inductive agent to direct the 
thesis research.  The identification of the thesis’ theoretical templates makes 
up the conceptual foundation of the nomological net.  As such, the approach 
serves to sharpen the thesis’ analytical scope.  Framing the study through 
empirical field boundaries facilitates the analysis of informant feedback.  
The research framework is considered theory driven while empirical data is 
progressively collected.  The general sampling methodology thus allows for 
the identification of phenomena crucial to subsequent theoretical 
propositions.   
8.2 Epistemological and ontological considerations 
8.2.1 Competing arguments on methods and methodology 
The research approach does not ascribe to the laws of classical deductive 
positivism.  Thesis explanations are derived from how different empirical 
field structures reflect the events observed and how this is analyzed.  One 
looks for individual rationale and affective perception patterns indicative of 
cognitive processes explaining contextual processes.  As expressed by Howe 
(Howe 1988), one ought to be wary of abstract epistemological arguments 
that do not connect operationally with the actual practices used to gain 
knowledge (Miles and Huberman 1994).  The way in which a research 
question is asked determines the research method that needs to be applied in 
order to answer it (Strauss 1996).  The “how”-question calls for explanatory 
type research strategies (Yin 1994).  According to Yin, this justifies dealing 
with operational links rather than mere frequencies or incidence.  Thus, 
determining whether to apply a qualitative or a quantitative approach 
depends upon the challenges contained in the research problem. The thesis 
works with small stakeholder populations within a few cases of public 
hospitals.  This research setting does not lend itself to quantitative methods 
where the purpose is generalizations for universal applications.  Nor does the 
research question entail making direct statements about relationships 
between a dependent and an independent variable.  The purpose is not 
hypothesis testing.  However, any thesis research requires a method that 
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takes a basic epistemological stance relative to the research objective.  
Morgan (Morgan and Smircich 1980) reject the idea that the world can be 
represented in terms of deterministic relationships.  In their contention, it is 
emphasized that “social situations should be researched in a manner that 
reveals their inner nature” (Morgan and Smircich 1980).  The knowledge 
and findings developed in the thesis’ empirical fieldwork need to be seen as 
relative and specific to the immediate context and situation from which it is 
generated.  In this way one may build what Glaser calls “substantive theory” 
(Glaser 1967 p. 32) developed from a contextual inquiry and grounded in 
empirical data.  
8.2.2 Conceptual understanding of organizational choice 
To uncover the presence of stakeholder influence necessitates a conceptual 
understanding of what constitutes organizational decision-making.  From the 
thesis’ contextual analysis one may surmise that the allocation of health 
resources seldom follows the bureaucratic axis of hospital governance.  
Cyert and March (Cyert and March 1992) argue that decision-making should 
be analyzed in terms of the variables that affect organizational goals.  These 
are variables that influence organizational expectations that again impact 
organizational choice.  As previously argued in the literature review, 
affirmative post-modern ethics theory relies on the organization’s capacity to 
reflect, represent or model the world without supposition.  In other words, 
organizational solutions may be perceived in the context of the 
organization’s cultural nature (Cludts 1999).  Selznick (Selznick 1957) 
labels this the significance of institutional norms and values.  In Argadona’s 
(Aragandona 1998) theory of the common good, emphasis is made on the 
importance of learning the company’s social relations maintained by its 
members with internal and external stakeholders.  One may therefore say 
that the nature of the hospital’s operations culminate in organizational 
decision-making. Such decision-making emanates from an interpretation of 
participating actors’ vested interests.  Organizational members will seek to 
find appropriate solutions applying an institutionalized rationale linked to 
fundamental communication processes within the organization (Blegen and 
Nylehn 1969).  Having stakeholder informants display their patterns of 
cognitive logic offers a promise of identifying an empirically sound basis for 
answering the research question.   
8.2.3 Epistemological stance 
The knowledge of the world of the public hospital as it relates to stakeholder 
interaction implies the need to understand and map its structure. The 
interaction between stakeholder groups in the context of decision-making, 
gives rise to positivism, with emphasis on the empirical analysis of concrete 
relationships. However, such a research methodology encourages an 
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objective form of knowledge specifying the precise nature of laws, 
regularities and relationships among the phenomena measured.  With respect 
to the thesis project, it is therefore important to revert to the epistemological 
stance of Morgan (Morgan 1988) advocating a move away from the 
conception of the world as a closed system, to a conception of the world as 
an organism or an open system.  Morgan’s core ontological assumption 
favors “a reality as a realm of symbolic discourse” (Morgan 1988 p. 195).  
This epistemological position rejects the idea that the organizational 
environment can be represented in terms of deterministic relationships.  One 
may therefore say that knowledge, understanding, and explanations of 
organizational affairs must take account of how participant order is 
fashioned in ways that are meaningful to the organizational actors. 
8.3 Stakeholder framework 
As previously outlined in the literature review, the stakeholder perspective 
on decision-making rests with the individual.  However, this is to be 
perceived of from the perspective of goals and objectives shared within the 
stakeholder group.  The presence of stakeholder groups convening on the 
hospital’s value chain operations generates a dynamic and evolving arena. 
Stakeholder interests are sought balanced or complied with by the decision-
making actors.  In illustration no. 7, a stakeholder framework for the public 
hospital as a generic class, has been developed.  The model depicts 
constituent representations converging on the point of decision-making.  
This particular scheme draws on the contextual significance of the hospital 
and dramatizes the diversity and scope of constituent presence.   
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Illustration No. 7: A framework of stakeholder forces 
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No distinction is made, as with Freeman’s model (Freeman 1984), 
classifying stakeholders into primary and secondary constituents.  In a 
managerial and instrumental perspective, Freeman’s stakeholder 
segmentation has as its ultimate goal to serve the interests of company 
shareholders.  Nor is the proposed stakeholder model making any effort to 
distinguish, as does Porter (Porter 1980), between primary and secondary 
value chain processes.  Porter’s value chain analysis is intended to 
strengthen the organization’s competitive position in the market place.   
 
Within the thesis research framework, all decision-making in the hospital 
may in principle be considered viable processes.  According to Ogden’s 
(Ogden and Watson 1999), the organization needs to maintain a certain “fit” 
between the mandate of its governance and the expectation of its 
shareholders.  This position is representative of the normative prescription of 
the intrinsic value of all stakeholders with regards to public goods 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995).  The lack of countervailing forces, parallel to 
the private sector’s dynamic interplay between company shareholders and 
market forces, opens up for a more unpredictable influx of stakeholder 
groups in organizational decision-making.  
8.3.1 Informant approach 
Conducting intra-organizational analysis poses a challenge to the 
methodology of informant selection.  The viability of constituent interests 
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vested in the mandated functions of the public hospital has been confirmed 
in the thesis’ contextual analysis.  Analyzing how stakeholder groups may 
influence decision-making outcome rests on information collected from 
representatives of key stakeholder groups.  The selection of the unit of 
analysis rests on the assumption of a specific dyadic relationship between 
constituent interests and decision-making actors.   
The selection of stakeholder groups and stakeholder group informants 
represents a challenge with respect to informant bias.  Informant 
methodology represents at the outset a potential for validity drawbacks.  The 
selection problem is represented by identifying informants competent to 
report on dyadic relationships (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993).  A 
second problem also pointed out by Kumar, is the challenge of potential 
dissimilarity on perceptual agreement between competent multiple 
informants.  Therefore, when addressing the thesis research question, one 
will seek to address how stakeholder groups convene on organizational 
decision-making at specific organizational levels.  To resolve this challenge, 
one will be pooling stakeholder informants operating tangent to the 
organizational positions to record their issue focus.  The following key 
informant methodology is subscribed to in order to resolve the challenge of 
informant bias.   
 
Table No. 5: Informant selection methodology 
Key informant methodology Method rationale 
A consensual approach Multiple informants to be selected from 
constituent groups sharing positions on 
items relevant for organizational 
decision-making. 
An approach of aggregating responses Multiple informant responses to be 
pooled relative to organizational level 
indicators 
 
 
8.3.2 Stakeholder selection 
8.3.2.1 Methodological approach 
To describe the relationship between stakeholder groups’ vested interests 
and decision-making outcome, the thesis ascribes to the existence of a 
dialectic relationship between deductive and inductive research. The 
hospital’s operational arena provides a basis for a field-directed a priori 
assumption with respect to the identification of stakeholder groups to be 
recognized in the context of the thesis research.  This deductive approach 
serves to reduce the scope of stakeholder groups to be represented. The 
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project’s inductive approach aims at establishing the nature of relationships 
between stakeholder group interests and their capacity to influence decision-
making.  Instead of having to choose side with the methodological 
arguments of “theory first or theory-later” (Wolcott 1992), one has sided 
with the argument that both the deductive and the inductive approach 
support each other in establishing a cause-and-effect relationship (Miles and 
Huberman 1994).   
 
The stakeholder model shown in illustration no.8, establishes a conceptual 
construct abstraction of the interaction between representative groups of 
constituent interests (Judd, Smith, and Kidder 1990).  The model itself does 
not preclude any one particular constituent stakeholder group.  It merely 
depicts a generic representation or a typology of constituent classes.  
Through the preceding contextual analysis, one has identified those 
stakeholder groups that command the attention of hospital decision-making.  
The relative constituent position is shown in the circular matrix.  Here, 
internal and external stakeholder groups convene on the particular decision-
making arena within the public hospital.  The empirical analysis will 
evaluate how internal and external stakeholders operate in a particular matrix 
relationship to reach closure.  The external stakeholder groups are visualized 
in the model’s outer circle.  These groups have a vested interest in keeping 
contact with internal counterparts to induce action on their behalf.  This is 
accomplished by virtue of mandate, or through corporate channels.   
Suppliers of items critical to clinical activity may have as their most 
common tangent point the ward directors or the supervisors of clinical 
activity. Hospital boards maintain their executive dialogue with hospital’s 
operations management.  Next, professional affiliations, or membership 
organizations representing various medical type professions, have a direct 
access to membership representatives within the hospital’s clinical 
environment.  The so-called proxy agents are seen to speak on behalf of 
patients or patient groups classified by common medical diagnosis.  As 
previously outlined in the thesis, such proxy organizations are established 
outside the hospital but keep a visible profile within the particular hospital.   
Internal stakeholder groups are shown in the model’s inner circle convening 
on the decision-making arena.  The thesis objective is to find an answer as to 
how external stakeholder groups influence decision-making either through- 
or in competition with their tangent internal counterparts in the context of 
decision-making. 
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Illustration No. 8: A model of public hospital stakeholders 
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8.3.2.2 A descriptive stakeholder account 
The thesis’ contextual analysis represents the basis for the following 
descriptive accounts of hospital internal stakeholder groups64.  These 
descriptive accounts will be applied in the analysis of informant interviews. 
8.3.2.2.1 Hospital internal stakeholder groups 
8.3.2.2.1.1 Hospital management 
The following table outlines the constituent platform of hospital 
management as an internal stakeholder group critical to hospital 
performance. 
 
                                                 
64 Hospital external stakeholder groups are descriptively analysed in thesis section 
10.3.2.2 “At operations management level”.  
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Table No. 6: Stakeholder group: Hospital management 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder group Group 
objectives 
Group’s 
significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Hospital 
management 
Hospital top 
management (TM) 
made up of 
managing director 
and the directors 
of key staff 
positions such as 
Personnel, 
Finance and 
including the 
director’s medical 
advisor 
(“Sjeflege”) and 
advisor on nurses 
activities 
(“Sjefsykepleier”).
 
Also at times 
including staff 
directors on HMS 
(Health, Work 
environment and 
Safety), 
Information. 
The TM 
seeks to 
maintain its 
decision-
making 
process by 
creating a 
best “fit” 
between 
recognized 
constituent 
interests. 
The TM, as a 
group, acts as 
gate keeper 
and facilitator 
for hospital 
operational 
activities  
The actions of 
hospital 
management 
influences  
how the 
hospital may 
accomplish 
governance 
objectives. 
8.3.2.2.1.2 Work force representation 
The next table depicts the stakeholder group position of “Work force 
representation” groups.  The significance of the “Work force representation” 
groups is evident in their call for frequent consultations, information 
exchanges and negotiation processes with hospital management.  Within the 
case hospitals, hospital internal employee federation representatives of Dnlf 
(Norwegian Medical Association) and the NSF (Norwegian Nurses’ 
Association) work full time to ensure hospitals’ abidance by their collective 
arbitration agreements and to promulgate federation issues. 
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Table No. 7: Stakeholder group: Work force representation groups 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder 
group 
Group 
objectives 
Group’s 
significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Work force 
representation 
groups (WFRs) 
Employee 
affiliation 
groups 
recognized by 
the hospital’s 
governing 
bodies. 
To ensure that 
the hospital 
upholds 
negotiated 
agreements 
governing the 
members’ 
employment 
rights and 
duties. 
The hospital’s 
abidance by 
negotiated 
agreements is 
important to 
avoid costly 
labor conflicts. 
Strategies and 
actions by the 
National WFRs 
for both 
doctors and 
nurses impact 
how hospitals 
work to 
achieve its 
objectives. 
8.3.2.2.1.3 Patient client groups 
The following table identifies patient client groups acting as representative 
of patients generally admitted to the hospital without any initial 
collaboration with formal patient group organizations.  The issue of patient 
rights has been argued politically and in the national media particularly since 
the mid 1980s65.  Augmented by the Norwegian Patient Association (Norsk 
Pasientforening), patient rights were put into a new law January 1, 2001 
(LOV av 2. juli 1999 nr. 63 (Pasientrettighetsloven) 1999). Also 
international declarations on human rights, such as The World Health 
Organization’s “The Declaration on the Promotion of Patient Rights in 
Europe (Amsterdam 28.-30 March, 1994) and “The Ljubliana Charter on 
Reforming Health Care”, approved by WHO’s European Office, June 18th, 
1996 serve to promulgate patient rights within a European context.  In 
Norway, the issue of patient rights culminated in incremental legislation 
prior to the aforementioned comprehensive new law on patient rights.  
Particularly, the law permitting patient choice of hospital treatment 
institution66 and providing for a patient waiting list guarantee67 have served 
to bring the issue of patient rights into a collective stakeholder perspective 
opposite the public hospital sector.   
 
                                                 
65 A historical account of the legal process culminating the law on patient rights  
(“Lov 2. Juli 1999 NR. 63 Om Pasientrettigheter”), is outlined in Government white 
paper Ot prp nr 12 Lov om pasientrettigheter 1998-99, p.p. 14-30. 
66 Government white paper: St meld nr 24 (19996-97), Innst S nr 237 (1996-97). 
67 Government white paper: St meld nr 44 (1996-97), Innst S nr 27 (1996-97). 
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Table No. 8: Stakeholder group: Patient-client groups 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder group Group 
objectives 
Group’s 
significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Patient -client 
groups 
By virtue of the patients’ 
uniform expectancy of 
immediate access to 
professional, timely and 
courteous treatment, 
make hospital patients 
part of a virtual but still 
potentially powerful 
stakeholder constituency. 
 
   
 
To ensure that 
the patient 
receives 
necessary 
medical 
attention.  
To exert their 
rights, hospital 
patients may 
call on sector 
audit groups 
to argue their 
grievances. 
Satisfied 
patients 
represent an 
important 
testimony to 
the qualities 
of a particular 
hospital. 
Patient-doctor 
collaboration 
is important 
also to secure 
empirical 
accounts of 
treatment 
regimen 
critical to 
medical 
research. 
8.3.2.2.1.4 Clinical supervisors 
The following table identifies clinical supervisors critical to the hospital’s 
core medical services.  Clinical supervisors are generally in charge of a 
medical ward.  The government white paper NOU 1997:2 makes reference 
to the clinical ward as a major organizational unit within the hospital68.  A 
clinical ward may be defined as an organizational unit within the hospital.  
The purpose of such a unit is to conduct highly specialized medical sub-
activities as part of the hospital’s comprehensive medical services.  The 
specialized medical services function is part of a wider medical field 
possibly having several tangent specialties and other subordinate medical 
specialty fields69.  All case hospitals include ward managers in the hospital 
director’s top management team.  One may, however, also talk of the clinical 
                                                 
68 See particularly  section 5.6.1.1 “De kliniske avdelingene”, p.p. 33-34. 
69 Ibid; “En klinisk avdeling kan defineres som en organisatorisk del av et sykehus, 
hvis oppgave det er å utføre en spesialisert medisinsk delfunksjon av sykehusets 
totale virksomhet.  Denne funksjonen omfatter vanligvis et fagområde som er 
identisk med en medisinsk hovedspesialitet, evt., med en eller flere 
grensespesialiteter og sjeldnere en eller flere subspesialiteter.  En klinisk avdeling 
vil som regel omfatte sengeposter, poliklinkker, undersøkelsesrom og –fasiliteter”. 
 94
directors as a cohesive constituent group.  In as much as its members 
commonly include medically trained staff, their professional uniformity add 
to the constituents’ common traits and characteristics.  Another factor 
unifying ward managers is the call for professional autonomy in organizing 
and performing clinical activities.  This is particularly promulgated in the 
law on medical doctors calling for professional duties to be organized in 
accordance with medical prerequisites70. 
 
Table No. 9: Stakeholder group: Clinical supervisor 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder 
group 
Group objectives Group’s 
significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Clinical 
supervisors 
The clinical 
supervisor works 
within a 
managerial 
echelon but 
acting in unison 
as a stakeholder 
group. 
 
   
 
To ensure the 
continuance of 
resources, staff 
and facilities 
necessary to 
fulfill ward 
objectives. 
The ward 
director 
supervises all 
medical activities 
and as such 
commands the 
resources 
application 
critical to the 
achievement of 
hospital 
objectives. 
Hospital 
management is 
dependent on 
ward managers’ 
capacity to 
effectively apply 
allocated 
resources in line 
with hospital 
objectives. 
 
8.3.3 Decision-making levels 
The most commonly found functional organization model of public hospitals 
is described in chapter 3, “The public hospital”71.  Erichsen’s (Erichsen 
1996) contention on hospital organization, is that health institutions operate 
within various degrees of established formal and informal jurisdiction.  The 
continuous challenge has always been to balance converging interests arising 
in a multi- functional institution.  Public hospitals have, since the general 
acceptance of the governing logic of New Public Management (NPM), been 
seeking to balance formal supervision and operational autonomy.  According 
to Christensen (Christensen and Lægreid 2001), structural transitions within 
public organizations introduced along the analogy of NPM, have produced 
disintegrated and fragmented organizational hierarchical structures.  Thus, a 
formal organizational framework of the public hospital does not lend itself to 
                                                 
70 Lov av 13 Juni 1980 Om Leger (as amended July 30th, 1992); specifically section 
II, §§ 16, 17 “Legens rettigheter”. 
71 See specifically thesis section 3.3 “Organizing for medical services” 
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any clear-cut illustration of its true operational dynamics. However, as the 
thesis research model addresses the question of how organizational decision-
making is conducted, it becomes necessary to identify where decisions are 
made that are most critical to hospital value creation.     
 
Within the context of the hospital ward, present-day organizational 
structures exhibit a pattern of horizontal specialization and vertical 
differentiation much along the development of medical fields.  This latter 
pattern is evident in the hospital’s formal hierarchical structure. The 
managerial jurisdictions within the public hospital distinguish between the 
executive authority as represented by the hospital board, hospital 
administrative management and ward operations.  The thesis research will 
hence address the tri-level hierarchical organizational levels in its efforts to 
identify organizational decision-making in public hospitals.    
 
Illustration No. 9: Hospital decision-making sectioning 
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8.3.4 Decision-making properties 
In the thesis project, stakeholder groups’ influence is to be measured in 
terms of their relative influence on decision-making outcome.  The analytical 
vantage point therefore is the public hospital’s core functional tasks.  These 
 96
are stated in legislation on hospital activities and sector prescriptions72.  To 
accomplish this analytical objective, and hence answer the research question, 
the thesis will seek to determine what issue matters are addressed at what 
management level.   
  
Illustration no. 10 depicts the public hospital’s functional obligations 
relevant to the analysis of its decision-making.  Decision-making matters 
addressed, but falling outside the three core hospital functions, will be 
recorded as “hospital administrative issue matters”. 
 
Illustration No. 10:  Analytical framework: Stakeholder influence 
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8.3.5 Case sampling properties 
The sampling technique applied with respect to locating stakeholder groups 
within the hospital institution, may be representative of what Kuzel (Kuzel 
1992) labels purposive. This connotation refers to a limited sampling 
                                                 
72 See thesis section 3.3.1 “Hospital services functions”. 
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population explained by the logic and coherence of particular properties 
governing the targeted empirical field.   
Hospitals are to be selected based on properties qualifying for contextual 
richness and case category representation.  The purpose is to secure the 
presence and interplay of constructs as identified in the nomological net and 
as specified in the sampling properties.  Stakeholder groups (admitted into 
the unit of analysis’ sample population) may reveal common as well as 
differentiated characteristics on properties relevant to the research question.  
As such, the sampling technique is conceptually driven and should follow 
boundaries established in the construct variables.  To ensure that sampling 
supports the thesis research strategy, the following sampling properties have 
been selected to serve as guideposts to the selection of case hospitals. 
 
Table No. 10: Sampling properties 
Case sampling prerequisites Purpose 
 
Theory based To find examples of theoretical constructs 
and associated variables. 
Critical case To permit logical generalizations as per 
research questions based on case properties 
present. 
Typical case Should be representative of class hospital 
throughout the population universe of public 
hospitals in Norway.  Permits logical 
generalization. 
Politically important case Case hospital to be representative of case 
properties important to sector governance. 
Opportunistic case Case hospital to be representative of 
properties tied to new law on hospital 
governance.  This creates an opportunity for 
later comparative analysis of stakeholder 
relationships 
Stratified purposeful Case hospital to be representative of 
diversified population of stakeholder groups 
Method’s conformity Empirical methods’ uniformity between 
case hospitals 
8.4 Data collection methods 
The diversity of stakeholders and their presumed multiplicity of interests 
necessitate a uniform approach to data development.  This is to establish a 
best possible foundation for data analysis and empirical generalizations.  To 
answer the research question, a multiple source approach method is 
employed to obtain the empirical evidence.   
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The methodological triangulation employed in the thesis research involves 
collecting differentiated (1) data sources and applying (2) different data 
collection methods as well as (3) developing different and unique data types.  
This triangulation method is expected to yield a set of synergistic data.  
Thus, it may be said that the validity support resulting from the use of the 
triangulation strategy provides a better basis for generalizations in the 
interpretation of the data (Eisenhart 1989).       
 
Illustration No. 11:  Data triangulation 
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In Bryman’s view (Bryman and Burgess 1994), triangulation is not merely a 
method condensation to have one single research method checking the 
validity of another.  Each data source and collection method yields data 
about different phenomena.  The purpose of triangulation, as done in this 
research project, is to enhance the quality of the overall analysis.  The 
analytical challenge is to combine static archive information with responses 
to questions engaging the informant’s intellect.  The challenge is sought 
resolved by making the qualitative components reveal the processes and 
perspectives of those actually involved in decision-making with the 
principles applied to rationalize ultimate priorities evident from documented 
records.    
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9 The research setting 
9.1 The national population of public hospitals 
The national population of public hospitals in Norway, as organized into 
formal entities73, consisted in 1999, of 67 such institutions74.  A public 
hospital’s functional classification serves as a distributive guideline for 
sector resources’ allocation.  Table no. 11 lists the population of public 
hospitals by functional category and their corresponding employment of 
medical doctors and registered nurses. 
 
Table No. 11: National population of public hospitals (1999) (Rønning 2000). 75 
Type hospital 
(Excluding 8 smaller State-owned 
speciality clinics and Det Norske 
Radiumhospital; i.e., an oncology hospital)
 
Number 
of 
hospitals 
in each 
category 
Number of 
medical doctors  
employed 
within each 
hospital category 
(%-share of 
national 
population 
category) 
Number of  
registered nurses 
employed 
within each 
hospital category 
(%-share of 
national 
population 
category) 
Regional hospitals:  
(Rikshospitalet is classified as the 
Regional hospital for Health Region East. 
Ullevål sykehus is classified as the 
Regional hospital for Health Region 
South. 
Haukeland sykehus is classified as the 
Regional hospital for Health Region West)
5 2441 (37.5%) 7032 (33.5%) 
County hospitals:  
(Inclusive of hospitals owned and run by 
the city and county of Oslo) 
12 1862 (28.7%) 5926 (28.2%) 
Community hospitals: 
(Inclusive of hospitals owned and run by 
the city and county of Oslo) 
50 2202 (33.8%) 8050 (38.3%) 
Sum  67 6505 (100%) 21008 (100%) 
                                                 
73 In several health regions, county administrations have merged hospitals and thus 
report on them as consolidated units. 
74 As outlined in thesis chapter 3, “The public hospital”, and detailed in section 3.2, 
“The governance model”, a hospital institution’s scope of operations is prescribed 
by its functional classification; i.e., hence the thesis applied term: class hospital. 
75 (Rønning 2000). Table developed by using data from table 8.2 “Antall årsverk 
etter sykehuseier, sykehus og personellkategori”, p. 126.  Somatiske sykehus 1999. 
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As shown in table no. 11, the nation’s five regional hospitals account for the 
employment of approximately 1/3 of all medical doctors and nurses. 
 
The next table shows the relative representation of employment groups 
working in public hospitals.  
 
Table No. 12:  Sum m/y (man year) by employment category (1999) (Rønning 2000). 
76 
Sum man-years (m/y) by employment 
category 
m/y %  
of  
total m/y 
% 
Accumulated 
Sum m/y medical doctors77 6692 11.8% 11.8% 
Sum m/y registered nurses78 21699 38,4% 50.2% 
Sum m/y other patient treatment personnel 11501 20,4% 70.6% 
Sum m/y administrative personnel 7710 13,6% 84.2% 
Sum m/y other personnel employed in the 
hospital 
8926 15.8% 100.0% 
Sum m/y all categories 56527 100%  
 
Looking at the employment structure making up the public hospitals’ 
working population as denoted by m/y, shows that medical doctors and 
registered nurses account for approximately 50% (50.2%) of the total m/y 
recorded.  The development trend for professions employed in public 
hospitals between 1993 and 1999 confirms that the number of medical 
doctors and registered nurses grew by 4.3% and 4.2% respectively (Rønning 
2000)79.  The growth in administrative staff in the same period was 6.8%80.   
9.2 Sampling characteristics 
To create a case sample population it is necessary to determine how the 
various hospital types fit the sampling property requirements.  In table no. 
13, the functional characteristics for each hospital category are listed and 
evaluated in terms of their sampling significance.   
 
                                                 
76 Table developed by using data from table 2.5 “Antall årsverk – nasjonale tall”, p. 
31.  Somatiske sykehus 1999. 
77 Inclusive of the state owned specialty clinics. 
78 Inclusive of the state owned specialty clinics. 
79 Table developed by using data from table 2.5 “Antall årsverk – nasjonale tall”, p. 
31.  Somatiske sykehus, 1999. 
80 Ibid. 
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Table No. 13: Sampling significance 
Hospital category Functional characteristics Sampling 
significance 
 
Regionssykehus  
(Regional hospital) 
• Larger scale clinical operations 
(400 beds +) 
• Performing national and regional 
clinical functions requiring larger 
scale resources operations 
• University based functions  
• Both State and County governed 
units 
• Limited to five such units in the 
Country81 
• Medical staff 
closely linked to 
university 
functions 
• Special national 
status afforded 
on research 
projects 
• Larger scale 
planned clinical 
operations 
relative to other 
hospitals’ share 
of elective 
patient cases 
Sentralsykehus  
(County hospital) 
• Larger scale clinical operations 
(200 to 400 beds) 
• Maintains one or more assigned 
national and/or regional levels of 
medical field/clinical specialities 
(“Sentralsykehusfunksjoner” – 
“Universitetssykehusfunksjoner”) 
• Large population 
of doctors and 
nurses. 
• Arena for 
medical research 
projects. 
Lokalsykehus 
(Community 
hospital) 
• Clinical activity scaled to fit 
population scope and local 
epidemiological characteristics 
• Scope of clinical activities 
commonly limited to the four-
functioned hospital structure 
(“Det fir-delte sykehus”; i.e., 
surgical unit, internal medicine, 
maternity, emergency unit)   
• High rate of acute based 
admissions. 
• Staffing closely 
maching scope 
of clinical 
services. 
 
 
As expressed in the above table, the national hospital classifications 
distinguish between scopes of clinical operations. The county and 
community hospitals combined employ 2/3 of doctors and nurses. The 
amount and type of resources allocated to regional institutions, serve to 
further distinguish between the natures of operations.  Regional institutions 
                                                 
81 (St.meld. nr. 9 (1975): Sykehusutbygging i et regionalisert helsevesen). 
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are by their very operational scope, administration and university-linked 
activities, clearly an a-typical case in the population of public somatic 
hospitals.   
Relating the hospital case category of regional hospitals to the criteria of 
sampling properties as specified in table no. 10, shows that case sampling 
pre-requisites are not satisfied.  Clearly, examples of theoretical constructs 
may be identified as prescribed in the nomological net as depicted in 
illustration no. 2.  Relative to the selected key sampling properties, it is 
apparent that only county and community hospitals meet a set of desired 
case sample standards.   
 
The outcome of a sampling conformity control is listed in table no. 14, in 
which case hospital categories are checked relative to case sample 
properties.   
 
Table No. 14: Sampling conformity test 
Hospital 
category 
Theory 
based 
Critical case Typical 
case 
Politically 
important 
case 
Oppor-
tunistic case
Stratified 
purposeful 
Method’s 
conformity 
Regional 
Hospital 
       
County 
Hospital 
       
Local 
hospital 
       
 
                   Satisfied                          Not satisfied 
 
9.3 Case sample development 
9.3.1 Case study tactics 
The very nature of the phenomenon under study challenges the utility of 
methodology.  According to Eisenhardt (Eisenhart 1989), case studies’ focus 
is on understanding, and thus exemplifies the dynamics present within single 
settings. In order therefore to secure the quality of data necessary to establish 
a complete statement in response to the research question, Yin (Yin 1994) 
proposes that a set of  case study tactics be established.  Consequently, table 
no. 15 has been developed as a reference instrument.  The purpose is to 
identify the type of quality assurance control in order to meet validity 
standards relevant for the thesis’ case study research.       
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Table No. 15:  Validity assurance control 
Quality assurance focus Case study tactic 
Construct validity Uniform operational measures to be established for the 
concepts being studied at all case hospitals. 
Internal validity Strengthening data explanatory power through patters 
identified within and across case hospital comparisons. 
External validity Strengthening data explanatory power through patterns 
identified in case replication logic. 
Reliability Demonstration of the operations of the study to be 
repeated at the various case hospitals producing similar 
results. 
 
To follow Strauss and Corbin’s (Strauss 1996) assessment of case study 
generalization, the purpose is to establish a case sample validity that 
provides a basis for explanatory power rather than that of generalizability.  
In the opinion of Strauss and Corbins, the explanatory power is directly 
attributable to the data’s predictive ability or instrumental properties.  As 
such it provides a better basis for answering the research question. 
9.3.2 Case hospital selections82 
The mapping of stakeholder groups converging on public hospitals’ 
organizational decision-making, calls for methodological choices suited to 
carry out what Grimen labels “intensive research” (Grimen 2000 p. 192).  
Common to intensive research projects is working with few cases and many 
variables.  According to Yin (Yin 1994), a single case setting may be 
appropriate under a number of circumstances.  A regional hospital alone may 
provide a research arena for a holistic study, or otherwise be representative 
of embedded properties but with multiple units of analysis.  Also, being able 
to observe phenomena of particular interest at one hospital may make it a 
revelatory case, otherwise inaccessible to scientific investigation.  Single 
case designs “require careful investigation of the potential to minimize the 
chances of misrepresentation and to maximize the access needed to collect 
case study evidence” (Yin 1994 p. 41).   
According to Herriott (Herriott and Firestone 1983), evidence from multiple 
cases is often considered more compelling.  In accordance with the sampling 
logic of multiple case studies, one will identify a certain number of cases 
that represent a large pool of case respondents.  The logic transported to data 
collection of multiple cases, is that data from a small number of hospital 
                                                 
82 Due to the nature of data to be collected, an application for the approval of data 
collection and retention has been forwarded the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Service (NSSDS) (“Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste”).  A conditional 
approval from NSSDS was received, dated 07.12.01. 
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cases is assumed to represent data that might have been collected from the 
entire population of category hospitals.  However, the issue is not to identify 
and aggregate responses.  The objective of the case study research approach 
is to access phenomena that yield observable context variables.  Employing 
the categories of county and community hospitals offers the most distinct 
advantages from a replication point of view.   
 
The following three case hospitals have been selected to represent the 
sample population of the thesis study of multiple cases.  Information about 
the case hospitals is listed in the next table. 
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Table No. 16:  Selected case hospitals 
Hospitals Functional status Sampling significance Operational 
Scope83 
Case hospital 
no. 1. 
(In the analysis, 
referred to as the 
university 
hospital). 
Community hospital 
within the Commune 
of Oslo. 
Has status as 
university clinic. 
Limited regional 
functions. 
 
• Satisfies sampling 
conformity test as per 
criteria spelled out in 
table no. 14. 
• A strong “opportunistic 
case” 
• A strong “political case” 
Has drawn political 
attention to its 
governance practices 
due to ownership 
structure. 
• 567 beds for somatic 
patients 
• 3.500 employees 
• 250 doctors 
• 1100 nurses 
• Operational budget 
in 2000: 
     NOK 1.051 mill. 
• Operations deficit in 
2000:  
     NOK - 9.4 mill. 
Case hospital 
no. 2 
(In the analysis, 
referred to as the 
community 
hospital). 
Community hospital 
within the County of 
Akershus. 
• Satisfies sampling 
conformity test as per 
criteria spelled out in 
table no. 14. 
• A strong “typical case” 
Is representative case of 
community owned and 
administered hospitals; 
i.e., the hospital 
category with the 
highest class population 
(75% of all single case 
hospitals) 
• 283 beds for somatic 
patients 
• 1.500 employees 
• 112 doctors 
• 358 nurses 
• Operational budget 
in 2000: 
    NOK 550 mill. 
• Operations deficit in 
2000: 
     NOK- 4.0 mill. 
Case hospital 
No. 3. 
(In the analysis, 
referred to as the 
county hospital). 
County hospital also 
serving as 
community hospital 
for a limited number 
of local communes in 
the County of 
Buskerud. 
 
 
• Satisfies sampling 
conformity test as per 
criteria spelled out in 
table no. 14. 
• A strong “opportunistic 
case” 
Has since 2001 been an 
incorporated hospital; 
i.e., “Fylkeskommunalt 
foretak”84. 
• A strong “typical case” 
By its size, scope and 
nature of operations 
quite representative of 
the community hospital 
category 
• 518 beds for somatic 
patients 
• 2.700 employees 
• 229 doctors (m/y) 
• 646 nurses (m/y) 
• Operational budget    
     in 2000: 
     NOK 1.191 mill. 
• Operations deficit    
     in 2000:  
     NOK –  57.6 mill. 
                                                 
83 Information obtained from annual reports of the respective hospitals.  Annual 
reports are part of research project’s archive information on each case hospital. 
84 Established as a ”Fylkeskommunalt foretak” March 1st, 2000, Case hospital no. 3 
is subject to structural mechanisms much alike those construed for the public 
hospitals incorporated January 1, 2002. 
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9.4 Collecting the evidence  
9.4.1 The logic of instrumentation 
One key contributory effect of the research model is its structural properties.  
Through the model’s construct operationalization one has provided a 
foundation for a sophisticated study of the sociology of the hospital 
organization.  The thesis’ empirical venue consists of collecting evidence 
through semi-structured, in-depth interviews.  Information feedback from a 
relatively small number of knowledgeable informants is expected to reflect 
stakeholder relationships in their interaction with hospital decision-making.  
Stakeholder groups’ patterns of perception relative to hospital issue matters 
represent important input to identify stakeholder positions and to understand 
thesis rationale.  As implied in the research model, the approach to obtain 
both rational and affective perceptions presumes a structural approach that 
facilitates cognition.  Informant interviews are thus expected to yield 
important insight into the dynamics of stakeholder interaction surrounding 
the decision-making processes.       
Archives from management meetings represent a reliable source of 
information on the hospital’s formalized decision-making.  Implicit in the 
records of ultimate decision-making, one may ascertain the relationship 
between stakeholder group cognition and a capacity to exert influence on 
ultimate decision-making outcomes. 
   
An overview of the properties data collection methods is introduced in the 
following table.      
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Table No. 17:  Sources of evidence85 
Instrumentation Sources and prerequisites  Empirical focus 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Identification of 
informants 
• Access to informants 
• Informant acceptance 
• To have a targeted focus 
on case study issue 
matters 
 
Archival records  PRIMARY FOCUS: 
• Official records from 
board meetings 
• Official records from 
top management team 
meetings 
 
Supportive documentation: 
• Operational charter 
• Ownership structure 
•  Organizational charts 
• Functional charts 
• List of organizational 
records 
• Strategy documents 
and other planning 
documents 
• Financial records 
• To represent precise and 
formalized data 
• To contain exact; 
accurate and precise 
references 
• Unobtrusive 
 
9.4.1.1 Semi-structured interviews 
The interview generally is open-ended.  Interviews representing a verbal 
report are subject to the common problems of informant bias, poor memory 
recall and poor or inaccurate articulation (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 
1993).  The solution here has been to subscribe to the structured questioning 
format as laid out in the research model.  The logic of the issue matters has 
previously been introduced in the discussion on cognition and spatial 
decision-making. The informant interview’s questioning structure is 
displayed in the next illustration. Depicted herein are the conceptual 
categories and their properties connected to each level along the processing 
pathway86. Related to each conceptual property issue, questions are raised on 
contextual issue matters.  Complex contextual issue matters brought forward 
in the interview are expected to mobilize the informant’s cognitive 
processes.     
 
                                                 
85 Developed from Yin’s ”Six Sources of Evidence” (Yin 1994). 
86 See thesis illustration no. 4: “Processing pathway”. 
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Illustration No. 12: Informant interview structure: analytical constructs and 
corresponding properties 
Recognize Acknowledge Prioritize Makedecisions
External factors
Branch considerations
Goals & expectations
Stakeholder interests
Resource allocations
Efficiency
Leadership
Know-how
Communication 
structure
Leadership style
Work culture
Overall objectives
Change
affirmation
Operational
significance
Leadership
acceptance
Constituent 
recognition
Governance
subscription
Directional
preference
Key staff Client view
Constituent clearance
 
The interview structure is based on the thesis’ cognitive strategizing model 
and follows a perceptual process along the logic of Golledge’s (Golledge 
1999) cognitive pathway87.  This technique has been directed to make the 
respondent conscious of a legible path associated with a particular issue 
matter.  Golledge (Golledge 1999) speaks of a mental cognition path or route 
between an origin and a destination.  The semi-structured informant 
interviews employ contextually familiar issue matters to trigger the 
informant’s spatial navigation.  Guided by the issue matters’ internal 
representation, respondents interact with questions, triggering the spatial or 
“route-based knowledge” of reasoning (Golledge 1999). 
The previously described contextual ramification of the public hospital 
supports a picture of a culturally embedded organizational field.  By virtue 
of one’s organizational position, each respondent is expected to exhibit 
institutionalized values and embedded norms.  These reflect the logic and 
attitudes of ones interests and vested position.  As such, one hopes to avoid 
the potential for intentional misrepresentation.  The informant is taken 
                                                 
87 See thesis section 7.2.2 “The logic of spatial decision-making” and illustration  
no. 4. 
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through the structured questionnaire that requires the cognitive processes of 
(1) issue matter interpretation; (2) memory recall (when reflecting and 
replying); next going through a process of  (3) integrating expressed views 
into a single judgment; finally to (4) identify an affirmative position on a 
particular decision-making issue.   
A common methodology bias related to informant interviews, is the problem 
of informant selection and the related issue of perceptual agreement (Kumar, 
Stern, and Anderson 1993).  To conquer this bias obstacle, knowledgeable 
respondents have been ensured through the verification of the informants’ 
inter-organizational relationships. This is demonstrated through organiza-
tional position and stakeholder group confirmation.  The thesis selection of 
informants for the semi-structured interviews is listed in the following table. 
 
Table No. 18: Informants selected: Case hospitals 
Informant position Hospital 
no. 1 
Hospital 
no. 2 
Hospital 
no. 3 
Board director 1 1 1 
Hospital director 1 1 1 
Chief medical director 1 1 1 
Head nurse  1 1 
Chief accountant 1 1 1 
Personnel director  1 1 
Leading representative of the national 
federation of medical doctors; (Dnlf), Snr. 
department doctors (avdelingsoverleger”). 
1 1 1 
Leading representative of the national 
federation of medical doctors; (Dnlf); Jr. 
medical doctors; (Yngre leger). 
1 1 1 
Leading representative of the national 
federation of registered nurses (Norsk 
sykepleierforbund; NSF) 
1 1 1 
Ward/dept. manager; medical doctor 4 2 3 
Ward/dept. manager; nurse 2 - 2 
Leader, local hospital patient support group  1  
Leader; Patient Ombudsman (County) 1 Same as 
for 
Hospital  
No. 1  
1 
Sum total informants 14 12 15 
               
              Informant unavailable 
 
The organizational informants selected and interviewed are key decision-
makers at executive, managerial and ward decision-making levels.  While a 
broad field of these informants represents administrative and medical staff, 
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staff nurses are relatively few in numbers. The thesis recognizes the 
significance of a confined field of nurse informants.  As such, associated 
findings take on a hypothetical form, thus signifying a need to pursue future 
research to verify the thesis’ empirical findings and generalizations.  
9.4.1.2 Documents; archive data 
The most compelling cause for employing document data is the potential for 
having inferences made to the research question.  Therefore, documentation 
has been secured in a systematic manner to employ relevant information 
throughout the various stages in the data collection process.  Particularly, the 
need to secure case hospital approval and cooperation with key informants 
has been important to safeguard a systematic and efficient empirical field 
process.  The time and resources required to identify and to generate relevant 
documentation data, have necessitated a structured project administration.  
As per Yin (Yin 1994), the most important use of formal records is to 
corroborate this with evidence from multiple documentation sources.  A 
broad scope of archive data here provides the background to ensure correct 
information.  A thorough analysis of the data collected has served to verify 
evidence and uphold a critical interpretation of documentation contents.  
Particularly relevant here is the task of classifying issue matters introduced 
in the formal board meetings and management group meetings.  Each agenda 
case matter has been placed relative to the public hospital’s mandated 
functions88. The capacity to place issue matters formally processed in the 
subject meetings has in great part been based on assessment of the particular 
issue matter’s contextual character.    
 
The following table depicts the sources of official records utilized and the 
particular research purpose served.    
 
                                                 
88 See Illustration no. 10: “Analytical framework: Stakeholder influence”. 
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Table No. 19: Archival records 2001 
Sources of official records Particular focus and usefulness 
 
Governance records • Formal governance structure and 
listing of administrative officers 
o Access to members 
• Listings of executive board members 
o Access to members 
Annual reports of case hospitals • Annual reports 1999 
o Confirmation of activity and 
costs 
Organization chart and employee 
listings 
• Identification of key organizational 
positions and their member staffing 
o Access to key members 
o Securing of approval of case 
hospital status 
Minutes from the board meetings • Access to minutes from all board 
meetings conducted in 2001 
o An overview of issue matters 
confirmed as cases for 
discussion and decision-
making 
Minutes from top management 
meetings 
• Access to minutes from all 
management meetings conducted in 
2001 
o An overview of issue matters 
confirmed as cases for 
discussion and decision-
making 
Membership listing of employee 
federations  
• Develop questionnaire mailing lists 
o Survey respondents 
Financial statements and records • Records for 2000 and 2001 (if 
available) 
o Confirmation of key figures 
relating to decision-making 
o Confirmation of investments 
and purchases of external 
supplies 
9.5 The nature of analytical focus  
The thesis does not involve itself in an analysis of the merits of the classical 
schools of thought on fieldwork methodology and their analytical properties.  
According to Bryman (Bryman and Burgess 1994), progress has been 
achieved in this regard by having method giving way to the discussion of 
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methodology. Thus, a combination of methods and the application of several 
methodologies have been applied. Analytical inductions are in research 
literature closely associated with research approaches to sociological 
problems.  In the thesis, the sociological problem has been inverted and 
stated as the thesis’ research question. Appropriate cases have been 
examined and possible explanations sought through inductive techniques.  
Qualitative data is being applied to determine the structural properties of 
cognitive relationships.  The inductive evidence is developed through the 
dynamic questioning of selected stakeholder informants.   
In a parallel process, data comprehension is developed through a reflectivity 
approach to pattern making and theory propositions. Here, inferential 
techniques are applied to determine structural properties of archive data.  
Sorting and categorizing data through coding processes allow a synthesis of 
the various types of empirical field data to be developed.   
 
Throughout the research design work, the awareness and knowledge of 
scientific discourse has been paramount.  According to Potter (Potter and 
Wetherell 1994), “studies of scientific discourse have shown the way it is 
constructed out of a combination of an empiricist and a contingent 
repertoire, and that both are necessary for the interpretative tasks that 
constitute scientific practice”.  In practical terms, Potter’s emphasis marks 
the importance of being cognizant of articulation in the field instrument 
design and analysis.  The hospital’s operational environment consists of a 
multitude of professions with their respective occupational terminology 
applicable to both specific and common contextual scenes.  The awareness 
of health professions’ semantics and social practices and how these influence 
both language content and form, is important.  The latter is precursory to 
preparing and participating in rhetorical or argumentative discourse.  The 
distinguishing feature here will be to succeed in factoring descriptive and 
conceptual data categories.  Mason (Mason 1994) places the focus on data 
indexing.  Conceptual categories are in the analysis grounded in both the 
theoretical perspectives applied in the research design and the data collected.  
A salient issue about conceptualization may therefore be related to the 
question of how far concepts in qualitative data analysis are to emerge out of 
the research context.  To this end, the doctoral candidate’s own extensive 
contextual field knowledge may serve to overcome some of the obstacles to 
discourse comprehension. 
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10 Analysis and findings 
10.1 A cohesive analytical framework 
The thesis research model is rooted in the logic of spatial decision-making as 
expressed by Liben (Liben 1982)89.  The research model is thus intended to 
help gain insight into how the informant reasons on specific issue matters in 
a given organizational context.  The perceptive position represents the crest 
of reasoning when stakeholder interests convene to cause affirmative action 
to be taken on issue matters.  The theoretical underpinnings of the cognitive 
approach are vested in the previously discussed Kitchin’s (Kitchin and 
Freundschuh 2000) process model of decision-making90.  The thesis also 
draws its conceptual support from Burgleman’s (Burgelman 1991) 
contention of cognitive and affective mechanisms.  According to Burgelman, 
these mechanisms regulate the allocation of organizational attention and 
resources relative to different areas of stakeholder initiatives.  Decision-
making processes thus take place in an ecological fashion in response to a 
steady flow of constituent initiatives.  These are said to emerge in patterned 
ways, the presence and outcome of which imply their relative importance in 
the organizational arena.   
 
The subsequent unravelling of empirical accounts obtained from in-depth 
interviews and archival records calls for a data decomposition approach.  
The objective here is to ensure the development of descriptive stakeholder 
accounts of process, actions and reason.  Working with different classes of 
data necessitates a differentiated but cohesive analytical framework.  When 
employing qualitative methods of different origins, Malterud (Malterud 
2001) refers to these as naturalistic or interpretative inquiries. Such inquiries 
require a broad scope of collection strategies merged into a systematic 
method of organizing and interpreting the data.  The analytical framework 
has been developed specifically to accommodate the two particular sets of 
data.  Care has been taken to consider the different phenomena offered by 
each account. The approach facilitates the identification of construct 
variables as these relate to organizational decision-making.   
 
The following table outlines the analytical focus relevant to each set of data 
and an associated interpretative framework. 
 
                                                 
89 Pls. view thesis section 7.2.3 “The thesis research model”. 
90 Pls. view thesis section 4.5.3 “Cognitive mapping and decision-making”. 
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Table No. 20:  Differentiated analytical framework 
Data classes Analytical Focus Interpretive framework 
Informant interviews Organizational  
dynamics 
 
 
Informant 
perception 
Organizational dynamics as 
framework for decision-making 
processes. 
 
Informants’ issue matter 
perception related to 
organizational decision-making 
Archival records Organizational 
preference 
Properties of decision-making 
focus and ultimate priorities 
 
The cohesive character of the analytical framework helps to establish a 
comprehensive account of organizational decision-making.  Each of the two 
selected analytical focus areas is expected to render important empirical 
substance to the descriptive accounts of stakeholder group categorization.    
 
The following illustration depicts a conceptual framework of the analysis 
outlining (1) data class, (2) analytical focus and (3) descriptive accounts.   
Through such a comprehensive and cohesive analytical process, (4) research 
closure emerges as a descriptive rendering of the public hospital’s 
organizational decision-making. 
 
Illustration No. 13: Answering the research question: Empirical venue 
Informant
Interviews
Organizational
dynamics
Organizational
choice
Actor-agent
perception
Decision-making
processes
Decision-making
priorities
Decision-making
properties
Answering The Research Question
Archival 
records    Data
Class
Analytical
focus
Descriptive
accounts
Research
closure
Archival 
records    Archival records    
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Firstly, informant feedback is analyzed relative to the hospital’s operational 
properties at the pre-selected decision-making levels.  Through the analysis 
of the informants’ shared experience in working within the hospital, the 
significance of decision-making processes is expected to appear.  
Stakeholders’ interaction on case matter issues, may in part offer a rationale 
as to the composition of the hospital’s agenda items.  Here, the presence of 
each stakeholder group in a decision-making setting may be recognized 
through its constituent interest and subsequent influence.     
Secondly, these same informant statements obtained along the research 
model’s interview structure, is analyzed as to their cognitive character.  
Stakeholder groups’ cognitive traits are expected to offer an insight into the 
constituents’ perceptive rationale associated with key decision-making issue 
matters and their properties.  Here, emerging patterns of spatial logic may 
offer instrumental evidence of decision-making outcomes. The stakeholders’ 
process-oriented behavior may serve as a precursor to agenda item 
composition and decision-making.   
Thirdly, the protocol analysis of the organization’s affirmative decision-
making measures is to confirm the hospital’s ultimate operational priorities.  
Thus, archival records combined with process accounts of informant 
cognition may offer compelling evidence of stakeholder groups’ influence 
on hospital decision-making.   
 
The summary perspective of the thesis’ analytical model, recognizes the 
significance of Morgan’s (Morgan 1988) interactive perception of 
stakeholder power91.  The interpretative approach is thus to view stakeholder 
group influence expressed through the hospital’s organizational decision-
making.  The latter is herein considered as property functions of institutional 
premises, governing processes, system priorities and actor-agent rationale. 
10.2 Mediating a potential interpretative bias 
The qualitative empirical data obtained is by its very nature contextualized.  
Each particular document or set of records validates issue matters, their 
respective origin, relevance, process and associated actor participants. In 
qualitative data validation, Malterud (Malterud 2002) subscribes to a 
methodological inference in which a document’s “internal validity” is 
interchangeable with its contextual “credibility”.  Furthermore, an item 
record’s “confirmability” may be transposed by its “objectivity”, while data 
“generalizability” or “external validity” may be considered equal to its 
                                                 
91 Pls. view thesis section 2.6 “Organizational decision-making in hospitals”. 
 116
“transferability”.  Ultimately, archival records’ “reliability” is strengthened 
by the contextual prerequisites apparent in the particular record item92.   
 
The approach of equating data validation techniques from different schools 
of scientific inquiry may be said to rest on an assumption of reflexivity.  The 
call for the researcher to be attentive to contextual information is based on 
the presumption that such insights act to shape the analyst’s interpretative 
perspective.  According to Berger (Berger 1981), a researcher’s reflexivity 
promotes self-awareness and serves to establish a role distance between the 
researcher and the qualitative data source93.  Reference to the application of 
reflexivity therefore serves to underscore the importance of being aware of 
the role that the researcher plays in the analysis and interpretation of 
qualitative data.  Gidden’s (Giddens 1991) contention is that all researchers 
at all times are concept bearing animals.  In a conscious and methodological 
sense one therefore heeds the call for reflexivity, as the knowledge generated 
is injected back into the realism developed as descriptive accounts.   
 
This concern for potential analytical biases refers back to the thesis 
introduction of Potter’s (Potter and Wetherell 1994) reference to interpretive 
prerequisites connected to scientific inquiry94. 
10.3 Informant interviews: An analysis of the hospital’s 
organizational dynamics 
10.3.1 Interpretative framework 
As outlined in table no. 18 “Informants selected: Case hospitals”, in all 41 
interviews have been conducted. The interviews were taped and later 
transcribed. Interview accounts have been filed and will, based upon a 
request from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, be stored for 
safekeeping and ultimate destruction95.  Each scheduled interview typically 
required between 70 and 90 minutes of dialogue and was carried out at the 
informants’ case hospitals.  A transcribed interview represents between 15 
and 20 pages of typewritten text, thus rendering a library of interviews 
                                                 
92 Ascribing to Malterud’s contentions brings the thesis in alignment with its quality 
assurance focus as outlined in thesis table no. 15 “Validity assessment control”.   
93 In Giddens’ analysis of post-modernism or what he terms “high modernity”, 
Giddens (Giddens 1991) also talks of “institutional reflexivity” in which  the 
regularized use of knowledge about circumstances of social life represents a 
constitutive element in its organization and transformation. 
94 Thesis section 9.5 “The nature of analytical focus”. 
95 A request dated November 12, inst., has been received from the NSSDS in which 
qualitative data is sought transferred to its national library of research information. 
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numbering between 600 to 800 pages. All interviews have been coded 
applying the thesis research model constructs as coding nodes96. A 
commercial data program developed for qualitative data processing, 
NVIVO97 has served to facilitate interview data management.  The program 
features have made possible subsequent pattern coding, storing, retrieving 
and visualizing by text referenced to selected constructs.  The NVIVO has 
also provided the basis for conceptual network building by allowing 
connections to be made between information groups. 
  
In line with the analytical focus, interview data is firstly to provide a 
comprehension of the nature and dynamics of organizational decision-
making. To accomplish this objective, the analysis has focused on 
developing conceptual categories that render insight into the informants’ 
decision-making accounts, values and opinions.  Structural conditions and 
stakeholder perceptions that are believed to be instrumental in the hospitals’ 
decision-making processes have been identified. By applying a set of 
conceptual categories and their properties, explanatory power may evolve 
relative to the research question.  In sum, the empirical analysis of each 
conceptual category facilitates an improved understanding of the contextual 
field later to function as elements of theoretical propositions. Careful 
considerations have gone into arriving at categories that sensitize construct 
characteristics. Such categories need to be abstract enough to develop 
descriptive renderings of the contextual accounts.  It is here relevant to note 
that the selected conceptual categories or constructs, have emerged 
throughout the research process, comparable to what is outlined in grounded 
theory (Glaser 1967)98.   
 
The following conceptual focus areas have been identified relative to the 
hospital’s organizational dynamics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 See thesis section7.2.3 “Thesis research model”, and Illustration no. 5. 
97 NVIVO source:  Richards, Tom and Lyn, Qualitative Solutions and Research Pty 
Ltd., 2 Research Drive, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Vic. 3083, Australia. 
98 Glasser and Strauss makes credits Leonard Schatzman who termed this field 
experience as “the momentum effect” (Glaser 1967). 
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Illustration No. 14: Conceptual focus areas: Organizational dynamics 
Organizational
dynamics
Operations
management
Ward
supervision
Executive
governance
 
As presented in thesis section 8.3.3 “Decision-making levels”, and as 
referenced in section 9.5 “The nature of analytical focus”, one has 
determined that there is a clear hierarchical structure segmenting major 
decision-making levels within the public hospital99.  The most 
distinguishable governing decision-making levels related to hospital 
operations are (1) the executive level, (2) the managerial level or the 
hospital’s top-management group100 and (3) ward level. 
The hospital’s board of directors represents the governing authorities’ formal 
executive body.  Its mandate encompasses directing over-all goals, standards 
of performance and resource allocation101.   
                                                 
99 This contention is also supported by NOU 1997:2; specifically section 5.6 
“Sykehusets interne organisering”, p.p. 33-38. 
100 Considered here to be the hospital director and his/her formally established 
management team.  Top management is also the term employed in NOU 1997: 2; 
see section 10.3 “Toppledelsesfunksjonen i sykehus”; p. 95; particularly sub-section 
10.3.2 Toppledelsens ansvar og ledelse”, p.p. 95-97. 
101 Hospital specific document will be referenced relevant to the analysis of each 
case hospital. 
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The hospital’s top management team made up of the director and his/her 
administrative staff plans, facilitates, controls and follows up hospital 
performances.  As with the hospital board of directors, all formal hospital 
decision-making processes are entered into meeting protocols verifying case 
matter issues called and their affirmative outcome. 
 
Hospital ward management supervises clinical activities but does not 
practice an equally formal and well-documented decision-making process.  
However, over-all clinical goals are presumed presented, promoted, and 
processed by ward supervisors in other decision-making arenas in the 
hospital.  Thus, ward-planning processes ascend from clinical unit levels and 
culminate at management or board levels.   
 
The interview informants which have been selected are representative of 
these key organizational positions within the hospital’s hierarchical structure 
as depicted in illustration no. 12: “Hospital decision-making sectioning”102.   
 
10.3.2 Analysis and findings 
10.3.2.1 At executive governance level 
10.3.2.1.1 Analytical approach 
All board directors at the respective case hospitals have been interviewed.  
Transcribed interview records provide important insight into board logic.  
All board directors are senior executives and range in age from the mid 50’s 
to the late 60’s.  All three have previously been active in city and county 
political affairs. 
 
Board informant interviews provide insight into how the board perceives its 
role in the hospital’s chain of command.  The conceptual categories selected 
are to function as analytical constructs.  As such, they serve as analytical 
parameters indicative of the boards’ inductive power in their respective 
hospitals’ organizational decision-making. 
 
The conceptual categories and property focus are shown in the next table.  
                                                 
102 This tri-level chain of command within the hospital is also supported in literature 
by (Abbot 1988),(Erichsen 1996), (Friedson 2001), (Freddi and Björkman 1989), 
(Gordon 1980), (Harrison and Pollitt 1994).  
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Table no. 21:  Conceptual analysis: Organizational dynamics (1) 
Conceptual focus area Conceptual categories Conceptual property focus 
 
Branch sensitivity The informant’s 
perception of the board’s 
over-all position in 
representing and ensuring 
hospital services delivery 
Mandate interpretations The informant’s 
perception of the board’s 
mandated scope of 
responsibility 
Authority assessment The informant’s 
perception of the board’s 
decision-making authority. 
Executive governance 
Impact recognition The informant’s 
perception of impact 
generated through the 
board’s decision-making 
actions. 
10.3.2.1.1.1 Branch sensitivity 
The board model selected for all three case hospitals, are boards staffed with 
members external to sector governance103. As such these members are 
expected to bring forth their external leadership experience and managerial 
know-how. The boards are to conduct executive-oriented leadership with 
particular focus on establishing over-all strategic objectives and securing the 
management of the hospital’s resources allocations104.  
 
A common trait for the board directors appears to be their uniformly 
expressed concern for efficient resource administration. Their views of 
future hospital challenges relate to operational, organizational and leadership 
issues.  
The board chairman of hospital no.3 particularly underscores this. A recently 
completed hospital strategy plan is cited as having been instrumental in 
bringing about an improved hospital focus on effective operational 
measures.  An important objective has been to cut down on patient waiting 
lists.  The board views its role as an inductive agent to: (1) ensure patient 
                                                 
103 For a closer look at board models approved for public hospitals, pls. view thesis 
section 10.5.5.2.1.1 “Structural characteristics of the BDM”.  Board formation and 
board functions are legislated in the law on counties and communes, September 25, 
1992 (“Lov om kommuner og fylkeskommuner”). 
104 This is outlined in NOU 1997: 2, section 10.2.4 “Styrets rolle” (Role of the 
board), p.p. 94-95. 
 121
logistics, (2) achieve its operational budget and (3) secure professional 
administrative leadership within the medical wards. According to the 
directors, this is what hospital leadership is all about.  
 
”There has to be a change in the quality of leadership, from clinical 
leadership to a more administrative leadership.” 
 
When asked about the significance of administrative leadership, the 
directors all underscored the need for improved ward focus on hospital 
resources management rather than leadership time spent on clinical issues.      
 
The board-chairman of hospital no. 1 is concerned about safeguarding the 
hospital’s assigned university functions, underscoring a present low level of 
research activities.  Therefore the hospital’s strategic perspective is to secure 
the hospital’s continual position as a university based clinic.   
 
At hospital no. 2, the logic of corporate business economics is downplayed. 
The board chairman makes a distinction between the objective of a private 
business firm and that of a public hospital.  While the former seeks to secure 
profit maximization for its shareholders the public hospital continuously 
strives to optimize scarce resources in an effort to benefit patient treatment: 
 
”The hospital’s goal is not to earn money so that the owners can stash 
it away in a bank account.   We are not primarily concerned with 
increasing shareholder value.” 
 
The board chairman reiterates the need for hospital management and other 
supervisory staff to be cognizant of their roles as public servants: 
 
 “You have to be concerned with society in general and the role our 
hospital plays in it.” 
 
With the exception of the director at hospital no. 2, the governing board 
logic is its adherence to the economics of hospital resources deployment.  
The board mandate is scaled to patient treatment for the deserving DRG-
cases and the pursuit of the balanced budget, as paraphrased by the board 
director at hospital no. 1: 
 
 “There is a temptation to seek out those patients and those cases 
which pay well.” 
 
Generally, board directors express little public hospital branch sensitivity 
outside the needs for effective resources allocation.  Little attentiveness is 
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evident as to the overall perspective of public health in general and the 
hospital sector’s specific role in it.   
 
The governing logic of cost efficiency measures, appear well grounded and 
explicated in the governing philosophies of the board directors. 
10.3.2.1.1.2 Mandate interpretation 
The board chairmen all confirm their obligation to represent hospital 
ownership interests and governing views in hospital operations.  As 
expressed by the board director at hospital no. 1: 
  
”The Board’s main concern is with relations upwards, our owners.” 
 
It is quite apparent that it is chiefly the hospitals’ economic performance that 
commands the attention of board executives interviewed.  From the record of 
transcribed interviews, it is noted that all board directors are concerned with 
satisfying hospital ownership’s call for balancing budgets and cutting down 
on treatment waiting lists.  The director at hospital no. 1 underscores the 
board’s prioritized objectives of ensuring an effective hospital organization 
capable of turning out peak production performance. 
 
 “We deliver the services we are required to deliver within the 
framework of a sound economy.” 
 
At hospital no. 2, the director confirms the county ownership’s tightening of 
budgetary limits while at the same time calling for improved production.  
However, the director warns of a potential conflict between the county’s 
demand for cost containment and the call for the hospital to deliver the 
legislated scope of medical services. 
 
 “If we get into such a situation then we will have a national problem 
which requires a political solution.” 
 
In the interview with hospital no. 3 the perceived benefits of a new 
governance contractual services model is highlighted.  Under the provisions 
of the new model, the new formal hospital owner105 (Fylkeskommunen) 
acting as the hospital services procurement initiator (bestillerrollen), secures 
its anticipated needs for medical services from the hospital as the producer 
of said services (utførerrolle).  Under this revised governance system the 
county’s political administration, represented by its politically elected county 
                                                 
105 For details on the ownership change of Case hospital no. 3, pls. view thesis 
section 10.5.5.4.1 “Structural characteristics”. 
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mayor (Fylkesordfører), requests a set of specified medical services. An 
annual performance contract is prepared that represents the prescribed 
performance norm governing a particular period, normally a budget year.  
The board director expresses great confidence in this new administrative 
governance prescription and sees it as a measure to improve hospital 
performance. 
10.3.2.1.1.3 Authority assessment 
Board directors of both hospitals no. 1 and 3 are expressing confidence in 
their perceived scope of authority and find it adequate for the 
implementation of board objectives and actions.  Particularly at hospital no. 
3, having become an incorporated public organization separated from the 
county’s administrative branch, a confidence in corporate autonomy is 
noted: 
 
“We don’t bother the County Council and the County Council doesn’t 
bother us. We have a free hand.” 
 
Obstacles noted are the dissatisfaction with the hospitals’ differentiated staff 
cultures making targeted changes and improvement transitions particularly 
difficult: 
 
 “The walls between the hospital’s different departments are very 
high. One of our greatest challenges is the will to change.” 
 
While the directors of hospital no. 1 and no. 3 both are comfortable with 
their perceived scope of authority, this appears not to be the case at hospital 
no. 2. The board director views the hospital board as an insignificant 
caretaker without sufficient authority: 
 
 “If I am really honest, the Board has little more than a controller  
function. ” 
 
In the opinion of the board director, the system of shared public hospital 
governance between county administration and the county’s political arm 
has rendered the board without any real executive authority:   
 
“The current situation where a lack of mandate inhibits the Board’s 
influence on operations is not a good situation.  One cannot expect 
Board members to spend time and energy on operational issues if this 
situation continues. ” 
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The latter statement displays a frustration with what the director finds to be 
an unresolved structural problem.  The director also points out that 
insufficient budget resources necessitates excessive amount of time spent on 
cost control with lesser time to pursue core hospital functions: 
  
”The financial problems have taken up so much of our time that we 
have neither the capacity nor the opportunity to get really involved 
with  the hospital’s inner life and its day-to-day running.  ” 
 
One also notes the distress of the director at hospital no. 3 related to external 
constituents challenging the hospital’s public credibility and thus impeding 
board authority:  
 
“The media has a lot of influence. If the media writes something 
negative about some function or other at the hospital, or about a 
particular patient-case – it doesn’t happen often, but say a few times a 
year – if there is some scandal or other, the media will be there.  Not 
least if a hospital spokesman has been a little careless in expressing 
him/herself about what really is quite a trivial matter, then it gets 
blown out of all proportion.”  
 
Problems in the board’s perception of executive authority are also being 
attributed to organized employee groups, or employee federations:   
 
“These are organizations with a long tradition in proclaiming 
complex solutions.”106. 
10.3.2.1.1.4 Impact recognition 
Success or failures for the hospital boards are perceived in terms of the their 
records on resource efficiency.  Hospital no.1 looks at it this way: 
 
“No problems can be solved unless we have a financial turnover.  
After all it is about maintaining operations.” 
 
Board director at hospital no. 3 prides himself in having been able to 
generate changes and transitions in hospital management.  He emphasizes 
his initiative to establish a hospital strategy plan involving a large number of 
hospital internal participants.  Here again, the board chairman cites the 
board’s influence in developing the hospital’s strategic focus, having called 
                                                 
106 Thesis section 10.3.2.2.1.4 “Goal alignment”, discusses the influence of external 
stakeholder groups. 
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for plans to be based on the hospital’s capacity to remain effective and 
efficient:  
 
“I don’t believe in all these empty promises lying around in strategy 
documents here and there. The strategy plan has to have a main focus 
on 4 – 5 areas.”  
 
Board director at hospital no. 2 regrets the fact that board is without any 
direct mandate or control to secure necessary capital investments and 
investments in hospital maintenance.  On this latter point, the directors 
underscore the board’s inability to call on capital resources to replace 
outdated medical technology equipment.   
 
Related to resources administration, the board chairman points to a common 
problem of delayed budget approvals making cost control a major problem 
throughout the year. 
 
“It has taken a long time to reach an agreement on what the budget 
should be.  We have gone well into June and maybe even July. In other 
words half the year has gone before an agreement is finally reached.” 
  
The county and commune governance’s traditional inability to ensure proper 
budgetary procedures is cited as contributing to poor budgetary management 
within the case hospitals. 
10.3.2.1.2 Summary evaluation107 
On branch sensitivity: 
Boards express different views and exhibit different positions on branch 
sensitivity.  The board director at the community hospital (hospital no. 2) 
takes a firm value-based stand on the distinguishing characteristics between 
a private firm and a public service organization.  It becomes apparent that 
this board director also perceives the public hospital to be an integrated part 
in the production of society’s welfare services. However, no such 
operationalization of a societal view was offered in the context of the public 
hospital.  Other case hospital directors exhibit a leadership agenda chiefly 
aimed at resources supervision. Although the hospital director at the 
university clinic (Case hospital no. 1) is attentive to the financial 
significance of the national hospital classification, this is not tied to a 
                                                 
107 Specific reference to case hospital is done either by case number; e.g., Case 
hospital no., or by its national hospital class, such as “University clinic”, “County”- 
“Community” hospital.  Se thesis section 9.3.2 “Case hospital selections”; 
specifically table no. 16 “Selected case hospitals”. 
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strategic perspective.  A strategic imperative of costs control at the county 
hospital (hospital no. 3) aims at transforming the clinical supervision into 
improved administrative leadership.   
 
Mandate interpretation: 
The directors’ perception of branch sensitivity generally follows their 
mandate interpretation. Board mandate is documented in the law on hospitals 
as well as detailed in local governance prescriptions.  However, board focus 
reflects the present governance prescriptions on the economizing of public 
resources. A new leaf in institutionalized prescriptions is evidenced through 
a newly instituted contract administration concept. Contractual hospital 
services are procured according to specifications in an annual production 
contract. The board director at the university hospital promulgates 
economizing resources and maximizing production.  Again, the board 
director at the community hospital abstains.  Rather political restitutions are 
perceived necessary in the event that the hospital is unable to deliver the 
legislated scope and amount of medical services. 
 
Authority assessment: 
Executive management authority as interpreted by the hospital board follows 
from the preceding analysis.  Board directors at both the university hospital 
and county hospital credit good ownership relations with compatible views 
on hospital governance.  The medical staffs’ differing logic is identified as 
the most serious obstacle to effective hospital management. Other 
extraneous factors such as media are listed as a disturbing element to 
hospital autonomy.  Again dissenting, is the board director at the community 
hospital. Several factors are listed as seriously impeding executive 
management. A complex board-reporting matrix undermines board authority 
opposite sector governance and internally opposite the hospital 
administrative director.  Also, fiscal and monetary shortages are listed as 
being so serious that they inhibit operational planning and services 
production.  He lists a disproportionately large amount of time spent on 
budgetary audit functions completely hindering any other executive function. 
 
Impact recognition: 
All board directors agree that allocated resources and their deployment 
represent the basis for hospital services provided.  The community hospital 
board takes pride in having taken the initiative to develop a strategy that 
prioritizes resources efficiency measures related to an effective patient 
treatment program. Common frustration stems from lack of investment 
capital to replenish equipment and facilities. County hospital board reiterates 
delayed county budget approval, which reduces opportunities for effective 
cost supervision.   
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Executive board management seems to have only marginal focus on the 
nature, quality and scope of medical services provided.  This may explain 
why none of the hospital boards talk of developing strategies to prioritize 
medical focus and measures to enhance the quality and costs of services to 
be provided.  Completely lacking is an executive board focus on the 
development of competence and skills critical to proficient and effective 
treatment and care. 
10.3.2.2 At operations management level 
10.3.2.2.1 Analytical approach 
In the interview analysis of case hospitals’ operations management 
informants, the focus is on conditions perceived precursory to decision-
making behavior.  Within the selected interpretative framework four 
conceptual categories have been identified to help explain top management’s 
goal orientation.  Information is drawn from interviews conducted with each 
of the case hospital directors as well as with administrative staff and 
management team members.  Thus, when referring to operations 
management one therefore includes both the hospital director and the 
administrative and staff directors.  These are collectively referred to as the 
respective case hospitals’ top management108. 
 
The following conceptual categories have been selected. 
  
                                                 
108 This understanding is in line with what is expressed in government white paper 
NOU 1997: 2; see section 10.3 “Toppledelsesfunksjonen i sykehus”, p. 95 and 
section 10.3.2 “Toppledelsen ansvar og ledelse”, p.p. 95-97. 
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Table No. 22:  Conceptual analysis: Organizational dynamics (2) 
Conceptual focus Conceptual category Property focus 
Issue perception Informant’s perception of 
what constitutes important 
issues for the hospital 
Institutional perspective Informant’s awareness of 
the hospital institution’s 
strategic implications  
Goal orientation Informant’s goal focus and 
view on goal realization 
Operations management 
Goal alignment Informant’s view on how 
the hospital organization 
works to reach closure 
with particular emphasis 
on the relevancy and 
impact of stakeholder 
groups 
 
The conceptual categories selected for the analysis of operations 
management are comparable in nature to the categories applied in the 
analysis of the board directors. Efforts have been made to account 
specifically for the operational nature of top-level management.  Specific 
analytical focus is vested on the hospital directors. These are all senior 
managers with several years of management experience from within the 
public hospital sector.  Two out of the three director informants are medical 
doctors (hospitals nos. 1 and 2) while the third hospital director (hospital no. 
3) is a psychiatric nurse.  All three have long employment records attached 
to the particular case hospital. The other management informants included 
are senior personnel from within their particular staff professions. 
10.3.2.2.1.1 Issue perception 
All three directors express poignant views on issues considered relevant to 
the particular hospital.  Their position is marked by the nature of the 
hospital’s national hospital classification109.  At hospital no. 1, one is 
concerned with implementing the still incomplete State approved university 
and regional hospital functions:  
 
“The definition of our hospital functions is a priority.” 
 
                                                 
109 On formal hospital classifications, pls. view thesis section 3.3.1 “Hospital 
services functions”. 
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The university classification is considered a competitive strength important 
for its recruiting programs for medical staff and other health professionals.  
In its recruiting efforts, the hospital seeks to attract candidates with an 
interest in research and development. 
 
”We attach more weight to these functions than just registering and 
treating patients.  We also have to consider profiling the unit 
externally.  The hospital must make the most of the opportunities for 
research and development, also professional development”. 
 
Hospital no. 3 recognizes its geographical proximity to the larger university 
based hospitals in and near Oslo and hence its comparably weak competitive 
position for attracting health professionals. An expressed objective is to 
develop a scope of general medical services and a patient oriented 
organizational culture. The director supports the recruitment of a medical 
staff and health professionals inspired by clinical teamwork: 
 
“I have to build up a staff based on a different situation than that of 
hospitals such as Rikshospitalet, Ullevål and Radiumhospitalet.  We 
need people who want to work with the patients, do a good, efficient 
job, work a lot with advising patients and staff. Not necessarily in an 
environment where research and development is the main focus.  
There are not many PhD’s here”. 
 
The hospital’s close contact with local clinics and private physicians is 
another prioritized goal supportive of its objective to better serve primary 
patient needs:  
 
“The front line of medical services (“1ste-linjetjenesten”) is really our 
main patient recruiting ground.  If we want to promote ourselves then 
we can only do this through the primary health care stations” 
 
This chosen strategy is also representative of the views of the director at 
hospital no. 2. The latter informant points to a the need for a close 
cooperation with the community’s primary health care system: 
 
“We try to promote ourselves through the local media.  We have 
regular meetings with them to keep them informed of what we are 
focusing on” 
 
All three hospital directors are concerned with the need to improve 
leadership.  The director at hospital no. 1 stresses the need for being able to 
develop a whole new generation of leaders in his hospital.  This is perceived 
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to be a challenging task particularly as the medical doctors are apprehensive 
about such programs.  The hospital directors consider this a problem of 
removing a mental obstacle to management training: 
 
“The first challenge is to free doctors from their own professional 
biases.” 
 
The director at hospital no. 3 wishes to transform ward supervisors into ward 
leaders.  In her conception of leadership one needs to take more of an over-
all strategic view of hospital challenges.  Her major conflict with the 
academically trained doctors is their resentment to teamwork: 
 
“My clinical leaders are relatively alike in that they are all primarily 
concerned with their profession.  They prefer to be on their own than 
to be part of a team.” 
 
At hospital no. 2, the importance of leadership is linked to an ability to bring 
about improvements and transformations of established conventions related 
to people and processes.  
 
“Leadership is critical to whether or not it works” 
 
Hospital directors and their administrative staff express little attentiveness to 
core functional activities.  Administrative leadership precedes issues of 
clinical nature.  The major agenda items within operations management 
concern resource administration and prescriptions associated with cost 
supervision.   
10.3.2.2.1.2 Institutional perspective 
Several government white papers published throughout the 1990’s make 
explicit references to management issues inviting ownership and 
management attention to the hospitals’ strategic leadership.  The following 
excerpt serves to demonstrate governance focus: 
 
 “The hospital staff is to develop strategic guidelines to serve as a 
platform for hospital management and leadership.  A clearly defined 
strategy facilitates the development of the hospital’s operational goals 
and objectives necessary to provide direction and criteria for 
organizational decision-making” 110. 
 
                                                 
110 ”Ledelse i sykehus” (Leadership in public hospitals), Sosialdepartementet, 
September 1990, p. 22. 
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In the above referenced prescriptive note, government white paper reference 
is made to management’s responsibility for strategy development.  Ginter’s 
(Ginter, Swayne, and Duncan 1989) views hospital strategy as a behavioral 
pattern emerging from a stream of decisions, and concern the positioning of 
the organization within its environment.  The distinction is made between 
strategy as a planning process and strategic management representative of a 
managerial philosophy.  When linking strategic thinking and analysis to 
organizational action, the act of management planning and leadership thus 
becomes an integrated executive performance.   
 
It is perhaps in the managerial planning tradition that hospital strategy may 
be said to have its tradition in Norway.  Hospital directors have worked in 
accordance with a set of management guidelines that helped shape the plans 
aimed at assuring a maximum consistency in decision-making.  New Public 
Management measures111 may be credited with bringing about the 
competitive aspects in hospital strategy development.  Government white 
paper NOU 1997:2 talks specifically of the emerging competitive elements 
in public hospitals as follows: 
 
”The over-all quality and services integrated in patient treatment and 
care, considered critical to patient satisfaction within the hospital, will 
increasingly become a competitive factor in hospital care”112. 
 
Another strong impetus to hospital strategy development was introduced 
with government white paper NOU 1999: 15.  Here structural models and 
governance mechanisms present potential new prescriptions on capital 
management113.  It is reasonable to assume, therefore that the concept and 
relevancy of public hospital strategy development should have been present 
and known to all thesis informants at the time of the interviews. 
 
At hospital no. 1, the hospital director is clearly maintaining a strategic 
management perspective when bringing up the concern for his hospital’s 
university functions  
 
“Strategy today is primarily for cementing the different functions 
within the hospital. Yet these are still not in line with the white paper 
                                                 
111 Pls. vies thesis section 3.4 “The emergence of a corporate logic”, p. 48. 
112 “Pasienten først”; NOU 1997: 2, January 21st, 1997; section 6.3.5 Ledelse 
(Leadership), p. 55. 
113 See particularly section 4.2.3 “Det effektive sykehus – rasjonell bruk av kapital 
og personell”, p.p. 27-28. 
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of 1993.  The hospital has made the decision that we are to play in the 
First Division” 
 
The director further underscores the strategic implications when pointing to 
the likelihood of public funding spin-offs that may safeguard hospital 
research programs:  
 
”In addition to general day-to-day operation the university clinic 
status provides opportunities for research and development.”  
 
A further expected windfall gain from the hospital’s national status, is the 
likelihood of increased public spending for facilities expansion:  
 
“What we need to do is to ensure that we have the proper framework 
for further support.  In this case we need more space.” 
 
On a mere strategic management level and along Ginter’s (Ginter, Swayne, 
and Duncan 1989) line of the organization’s behavioral elements, the 
director narrows the scope down to budgetary constraints: 
 
“The most important objective that I follow up on is the objective 
which I myself am being followed up on, namely budgets and 
economic performance.” 
 
The director contrasts his preferred strategy to the governance focus: 
 
”Then I think of patient care; in a professional capacity.  These are 
objectives which my superiors do not follow me up on to the same 
extent.” 
 
In summarizing the strategic issues, the director recognizes a present hospital 
leadership that neglects the hospital’s strategic perspective:  
 
“At the end of the day, it is a question of who follows me up and on 
what.  As a Director my performance is judged by my immediate 
superiors.” 
 
Implicit in this view is the assumption that one is to sacrifice the hospital’s 
long-term objectives for short-term governance merits earned on cost 
efficiency measures. 
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The director of hospital no. 2 views strategy in the perspective of a planning 
process supportive of local hospital functions.  Hence, patient treatment 
programs are highlighted as being the primary operational objective. 
 
 “Our goal is to succeed in patient treatment, providing good quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency. In other words; short waiting lists and a 
sound economy.  This is our primary focus.  We are being evaluated 
based on economy, economy and economy - which is the exclusive 
county governance focus” 
 
The director at hospital no. 3 emphasizes a strategic leadership that reaffirms 
the hospital’s vision of a patient focused institution. 
 
 “I need to get all my staff to focus on only one thing; namely satisfied 
patients.  Every hour of the day is to be spent thinking about what one 
can do to ensure that patients remain satisfied.”    
 
The issue perception, as expressed by the other management representatives, 
remains equally firm on operational priorities. The rationale is abidance by 
governance prescriptions on resources efficiency.  Strategy as a function of 
the hospital’s over all objectives vested in its competitive advantage is 
absent.   The scope and time perspective of strategy is related chiefly to 
patient treatment and its associated costs.   
 
An over all strategic awareness compatible with the law on public hospitals 
appears absent. Operations management perspective is limited to viewing the 
public hospital as a production unit. The management challenge of 
supervising advanced technologies and skills in intensive and integrated 
processes is not evident. The perspective of operations management is 
narrowed down to short-term concerns for resources efficiency and effective 
patient treatment production programs. 
10.3.2.2.1.3 Goal orientation 
Considering the institutional perspective as evidenced by the previous 
analysis, the goal orientation is formulated accordingly. The hospital 
directors’ justification for a priority of administrative prescriptions is 
referenced to governance expectations.  As expressed by the director at 
hospital no. 2:  
 
”Politicians decide the framework and provide the means.  They need 
to see that this is to the benefit of the general public.” 
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This recognition of governance preference translates into the following 
operations management philosophy: 
  
“Every minute a patient spends in the hospital, generates costs.  
Occupying a bed generates costs. Ensuring an effective patient flow 
therefore has a high priority.  There is still much to be gained by 
improved hospital logistics” 
 
To attain targeted efficiency, the director makes reference to the goal of 
working to improve the quality of ward leadership.  
 
”Improving ward leadership is a primary objective.” 
 
At hospital no. 3, the director emphasizes the need to develop an improved 
production oriented culture within the clinic.  The recruiting strategy for 
medical staff targets candidates who are motivated by patient services and 
not by academic pursuits: 
  
 “I concentrate the most on the production line so to speak, trying to 
find those who enjoy working with many different types of patients.  In 
this hospital they have to work with every aspect of medicine.” 
 
The emphasis is on satisfying the hospital’s primary functions within the 
scope of patient treatment and as integrated with the total public health 
service chain. 
  
“We need to ensure effective logistics within the hospital service 
chain” 
 
Herein also lies the director’s focus on the need to maintain effective 
administrative routines facilitating the logistics of the patient medical 
regimen.  
 
“We need to ensure that we have routines for referring and for 
discharging patients. This is extremely important. We must understand 
each other from a professional point of view.  We have to speak the 
same language.” 
 
As with the other case hospitals, the director brings up the priority of 
working to change old organizational structures and lines of communication. 
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”I feel that the hospital is so locked into pre-conceived notions and 
outmoded cultures; old idiosyncrasies and a hierarchical 
organizational structure. We are working on erasing old myths. ” 
 
In particular the director at Case hospital no. 1, emphasizes the need to work 
with the organization to improve team leadership:  
 
“The major objective is to transform the organization. In particular, 
high priority is given to developing leadership skills among newly 
appointed ward supervisors.” 
 
The directors’ goal orientation as expressed by all three directors, appears 
uniform in its focus on cost control and seeking to develop leadership traits 
in support of a managerial orientation.  The pattern of the directors’ 
perception of the hospital’s institutional perspective transforms into their 
operationalized goal focus.  
10.3.2.2.1.4 Goal alignment 
The thesis focus on the informants’ alignment of hospital goals is herein 
analyzed with respect to how management works to secure decision-making 
closure on a particular matter. At this point, a stakeholder group has 
succeeded in placing its case on an affirmative decision-making pinnacle.  
Management needs to align the particular case along with the support of 
other constituent parties critical to its final endorsement. Such goal 
alignment may take on different forms from ensuring abidance by formal 
sector governance to working with critical suppliers to secure a contractual 
relationship important for hospital operations. The analysis will be presented 
in a way that profiles how each stakeholder group exerts its position opposite 
operations management. 
  
In viewing the case hospitals’ liaison with external stakeholder groups and 
their hospital internal counterparts, one subscribes to the stakeholder model 
as presented in illustration no. 7: “A framework of stakeholder forces”.   
 
On sector governance: 
The differing nature of county and commune governance regimes is apparent 
in the informants’ views expressing their relationships with hospital owner 
representatives.  As has previously been confirmed by the board director at 
hospital no. 2, the hospital director confirms a dual reporting line between 
the hospital board and its county administration.  The hospital director’s 
immediate supervisor is said to be the county’s commissionaire on health 
(“helse- og sosialdirektør”).  However, the hospital director also confirms an 
active liaison with the county’s various political offices.     
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 ”I primarily report to the County Committee for Health and Social 
Affairs, (helse- og sosialutvalget) but also to the County Committee 
(fylkesutvalget) with the County Council (fylkestinget) as the 
governing body.” 
 
A direct liaison with State-level hospital sector government is also 
confirmed. 
 
“Then we have a fair bit of contact with the Government, the Ministry, 
quite a few tasks and discussions there.”   
 
The hospital director is actively working with stakeholder representatives at 
various sector levels.  This includes the county’s political and administrative 
regimes up to and including the State sector level (“Sosial- og 
helsedepartementet”). At the same time he serves a formal working 
relationship with the board of directors. 
 
The hospital director at hospital no. 1, being a commune or city owned 
hospital, confirms his discomfort with what he perceives to be unclear 
formal reporting lines.  The director views the board as a mere budget audit 
group. 
 
“The Board relates to the hospital governors and in terms of mandate 
is basically on the same level as the Director. ” 
 
However, the hospital director confirms a perception of the board as being 
hierarchically slightly above the position of the hospital director. 
 
“The Board answers to the City Council (Byråden) and the City 
Council is adviser to the County Board Commissioner, 
(Kommunaldirektøren).  This means that the Board is in fact a notch 
higher than the Director which is a somewhat of an unusual 
situation.” 
 
The hospital director considers the County Board Commissioner 
(“Kommunaldirektøren”) on health and social affairs as his immediate 
superior, with the board of directors acting in a supplementary capacity as 
budget audit supervisor. 
 
At Case hospital no. 3, the director’s immediate superior is the board of 
directors with its chairman reporting to the County Mayor (Fylkesordfører). 
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“I report to the Board who in turn reports to the County  Mayor.”   
 
However, the director confirms the need to work closely with the political 
regime making up the hospital’s county governance system. 
 
 “ I need to pay attention to those who wield the power in the hospital 
in order to be able to implement the strategy.” 
 
The political regime in its totality is considered important in assuring the 
hospital’s success. 
 
“The Central Committee for Health (Hovedutvalget for helse) and the 
Congressional County (Fylkesting) are our gatekeepers.” 
 
Operations management informants all confirm the working presence of 
governance audit units integrated in the hospitals’ formal organizational 
structures. These are the Work Environment Committee (Arbeidsmiljø-
utvalget; i.e., AMU) and the Joint Cooperation Committee on Organizational 
Decision-making (Medbestemmelsesutvalget; i.e., MBU).  The former is a 
committee established to ensure the hospital’s abidance by laws and 
regulations governing work environments.  The latter is established to ensure 
management information sharing on decision-making issues viable to the 
hospitals’ mandated functions.  Scheduled meetings are conducted and 
protocols written. The hospital director conducts regular consultation 
meetings with the AMU and the MBU to have them voice their views and 
concerns.  Work conducted by the AMU and the MBU may in part be 
overlapped by the hospitals’ office of health, work environment, safety and 
security (Helse, Miljø og Sikkerhet; i.e., HMS).  The HMU organizational 
placing is within the director’s administrative staff.     
Supplanting the hospital internal groups working to ensure employee 
environment, safety and security is the Norwegian labor inspection authority 
(NLIA) (Arbeidstilsynet).  The NLIA represents the Ministry of labor and 
government.  With its 29 local offices around the country, the public 
hospitals are subject to all its land-based control activities on the hospitals’ 
environmental and safety programs. 
 
Furthermore, the hospital directors all recognize the role and presence of the 
County Doctor General114 representing the State’s Health supervisory board 
(Statens helsetilsyn). Additionally, the respective county’s Patient 
Ombudsman (Pasientombudet) governing hospitals nos. 2 and 3, and the 
equivalent position governing hospital no. 1 (Helse- og sosialombudet) are 
                                                 
114 See thesis section 3.2 “The governance model”. 
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recognized as being part of the hospital governance audit system.  The 
patient ombudsman office is established to empower patients wishing to 
have a particular medical treatment matter reviewed.  While the County 
Doctor General is mandated a wide set of governing rights to audit hospital 
medical performance, the office of the Patient Ombudsman represents a first 
step in a patient recourse process to lodge a complaint against a particular 
department.   
 
A summary overview of sector governance may be expressed as follows: 
 
Table No. 23: Stakeholder group characteristics: Sector governance 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Group 
objectives 
Significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Sector 
governance 
1. Political 
governance 
system 
2. Sector audit 
groups 
To ensure 
fulfilling of 
political sector 
objectives 
Exercises its 
influence 
through 
legislation, 
practices 
prescriptions, 
resources 
provisions and 
decrees on 
managerial and 
functional 
operations 
Hospital 
management is 
subordinated 
governance 
authority as 
represented and 
enforced by the 
respective 
governance 
agencies 
 
On Professional affiliations 
With respect to the hospital internal employee organizations, the employee 
federations governing medical doctors and nurses are considered the most 
important to hospital performance115.  Representatives of these two health 
professions are present both in line management and in supervisory positions 
within the clinical ward.  The majority of doctors and nurses are members of 
their employee federations.116  Their knowledge and skills go into all patient 
diagnostic work and the treatment regimen administered by the hospital.  
Furthermore, from a managerial as well as the medical staff’s point of view, 
the judgment of these two professions are called for when investments are 
                                                 
115 Pls. view theses section 2.2.3 “The omnipresence of professions”. 
116 Of a total of 17.591 medical doctors in Norway, in all 93.9% of these are 
members of The Norwegian Medical Association (Dnlf) 
http://www.legeforeningen.no  (01.12.2002).  The Norwegian Association of Nurses 
(NSF) had a total of 60.197 registered members December 31st ,2000 (Statistisk 
Årbok 2002; table No. 257, p. 222).  
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made that require significant and long-term monetary commitments. The 
historical pattern of conflict-induced resolutions, add credence to any case 
matter promulgated by the employee federations. 
  
The formal objectives of these respective federations cover both general 
employee conditions and the principles and scope of remuneration.  
However, the strategic scope of the medical doctors and nurses’ federations 
go beyond mere general employment conditions.117  The provisions 
supporting the doctors’ specialist education program particularly underline 
the strong hospital internal position enjoyed by the medical profession118.   
 
The profession of medical doctors has a history of seeking to uphold its 
autonomy vested in its unique position of skills and legislated special status 
in the public health system (Christensen 1994).  Christensen describes the 
influence of Dnlf to be particularly prevalent at national health sector level.  
At the same time, Dnlf is noted for its participation in a multitude of cross-
professional organizations, associations, committees and project work 
groups. Christensen therefore concludes that the influence of Dnlf in national 
health policy legislation and sector rulings is significant.  At the same time 
Christensen notes Dnlf’s heterogeneity in working relationships with other 
so-called semi-professions. The latter invites a certain amount of uncertainty 
as to the existence of a possible integrated strategy between the health 
professions opposite the hospital sector.    
 
The managerial complexities surrounding hospital top-management’s 
working relationship with the medical profession becomes evident during the 
informant interviews. 
 
 ”Naturally it is the main employee federations we most relate to, 
these being the federation of doctors and the federation of nurses.”    
 
                                                 
117 The employee federations of doctors and nurses both have national policy 
documents promulgating their members’ formal position on organization and 
management. Reference is made to: ”Overlegeforeningens policydokument om 
organisasjons og ledelse”, dated 2000 and ”NSF’s formål og prinsipprogram, 
vedtekter m.m. Yrkesetiske retningslinjer for sykepleiere, 2001”.  The basis of 
prescriptive policies and programs stem from their respective national statues and 
strategic programs; i.e.,  Dnlf: “Lover for den norske lægeforening”, as amended 
October 1, 2001 (http://www.legeforeningen.no); NSF: “NSF’s formal, 
prinsipprogram og vedtekter 2001 (http://www.nosf.no)..  
118A national board on the education of medical doctors supervises their specialist 
training as prescribed by regulations governing in-hospital training and the type and 
the number of staff postings in public hospital. 
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All case hospital directors refer to the doctors’ and nurses’ rigid employer - 
employee agreements.  These are said to reflect the director’s perception of 
the employee federations and their presence in the respective hospitals.  The 
director at hospital no. 3 interprets the powerful presence of the Dnlf the 
following way: 
 
 “Firstly I need to pay attention to those who wield the power in the 
hospital.  There are certain groups that have power and it is often 
those who help guarantee that we have medicine. These are the 
professional groups on the clinical side.  Should one try to bypass 
these doctors then there is no way one can succeed.” 
 
The directors’ problems with securing cost-effective solutions for labor-
intensive hospital activities, is connected to the medical doctors’ collective 
bargaining power. 
 
“Exclusive agreements for doctors, their special working hours, are a 
barrier, a major barrier. I am bound by these exclusive agreements.”  
 
Also the nurses’ association is credited with a strong negotiating position. 
 
“Their union representatives protect their strong professional 
interests.” 
 
The director at hospital no.2 points to a distinguishing character between the 
medical doctors’ association and the nurses’ federation. 
 
“Doctors belong to a union with strong professional interests as well 
as a strong focus on employee rights.   Other organizations aim to be 
purely professional organizations, but it is not clear how much of their 
focus really is on professional issues.” 
 
The informant interviews confirm the medical profession and the nurses’ 
association as representing strong stakeholder positions within the case 
hospitals.  Their institutional position is confirmed at operations 
management level. 
 
A summary overview of professional employee federations as a constituent 
actor in the hospital may be expressed as follows: 
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Table no. 24:  Stakeholder group characteristics: Professional employee federations 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Group 
objectives 
Significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Professional 
employee  
federations  
1. Dnlf; 
(Norwegian 
Medical 
Association
) 
2. NSF; 
(Norwegian 
Association 
of  Nurses) 
 
To ensure the 
best possible 
terms and 
conditions 
governing the 
member 
employment, 
professional 
standards and 
professional 
autonomy in 
organized 
medical 
practice. 
 
Generally seeks 
to uphold 
autonomous 
status vested in 
arbitrated 
contractual 
rights and 
supported by 
institutional 
prescriptions. 
Critical supplier 
of medical 
knowledge and 
professional 
skills. 
Access to and 
provider of 
supplier 
networks and 
professional 
affiliations 
ensuring 
continuance of 
core medical 
functions  
Collaborative 
focus vested on 
hospital ward 
and patient 
treatment and 
treatment related 
activities. 
 
 
On Proxy agents 
A dictionary definition of the noun “proxy” is expressed as “the authority to 
act for another”, or “a person authorized to act for another; agent or 
substitute”, with its Latin origin being prôcurâtiô; i.e., caring for119.  As 
such one may say that also the governance system audit offices and their 
staffs focusing specifically on patient rights, as well as those outside the 
realm of the public health system qualify as proxy agents; i.e., that they are 
acting on behalf of past and/or presently hospitalized patients.  The thesis 
has already outlined recognized proxy agents existing both within and 
outside the formal structure of the public health sector120. Interviews with 
                                                 
119 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language, 1969, William 
Morris, Editor. 
120 See thesis section 2.4 “The presence of “Corporatism” and other proxy agents”., 
and  thesis section 3.2 “The governance model”.  
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hospital directors and the hospitals’ chief medical officers confirm the 
existence of hospital policies and formal case processing routines with 
regard to governance audit agents.  The hospital organization’s system logic 
as expressed by the director at Case hospital no.1, is representative of the 
managerial perception of this “proxy” agent: 
 
“I consider the Patient Ombudsman to be a stakeholder, and we have 
one in Oslo.  The system works as a kind of safety valve for patients 
who are not recognized by the hospitals normal complaints system or 
who have turned directly to the Patient Ombudsman for help. The 
latter is then the spokesperson for the patient vis a vis the hospital and 
we try to get the patient registered into the normal complaints system. 
We have experience with conflicting views, but the Patient 
Ombudsman brings in the professional aspects.121 The Patient 
Ombudsman often sees matters from a legal point of view. But as we 
view patients as stakeholders, the Patient Ombudsman may be 
considered part of our quality assurance system.”     
 
The managerial perspective concerning patient rights is stated by the chief 
medical officer who has noted an improved system attentiveness to patient 
rights: 
 
“Patient rights and next-of-kin rights are stronger than before and 
require more attention. Thus much more of our working time and work 
force at the hospital is more tied-up than previously in these matters. 
In that sense our priorities are influenced by public opinion.  Just as 
important as the media is our reputation developed amongst family 
and friends based on the fact that the patient speaks of the hospital 
either in positive or negative terms.” 
 
Adding this statement to the previously listed feedback from the director at 
hospital no. 3 makes a powerful case for the hospitals’ attentiveness to 
patient rights: 
 
“ I need to get the staff to be clear on the fact that every thing they do 
must be to the good of the patient.  Every hour at work is to be spent 
                                                 
121 The Patient Ombudsman in the County of Akershus (applicable to Case hospital 
nos. 1 and 2) is a lawyer in addition to being an educated nurse.  Additionally, the 
office has its own medical advisory board consisting of seven members.  A 
particularly resourceful office when compared with its counterpart at the County of 
Buskerud (serving Case hospital no. 3) who is without any dedicated support staff. 
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consciously thinking about what we can do to ensure satisfied 
patients.” 
  
The hospital director at hospital no. 2 underscores his commitment to patient 
interests: 
 
“We have input from individual patients and patient representative 
organizations.  We have for example user-groups present in our 
complaints/injury committee.  A strong stakeholder is our Friends of 
the Patients Association (“Venneforeningen”) through whom we have 
a lot of contact with users and patients on the issues which they bring 
forward.”122 
 
The chief medical officer supplants the director’s formal position, adding a 
note of past system weakness: 
 
“I am afraid that I have seen many examples of colleagues not treating 
patients well. But this also has something to do with the fact that the 
patient is becoming more and more demanding and is not willing to 
accept what one was prepared to tolerate before.  An obvious 
consequence is that we have to change.” 
 
Recent years’ development of patient rights vested in national legislation and 
public discourse has resulted in revisions in governance prescription, 
hospital policies, regulations and procedures. The audit functions of the 
Patient Ombudsman, County Doctor General, and arms of the Health 
Supervisory Board, provide channels for punitive action when hospital 
performance proves deviant.  Proxy agents external to the institutionalized 
governance inaugurated patient rights include both smaller and larger 
organizations. These act as stakeholder pressure groups lobbying their 
grievances to political offices, media and any other arena suitable for an 
effective promotion.  Largest among these is the Norwegian Federation of 
Organizations of Disabled People (“Funksjonshemmedes Felles-
organisasjon”; FFO)123.  With the increased specialization of medicine, a 
closer dialogue is established between medical expertise and a particular 
ailment group.  Evidence of the impact of an effective constituent liaison is 
noted in the interview with the hospital director at hospital no. 3: 
 
                                                 
122 The patient friends organization, a voluntary and independent membership 
organization working opposite Case hospital no. 2 has nearly 7000 members (from 
interview with the chair person of Venneforeningen”. 
123 See thesis section 2.4 “The presence of “Corporatism” and other proxy agents”. 
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“When we were short of money we closed down the rheumatology 
department.  In this case the Association of Rheumatism Sufferers 
(Revma-foreningen) stood up to be counted, for better or worse, on 
behalf of this hospital.  We also have active associations for heart and 
lung patients who also work very hard for us.”   
 
The chief medical doctor at hospital no. 1 also lends credence to a close 
cooperation between external proxy groups and the hospital’s clinical wards: 
 
“My impression is that we have a good cooperation with many of these 
groups. We consider them team members. The Association for 
Diabetics, for example is very much involved here.  This Association 
does in fact finance some of the projects we have and work with us in 
starting up new projects, financing new ideas.”  
 
Judging from the hospital internal informant feedback, patient proxy groups 
work closely with their hospital counterparts. A common interest in 
improving knowledge, methods and procedures contribute towards better 
patient treatment result. 
   
However, not all patients are diagnosed with ailments automatically bringing 
them into the safer threshold of a resourceful proxy constituency.  In this 
connection it may be useful to look at the duration of patients’ stay in public 
hospitals.  Statistics show that average patient hospital stay is continually 
reduced.  From an average hospital patient stay of 10.6 days in 1981, this 
had been reduced to 5,8 days in 2001124. Behind these numbers may be a 
host of patient rationale, professional judgment and cultural traits all serving 
to explain increased regimen expediency.  It may be reasonable to assume 
that a large number of patients admitted and discharged commanding little or 
no attention from patient proxy groups. As expressed by the Patient 
Ombudsman at Buskerud County: 
 
”There was more time spent on patients before.  Yet today there are 
more doctors and nurses than before.  Then of course, there are more 
patients too. The admission time is so short nowadays, you almost 
have to be dead or very lucky to be admitted to the hospital without 
having to wait for ages.  Then you get treated. Then you are 
discharged”. 
 
                                                 
124 Statistisk Årbok, 2002; Helse og sosiale forhold, table 157, ”Utskrevne pasienter 
fra og liggedager på somatiske sykehus etter kjønn og alder 2001”, p. 139. 
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The Patient Ombudsman at the County of Buskerud serves patients of 
hospital no. 3.  She is a nurse and familiar with the every day life and 
experiences of many patients.  Some of these patients experience their first 
encounter with the public hospital without the coaching of any patient 
support group. 
 
”People are not really that demanding. They are concerned with the 
simple things. For example, that they are met in a proper manner and 
they want one doctor to relate to. However, 10 doctors may be in 
attendance in the space of 5 days.  Maybe they can relate to 3 of the 10 
doctors so that these at least know which patient they are dealing with, 
and what is wrong with the patient, so that the patient doesn’t have to 
keep repeating his/her symptoms to different doctors. And that the 
patient is followed up when he or she leaves here.  Failure to do so 
does not inspire confidence. For some reason or other it appears that 
many doctors have not been trained in communication skills.  That we 
notify the patient’s General Practitioner (GP) or that the patient 
himself/herself can inform the GP of the care he/she needs.  As you 
know, it doesn’t function like this today. People don’t hear anything, 
time passes, and then they don’t dare to go outside their front doors 
for fear of missing a telephone call asking them to come in to the 
hospital for a check-up.” 
 
Perhaps noteworthy also is the fact that all patient grievances reported to the 
office of the Patient Ombudsman are forwarded the particular hospital’s 
chief medical officer.  The latter forwards all such cases to a ward director in 
charge of the particular clinic to which a patient was admitted.  The thesis 
will not address the grievance handling processes.  However, it is important 
to note that patient grievances are routinely channeled outside the 
mainstream of managerial decision-making. A further quote from the 
interview of the Patient Ombudsman confirms this. 
 
“In my experience, the director delegates these issues to the 
professional part of the organization.  There is therefore no point in 
going to her”.  
 
The analysis of the proxy agents as stakeholders working opposite 
organizational decision-makers shows a differentiated picture.  The strongest 
proxy group in terms of an ability to influence improved remedial action 
correlates with patients’ diagnosed ailment.  A medically attractive diagnosis 
will command funds and resources for improved knowledge, stands the best 
chance of gaining proxy group support. Patients falling outside the 
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supervised attention of proxy agents may find themselves lesser serviced and 
thus become more vulnerable to hospital system deficiencies. 
 
A summary overview of proxy agents as representative of a stakeholder 
group is given in the following table. 
 
Table no. 25:  Stakeholder group characteristics: Proxy agents 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Group 
objectives 
Significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Proxy agents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Patient 
ailment 
groups 
representin
g the 
chronically 
ill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Voluntary 
“Friends of 
the 
patients”-
groups 
To ensure 
public and 
professional 
provisions 
improving 
treatment, care 
and support of 
the respective 
patient ailment 
groups. 
 
 
 
To uphold 
continuous 
liaison 
particularly 
with key 
medical staff to 
induce support 
and action 
facilitating 
hospital 
attention to 
patients and 
patient group 
needs. 
Mutual interests 
in medical 
research and 
patient care as 
basis for 
cooperation to 
secure public 
and private 
funds to ensure 
the financing of 
future research 
programs. 
 
Voluntary 
groups serve to 
strengthen a 
hospital’s 
image favorable 
to the hospital 
operations. 
Patient ailment 
groups may 
work to serve 
interests 
important both 
to hospital and 
proxy group 
objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
groups work to 
secure safe and 
sound patient 
conditions and 
thus facilitate 
hospital – 
patient 
communication. 
 
Community 
fund raising 
programs 
facilitate 
auxiliary 
investments in 
hospital internal 
programs aimed 
at further 
improving 
patient 
conditions. 
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Critical suppliers: 
The modern public hospital is a labor intensive, high-tech, know-how and 
skills intensive type organization. The continual advances of modern 
medicine provide still better diagnostic and treatment measures.  Therefore 
there is a societal expectancy to be served by the latest, the best and the 
safest medical regimen.125  As outlined in the contextual analysis, there is a 
recurring national debate on the perceived shortages of funds allocated the 
hospital sector. 
In viewing the hospitals’ critical suppliers as a generic constituent agent, the 
thesis is here focusing on the suppliers of technology and medicine.  The 
governance concern opposite critical suppliers covers expenditures, product 
quality and procedural adherence to the distribution of publicly supervised 
products.  Control mechanisms involve regulatory agencies, sector audit 
groups and hospital internal management processes. 
   
The thesis analysis of critical suppliers seeks to determine how these interact 
with hospital operations management. External suppliers represent 
significant operational expenditures. The hospital naturally seeks to curb 
such capital and cash commitments. A distinction here needs to be made 
between capital investments and expenditures made on non-capital items.  
Capital accounts are not presented as part of the public hospitals’ budget or 
accounts126. In the empirical period covered (2001), public hospitals 
exercised little control over capital accounts127. Both communes and counties 
followed the principle of cash accounting. This means that all capital outlays 
had to be fully accounted for in the year of investment.  In this way, the 
hospital’s operational accounts are not evidence of real resources 
consumption. Also, the law on budgets and accounting in public 
organizations specify that capital funds shall not be financing operational 
                                                 
125 See theses section 2.3 “The influx of societal “medicalization”. 
126 Budgetary procedures governing public organizations are legislated in the law on 
commune and counties (“Kommuneloven”); September, 25, 1992 (§ 45).  Specific 
prescriptions on budgets and accounting procedures are prescribed by the 
Department of communes and labor activities (“Kommunal og 
arbeidsdepartementet”). 
127 NOU 1999:15 “Hvor nært skal det være? Tilknyttingsformer for offentlige 
sykehus”; section 4.2.3 ”Det effektive sykehus – rasjonell bruk av kapital og 
personell”, p.p. 27-28. 
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activities128. The justifying argument for this is that a hospital does not 
engage in activities where no immediate operational funds are available.129 
 
While acquisitions of medical technical equipment may be considered as 
long-term strategic investments, the hospital internal process of planning and 
financing does not procedurally support it. This makes the hospital 
vulnerable to poor quality decision-making processes.  As is evident from 
the interview with the chief medical doctor at hospital no. 1, the strategic 
imperative seems to have dissipated: 
 
“Investments in new equipment are almost force majeure. Equipment 
stops functioning and the supplier and technical staff say it is not 
worth repairing.  We must buy new equipment now.  So as we do not 
want to cause critical delays for the Laboratory, X-ray, Intensive Care 
or Respiratory Unit, one just accepts that investments are necessary. It 
is also the case that once the money is spent, the Director allows the 
costs to be put through operations accounts. In effect, many millions in 
equipment investments have been put through general operations 
accounts.” 
 
Some informants express their concern for expressed investments to 
represent fictitious needs. The chief medical doctor at hospital no. 1 
supervising the investment budget process puts it this way: 
 
“The strategy may well be that the Clinic or Department presents the 
needs making them appear greater than they really are.  The owners 
then get the impression that when we are operating with investment 
needs in the region of 150-200 million kroner, and are actually 
granted 15 million and finally spend 25 there surely appears to be a 
situation where matters are exaggerated”.130 
 
                                                 
128 Law on communes and counties (“Kommuneloven”); dated Septembver 25, 
1992; chapter 8 “Økonomiplan, årsbudsjett, årsregnskap og rapportering. 
129 The problem of lacking capital accounting in public hospitals is also discussed in 
NOU  1999:15 “Hvor nært skal det være? Tilknyttingsformer for offentlige 
sykehus”; specifically in section 4.2.3 “Det effektive sykehus – rasjonell bruk av 
kapital og personell”, p.p. 27-28. 
130 Investment budget in plant and medical equipment were in 2001 NOK 17,5 mill.  
Case hospital operational budget in the same year was approved at NOK 1.2 bill.  
Building and maintenance’s share of this investment was set at NOK 6 mill. 
Capital investment at Case hospital no. 2 was in the same period NOK 10 mill. For 
comparative view on operational budgets at case hospitals, pls. view Table 16 
“Selected Case hospitals”. 
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Different practices seem to exist between case hospitals regarding the 
handling of acquisitions and purchases of medical technical equipment.  All 
hospitals report new and recent initiatives to professionalize equipment 
acquisitions.  The objective is cost savings to be generated through larger 
volume purchases, thus creating a stronger negotiating position.  Still a 
problem is defined with respect to the critical dialogue, taking place between 
ward representatives and equipment suppliers. 
 
“The procurement process has chiefly been a communication between 
the professionals and the equipment suppliers who have strongly 
reduced our opportunity for proper negotiations.  Discussions have 
usually gone so far that we are tied up before the matter even reaches 
the procurement department” 
 
Judged from the informant interviews, there seems to be a constant tug of 
war between the clinicians and the administrative staff in matters of 
acquisitions of medical supplies, medicine and medical technical equipment.  
The chief medical doctor at hospital no. 1 puts it this way: 
 
“A lot of time is spent on this because the medical staff believe that the 
procurement people do not know enough about the professional 
requirements and therefore are not properly aware of professional 
needs.  Consequently doctors do not want to be bothered with 
procurement budgets.  In reality the situation now is such that the 
professionals’ direct communication with the suppliers has gone so far 
that hands are tied long before matters reach the procurement 
department.” 
 
Within the medical community at large, technological change is the hallmark 
of health care (Health Affairs 2001). According to an editorial article in 
Health Affairs “medical doctors world wide read the same journals and 
participate in international consortia to encourage best practice through the 
best available tools and techniques” (Health Affairs 2001).  In Norway, there 
is a great deal of disagreement as to the exact investment needs for medical 
technical equipment. Hospital internal analysis has confirmed that outdated 
equipment represents a significant problem for patient safety in hospitals 
(Vandeskog 2000). Vandeskog makes reference to outdated equipment 
contributing to resource inefficiency and unacceptable patient quality.  
Bottom line for the hospital is reduced treatment capacity and the 
accumulation of patient treatment waiting lists.  Prior to coming up with a 
new national investment support program in medical technical equipment131, 
                                                 
131 St prp nr. 61 (1997-98); Innst S nr 226. 
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the Department of health and social services reported a backlog of NOK 2.5 
bill. (milliarder) and with new investment needs placed at NOK 7.3 bill. 
(Vandeskog 2000).  In seeking to document investment needs, a great deal of 
uncertainty was reported as to the perceived reliability of estimates.  
Differing and unsystematic routines existed with respect to inventory 
recording, value assessment and routines for discarding, replacing and 
projecting new equipment needs (Vandeskog 2000).   
 
The thesis confirms a lack of clear policies, prescriptions and routines with 
regards to the acquisitions of medical technical equipment.  The clinical 
wards promote the needs to acquire new and improved equipment in order to 
maintain high quality, safe and efficient treatment programs.  The medical 
profession’s preference for supervising the hospital dialogue with critical 
suppliers curtails management’s ability to impact acquisition terms and 
conditions.   
 
It appears as if suppliers generally enjoy a direct access to hospital internal 
medical staffs. Based on the informant interviews, the exact consequences 
are difficult to determine.  Programs to pool hospital investments optimize 
the purchasing process.  Case hospital informants confirm that hospitals have 
benefited from such cooperative arrangements.   
 
Less talked about is the close liaison said to exist between the suppliers of 
pharmaceutical products and hospital doctors.  The control of prescription 
medicine sold in Norway is supervised by the Norwegian Medicines Agency 
(Statens legemiddelverk).  Total branch sales in 2001 to hospitals and 
pharmacies amounted to NOK 8.3 bill. (mrd.)132.  As the public health sector 
finances a significant share of this, hospital expenditures on prescription 
drugs become a governance issue.133  The objective of the staff working for 
pharmaceutical firms in Norway is to uphold a close liaison with the public 
hospitals.134  However, as the chief medical officer at hospital no. 1 notes, 
the supervision and control of pharmaceutical products appears firm:   
 
                                                 
132 Legemiddelindustriforeningen “Tall og fakta” (Facts and figures), 
http://www.lmi.no. 
133 In 2001, public health agencies financed 68.6% of expenditures on prescription 
drugs (Source: Legemiddelindustriforeningen “Tall og fakta” (Facts and figures), 
http://www.lmi.no. 
134 In 2001 (31.12.01) 4130 people were employed in the pharmaceutical drug 
industry in Norway (Source: Legemiddelindustriforeningen “Tall og fakta” (Facts 
and figures), http://www.lmi.no. 
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“Which medicine the hospital chooses to go for is strongly controlled 
centrally.  There are purchasing committees that select the medicines 
for our hospital and who negotiate prices for each product type with 
suppliers.  It is possible to go outside this system but there have to be 
very strong arguments.  A special application has to be submitted in 
order to be able to use medicines other than those that are on the list. 
And the list is extremely long.” 
 
Some informants make references to their particular hospital being 
underrepresented in the drugs purchasing committees.  The thesis analysis 
has not looked into this contention.  However, informant interviews confirm 
that pharmaceutical firms do indeed play an important role in clinical 
operations.  As the following informant statement confirms, critical suppliers 
do influence hospital decision-making on the selection of pharmaceutical 
products.  The chief medical doctor at hospital no. 1 provides the first of 
such informant statements: 
 
“The pharmaceutical industry supports a number of clinical studies at 
the hospital.  Here between 20 and 25 such studies commence each 
year. They are financed by the pharmaceutical industry and are often 
multi-center studies for the Nordic countries, all of Europe, 
worldwide, or just covering a number of areas in Norway, where there 
is close cooperation between representatives from the pharmaceutical 
industry and the clinics. The pharmaceutical industry is interested to 
know which medicines the leading professionals recommend.  Let us 
just take for example the department for heart disease that treats a 
large number of patient groups with heart disease in Oslo. 
Information on treatments administered is transferred through the 
system when the patient goes to a GP who continues to treat the 
patient with the same drugs as prescribed by the hospital. 
Consequently the pharmaceutical industry is very interested in which 
drugs the hospital prescribes. In this system it is our doctors who 
decide. But it is the industry that controls the choice of studies they 
wish to finance.  This type of inducement therefore is a topic of 
discussion because we have to choose how many studies we carry out, 
also testing of medicines; what proportion of our resources will be 
tied up relative to independent research and development projects 
which we also have to carry out. A broad scope of resources is tied 
up; our doctors and nurses.Things are formally documented.  
However there is a lot of pressure from the industry.” 
 
The presence of the suppliers of drugs and medical consumables seems in 
great detail to be associated with the hospitals’ medical research programs.  
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Suppliers introduce new equipment and medicines.  At the same time, our 
staff needs to become updated on new medicines, technology, skills 
requirement and improved procedures.  In this setting, the industry provides 
opportunities that benefit both management and the medical staff.   
 
The case hospitals show distinguishing traits in their approaches to research 
programs offered by the industry.  As already outlined, hospital no. 1, being 
a university hospital, confirms its research ambitions.  Hospital no. 3, being 
a relatively large county hospital, has a lesser focus on medical research: 
 
“We raised the problem of the lack of research and development 
projects with the Director.  As a result, a Research and Development 
Advisory Board was established with 330.000 kroner per year in 
funds.  In my opinion this is a first step in the direction of stimulating 
research and development. But we also need another type of 
motivation to stimulate an interest in medical advancement.  There are 
not many people motivated to work on research and development. 
Here you are all engulfed in practical every day issues and there are 
no resources, neither in terms of money nor people. When you are 
running a County Hospital then your task is defined. It is about taking 
care of a population of a considerable scope.  Time does not permit 
specialization.  You have to provide medical services for 225.000 to 
235.000 people.” 
 
At the same hospital, the chief medical doctor informs of the hospital’s 
participation in multi-center research programs: 
 
“We have research and development projects related to the 
pharmaceutical industry. We must not forget that much of what they 
do is in done in order to get their medicines into the Norwegian 
market. On our hand, we are dependent upon national surveys to 
finance some of our own programs.  And the medicines have to 
become known.  Therefore there is this type of development projects.” 
  
The scope of research activities is further confirmed in the informant 
interviews at hospital no. 2, a local hospital.  Again, a lack of management-
initiated research is confirmed.  The chief medical doctor puts it this way: 
 
“Research and development is important, but management has not 
initiated any such program.  It is very much up to the doctors, and 
each department.” 
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The hospital director confirms the lack of resources to start up any research 
program: 
 
“The financing of our hospital does not encompass research projects 
which we actually are committed to do.  We don’t get DRG-points for 
that.  Therefore it is the pharmaceutical industry that finances many of 
our research projects.  This is pretty much up to the initiative of the 
doctors and the departments.” 
  
The following informant statement made by an informant at hospital no.1 
dramatizes the efforts made by suppliers to gain access to the hospital’s 
medical staff: 
 
“The Director throws us right into the arms of the pharmaceutical 
industry. I feel that this hospital should live up to its responsibilities 
and cover a minimum of costs for training courses so as to avoid that 
certain departments continually attend courses as they have better 
contacts within the pharmaceutical industry, while other departments 
who for different reasons don’t have such good contacts, because they 
don’t use such expensive medication or such expensive equipment, 
cannot go on courses”. 
 
”We get many offers from the pharmaceutical industry. They bombard 
us with letters and offers”. 
 
”During recent days I have seen examples whereby one is asked to 
send out information together with a form where the doctor is to list 
which medicines he or she prescribes as primary treatment, giving the 
name of the medicine for the particular condition. Weekly prizes are 
given to those who submit the required information. This happens to 
be a company that lives off collecting this type of information and who 
then sells it to the pharmaceutical companies.  In addition they are 
responsible for printing the general catalogue of medical drugs   
(Felleskatalogen)135.   
 
As outlined in the law on public hospitals, it is the duty of public hospitals to 
teach and train medical students and graduate staff to maintain their 
                                                 
135 Felleskatalogen” (”Felleskatalogen over farmasøytiske spesialpreparater 
markedsført i Norge”) is a summary listing over all pharmaceutical drugs sold in 
Norway.  The catalogue is intended for medical doctors and other health 
professionals. The Norwegian Medicines Agency (Statens legemiddelverk) has 
approved all factual comments made on drugs listed in the catalogue.   
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proficiency and qualifications.  Hospitals do receive financial support to 
finance medical specialists’ education136.  However, from speaking with 
members of both management and members of the clinical staffs, the 
consensus is that funds are inadequate.  Thus, it becomes evident that the 
type of training programs introduced and financed by the suppliers of 
medical equipment and medical supplies are considered attractive. 
  
“The hospital itself has no budget for training, professional 
development, courses and conferences. Support for such programs 
from industry is very important for many, particularly doctors, but 
also to a certain extent nurses and other professional groups.  This 
creates an intimacy or a bond between professional users here and the 
drug and equipment suppliers. That I am sure of”. 
 
A summary overview of critical suppliers as representative of a stakeholder 
group is listed in the following table. 
 
Table no. 26: Stakeholder group characteristics: Critical suppliers 
Stakeholder 
class 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Group objectives Significance to 
hospital 
operations 
Group’s 
collaboration 
with hospital 
interests 
Critical 
suppliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Producers 
of tools/ 
technologies 
and supplies 
critical to 
hospitals’ core 
patient 
treatment 
programs 
To ensure that the 
particular hospital 
continues to 
request their 
products and 
services. 
 
The hospitals’ 
continued 
application of 
supplier items 
represents an 
empirical source 
for product 
performance 
evaluation. 
 
Products are 
critical to hospital 
performance. 
Product costs and 
services impact 
operational and 
economic 
efficiency. 
 
Indirect cost/-
performance 
impact induced 
through upgrade 
of hospital know-
how, competence 
and capabilities. 
Joint projects 
on research and 
development 
serve both 
parties with 
respect to 
improving 
supplier 
products and 
next improving 
patient 
treatment 
outcome and 
hospital 
resources 
performance. 
 
                                                 
136 Hospitals are each year receiving special allotments to partially cover expenses 
associated with training and development of health staffs.  The governing 
procedures for this is outlined and explained in the recently issued Government 
white paper NOU 2003: 1 “Behovsbasert finansiering av spesialisthelsetjenesten”. 
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10.3.2.2.2 Summary evaluation 
Issue perception: 
The hospital directors’ views of issues critical to hospital operations appear 
closely aligned with the respective hospital’s functional status. The 
prescribed functional status triggers function focus and overall strategy.  The 
university clinic, values its academic status, as it is believed to support the 
hospital’s national profiling programs.   Sector support programs represent 
financing critical to recruiting, research and development and patient 
treatment programs.  Thus, operations’ scope is correspondingly broadened 
to encompass high quality patient treatment focus, recruiting and training of 
medical staff and research and development. 
The opposite issue perception appears represented at the county hospital 
explained by its physical proximity to several university clinics in Oslo.  
Hence, issue perception has triggered a strategy that prioritizes what the 
director coins as non-academic medicine.  Operational focus is an all out 
effort to integrate hospital patient regimen with community health services 
clinics.  The hospital benefits from improved patient logistics.  Recruiting 
and training programs are scaled accordingly. Medical research and 
development programs are marginalized reflecting a strategy of treatment 
production and resources efficiency administration. 
As a community hospital, hospital no. 2 has adopted an operations strategy 
based on an issue perception much like the county hospital.  Its even closer 
proximity to larger scale clinics, regional and university hospitals in Oslo 
and surrounding communities, makes this appear to be management’s 
chosen operations strategy.   
 
Institutional perspective: 
At operations management level at the university hospital, its director and 
management team all express a strong adherence to a strategic logic 
triggered by its university status for medicine. The logic may be summarized 
accordingly:  Funds follow status.  Funding spin-offs follow in the trail of 
university based subscriptions.  The breech in the logic appears in the 
hospital director’s subscription to the calls of the (Oslo) commune 
governance administration.  A partial strategic write-off is the direct result of 
a submission to the governing prescriptions of budget austerity.  
Management subscribes to the commune’s shorter-term operational focus. 
At the county and community hospitals, the institutional perspectives 
correspond with their respective issue perception.  The director of the county 
hospital emphasizes the merits of patient attentiveness.  It is not clear if this 
is representative of a genuine patient care philosophy or if it is considered a 
prerequisite to attract the good will of the community health services and 
their patients.  Pragmatism rules the community hospital, as the director 
rationalizes the needs to subscribe to county governance prescriptions.   
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Goal orientation: 
The hospital directors’ goal orientation depicts how close operations 
management may identify itself with operational solutions and over which 
they may exercise a real influence.  Here, their perception of issues and 
perspective on institutional focus bring in their common interest in ward 
leadership.  The corporate logic of governance and operations come together 
in a common preference for ward leadership development.  A differentiated 
organizational culture is perceived to be an obstacle to operations 
management programs.  The rationale of governance is perceived to be in 
contrast to the logic of the health professions.  Leadership skills at the 
community and county hospitals are equated with the ability to recognize the 
merits of patient logistics.  The county hospital director comprehends the 
necessity of communicating a uniform logic to develop and facilitate 
resources management.  At the university clinic, the director works to 
integrate the differentiated cultures of the health professions into team-based 
work approaches.  This latter challenge is perceived to be greater at the 
county case hospital.  Here the director’s objective is to make medical 
doctors professionally embrace general medicine, as specialists are not 
welcome in the non-academic environment. 
  
Goal alignment: 
The summary analysis of case hospitals’ goal alignment centers largely on 
their capacity to manage the presence and influence of relevant stakeholder 
groups in hospital decision-making.  The hospitals’ liaison with stakeholder 
group representatives is an activity that concerns top management.  At 
operations management level the hospital director and the management team 
align issue matters relative to stakeholder groups’ interests.  The subsequent 
analysis focuses on how operations management relates to such constituent 
liaison.  Stakeholder groups identified in the thesis’ contextual analysis will 
be followed to ascertain stakeholder relations.137 
 
On sector governance: 
Structural maladies plague the governance of both the county and the 
community hospital as earlier confirmed by the respective executive board 
directors.  Their hospital directors verify this in their perception of reporting 
relationships.  The director at the university hospital confirms his uncertainty 
about his true hierarchical position seeking to verify his superior position 
opposite the hospital board of directors.  The community hospital director 
exhibits a capacity to work effectively with a complex matrix governance 
                                                 
137 See thesis section 8.3.2 “Stakeholder selection”; specifically illustration no. 8 “A 
model of public hospital stakeholders”. 
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system encompassing both county and State sector actor agents.  The county 
hospital director registers her satisfaction with a new governing regime. 
With the structurally incorporated hospital she perceives a clear and 
unbroken reporting relationship circumventing the past matrix of political 
and county administrative actor agents. 
Governance instituted audit agencies and the hospital internal system audit 
control groups are verified as serving their prescriptive functions.  However, 
it becomes clear that issue matters are promulgated only in a consultative 
format outside the mainstream of hospital management.  County and State 
sector audit offices are not registered as viable constituents within decision-
making forums of the case hospitals.  Top management does not invite issues 
associated with the Patient Ombudsman, County doctor general or the 
State’s health supervisory board into the arena for critical operations 
management decisions. 
 
On professional affiliations: 
A uniform recognition exists among the director informants on the presence 
and significance of the employee federations.  The Norwegian medical 
association (Dnlf) and Norwegian nurses’ federation (NSF) are confirmed as 
wielding significant powers that impact operations management. The 
directors univocally confirm that both these employee organizations 
influence operational flexibility and costs management through contractually 
negotiated employment contracts.  Members of organized health professions 
are said to represent major obstacles to what private industry wish to 
perceive as managerial prerogatives.  Contractual employment conditions 
impact work scheduling, salary administration, staff recruitment and 
development and ward organization.   
As pointed out in the thesis’ contextual analysis, this strong institutional 
position attained by the medical doctors is attributable to a historical pattern 
of the power of professionals138. The autonomy enjoyed by medical 
professionals is by Harrison (Harrison and Pollitt 1994) said to be socially 
oriented towards the perception of illness as an individual pathology rather 
than one that is socially, politically or economically created.  Hospital 
director informants distinguish between the medical doctors’ employee 
organizations and the nurses’ organization.  This appears done in a way that 
perhaps reflects a differentiated view on the health professions and thus their 
perception of organized medicine.  It is particularly evident in the interview 
with the director for the community hospital who questions the nurses’ focus 
on health professional issues.   
 
                                                 
138 See thesis section 2.2.3 ”The omnipresence of professionals”. 
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On proxy agents: 
Proxy agents working on behalf of hospitalized patients may be divided into 
three categories. The Patient Ombudsman is the county/commune 
governance instituted agent working to facilitate a desired patient – hospital 
dialogue based on an interest in recourse and restitution. The Friends of 
patients-groups are voluntary organizations commonly established around a 
hospital.  A third patient proxy agent is a group organized to aid the 
chronically ill frequently requiring hospital admission and treatment.   
Informant interviews confirm that at operations management, none of these 
organizations figure in any strategic or day-to-day operational setting.  The 
Patient Ombudsman office works directly with and through the medical 
ward in their fact-finding processes.  “Friends of the patients”-groups follow 
the same logic.  Contacts within the clinic provide desired patient regimen 
insight and represent the arena where the most immediate corrective 
measures are assumed.  Interviews with patient ombudsman representatives 
convey an impression that only a small portion of patient complaints ever 
reaches their offices.  The great majority of patients do not possess the 
individual capacity and resources to initiate a formal process to challenge 
sector authority and judgment.   The accomplishments of “Friends of 
patients”-groups are at best considered a non-threatening hospital lobbying 
group promoting localized patient improvement measures. Limited resources 
scale action output accordingly. 
The informant analysis confirms the pronounced presence in all the hospitals 
of the chronic ailment/disability patient organizations. Their strongest 
presence is naturally in the larger hospitals such as the university and county 
hospital.  The analysis shows that the chronic ailment groups and medical 
wards work in unison to secure project funding for medical research 
programs.  Operations management does not structurally intervene. The 
situation of active external proxy agent intervention is by the hospital 
operations management not considered to be of any strategic concern.   
The large majority of patients falling outside the supervising shield of the 
proxy agent groups do not benefit from the support of any other bona fide 
vested interest group.139   
 
                                                 
139 Recent developments within private medical insurance are not taken into account.  
Effective January 2003, a political decree approved as tax deductible and employee 
tax exempt employer paid medical insurance.  This governance initiative falls 
outside the empirical time frame of the thesis.  It is also too early to determine the 
impact this measure may have on the hospital sector.  Norwegian Patient Accident 
Registry (“Norsk pasientskaderegister) records a total of 240.000 people waiting on 
hospital medical treatment.  The insurance industry projects a dramatic increase in 
the number of organizations wishing to insure its employees (Finansavisen, 
Thursdag 9th January, 2003). 
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Critical suppliers: 
As the analysis has established, all case hospitals struggle with the uniform 
problem of resource deficiencies.  The scarce funds allocated are generally 
inadequate to uphold a full range of mandated services.  Investment funds 
are utilized to facilitate hospital operations needs and vice versa depending 
upon how critical a situation may be.  Operations management logic as 
promoted and supplanted by executive authority and sector administration, 
focuses on resources supervision.  While the public hospital is a labor-
intensive branch, it is also critically dependent upon medical technical 
equipment and a continuous stream of medical supplies.  Viewed isolated 
this represents procurement costs.  Governance administration staffs largely 
supervise public hospital investment programs.  Financial investment costs 
do not appear in hospital accounts.  This serves partly to keep hospitals’ 
operations management out of the procurement process.  The analysis shows 
that this is far from a professionally sound process.  There is a continuous 
direct dialogue between suppliers and ward users outside the formally 
established procurement channels. Informants confirm that clinical 
representatives act to influence supplier choice and equipment preference140.   
Providers of equipment and supplies also appear to furnish supplementary 
services not being part of the governance resources provisions.  Industry 
suppliers supplant governance provisions thus making up critical system 
deficiencies.  Project resolutions between outside suppliers and hospitals- 
boarder professional, legal and ethical barriers on what is acceptable and 
what break conventions and codes of ethics.  Operations management’s lack 
of involvement permits wards autonomy in medical issues carrying strategic 
implications. Joint dialogues between external suppliers and ward 
representatives influence hospitals’ directional choices. The hospitals 
become strategically vested in equipment and supplier choice and locked in 
the ensuing scope of financial commitments.   
Primarily, this is a situation that concerns chiefly the university hospital.  
The pattern described seems well entrenched.  The county hospital passively 
accepts industry intervention although at a smaller scale.  Hospital 
participation in patient-output testing programs guarantees funding of 
professional training programs, conferences attendance and insight into 
relevant empirical research programs.  Nurses in charge of purchasing large 
amounts of hospital medical supplies are equally serviced by the industry 
and enjoying similar rewards.  At the community hospital the practice is as 
with the two former hospitals but scaled down corresponding to its 
operational scope. 
 
                                                 
140 For a broader analysis of this issue matter, reference is made to The Economist, 
February 15, 2003: “Pharmaceuticals.  Pushing Pills”, p. 63. 
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The issue of industry cooperation is frequently debated in media under the 
auspices “Morale for sale”141.  The interpretative view of hospital informant 
statements is one where suppliers of equipment and medical drugs and ward 
staff represent a professional bond.  Based on informant interviews, the 
hospitals’ operations management does not actively intervene in this 
practice.  Issue matters related are resolved in the interaction of ward 
representatives, sector acquisition program representatives and represen-
tatives of critical suppliers. Hospital internal policies and prescriptions 
confirm formal procedures. However, management does not intervene to 
resume initiative and control over medical practice and choice relevant to an 
over-all strategic initiative. 
10.3.2.3 Ward management level 
10.3.2.3.1 Analytical approach 
In all, 15 clinical staff members have been interviewed.  These represent 
medical doctors and nurses, some in supervisory capacities, others working 
as senior staff within the respective case hospital wards. The interpretative 
focus is organizational decision-making at ward level. Therefore, the 
conceptual categories selected for analysis reflect areas of ward interest 
related to (i) managerial performance, (ii) clinical supervision, (iii) the 
vested interests of the health professions and (iv) patient orientation. 
 
By hospital ward, reference is made to a larger medical unit or clinic.  
Drawing on definitions developed by Government white paper NOU 
1997:2142, a ward (klinisk avdeling) may be defined as an organizational unit 
within the hospital.  Its assigned responsibilities are to conduct specialized 
medical sub-functions within the range of the hospital’s total medical 
responsibility.  Ward facilities commonly incorporate bed sections, day-care 
units, examination rooms and a range of medical support sections organized 
within and/or outside the particular ward facilitating the clinical activities.  
The patient is to be examined, given proper medical treatment and provided 
with necessary facilities and care.  Also, the ward staff performs medical 
research and conduct educational programs for doctors in specialist 
training143.  Consequently a number of different professions are assigned to 
                                                 
141 ”Moral til salgs”; title of editorial article in ”Dagens Medisin”, 15th August 2002.  
The article enters the public discourse on the issue of “mutual dependencies” 
between the medial industry and medical doctors. 
142 See specifically section 5.6.1 “De medisinske funksjonene”, p. 33, particularly 
sub section 5.6.1.1 “De kliniske avdelingene”, p.p. 33-34. 
143 For detailed description of hospital organization, staff employed and services 
performed, pls. view thesis section 3.3 “Organizing for medical services. 
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the medical ward to ensure the qualities and qualifications of programs and 
services executed.  The scope of ward activities connected to managerial 
conduct represents an important part of the thesis’ analytical focus.  In order 
to accomplish assigned functions, the ward administers a significant amount 
of dedicated resources. As such, organizational ward decision-making 
invites the interests of a wide range of stakeholder groups both inside and 
outside the hospital.   
Hospitals differ in terms of medical specialties offered, range of activities 
performed, number of staff assigned and the volume of patients admitted.  
However, as can be seen from Table no. 8: “Selected Case hospitals”, all 
hospitals are equipped to serve both community and county functions.  This 
requires a broad range of medical responsibilities and specialized skills144.  
This to evidence the wards’ supervisory complexities and the need for well 
conceived operations management processes and priorities. 
 
The conceptual analysis applies categories that are expected to provide 
informant feed back indicative of stakeholder interests and influence.  These 
are presented in the following table. 
 
Table No. 27:  Conceptual analysis: Operations management (3) 
Conceptual focus Conceptual categories Property characteristics 
Managerial 
Attentiveness 
Informant’s attentiveness to the 
hospital’s over-all managerial 
needs as perceived relevant to 
ward operations 
Clinical ward  
Development 
Informant’s view of ward 
development relative to its over-
all operational scope of activities 
Subscription to 
professional field 
development 
Informant’s view of how the ward 
balances the needs of its health 
professionals opposite operational 
needs 
Ward supervision 
Patient  
Orientation 
The informant’s view of the 
clinical staff attentiveness to 
patient needs  
 
                                                 
144 For a detailed classification of public hospital services, their organization and 
classification, pls. view SAMDATA sykehus 03/01: “Sykehusstruktur i endring.  De 
lange linjer og utvikling siste tiår”, p.p. 65-96. 
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10.3.2.3.1.1 Managerial attentiveness 
With respect to the wards’ managerial capabilities, the analytical focus is on 
how the ward balances its over-all objectives opposite its own clinical needs. 
All ward managers145 are members of the respective hospitals’ top 
management group.  As such, one would expect that the governing concerns 
and priorities of both executive and operations management is well known to 
ward managers. However, ward managers express little enthusiasm for 
having to spend time on what are considered planning processes with little or 
no relevance to ward operations.  The following informant statements verify 
ward manager disillusionment with managerial exercises at case hospital 
nos. 1 and 3: 
  
”We have a strategy plan for 2001 – 2004. This was written by the 
management team.  The focus is very much on the economics of the 
general overall running of the hospital; economic key indicators, i.e. 
not an operating plan.  It is all about the economics.  Basically, short-
term budgets.  In my opinion the Budget Process leaves much to be 
desired” 
 
”In the strategy plan I was looking for a profiling of what we actually 
do.  But everything was about DRG and income.  The focus is only on 
cutting costs and reductions so that financial and economic goals can 
be achieved. I feel it is important to follow up the logistics or “patient 
flow”.  Actually get to grips with what we do.” 
 
”Yes, we have an extensive planning document. The volume is such 
that we did not manage to decide on any common concrete goals to 
work towards.  At management level we have not had any focus on 
achieving goals.”  
 
”The hospital’s strategy plan is characterized by cost cutting and the 
management have not secured adequate ”buy-in” and commitment to 
the plan. There is not enough focus on the issues at hand and too much 
focus on money” 
 
”At the beginning of November the Director announces that we have 
to make up for a deficit of 30 million kroner.  At the same time we are 
to develop a strategy plan. There are a number of department 
managers who are then presented with these cost-saving tasks.  Their 
                                                 
145 At ward level, the term ward managers and supervisors will be used 
interchangeably. 
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reaction is to ask what the point is of a strategy plan when the strategy 
is down-sizing. Then you don’t need a strategy plan!  At least not a 
strategy with a professional clinical/medical focus!” 
 
Ward managers at all hospitals express a commitment to ensure medical 
services considered to be part of their national hospital status146.  At hospital 
no. 1, their national classification prescribes a wide range of medical 
services.  Ward management commitment appears firm:  
 
”We have a functional commitment encompassing national and 
regional assignments towards which I have been particularly 
observant and loyal to.”  
 
As earlier expressed by ward informants at hospital no. 3, the regional 
hospital classification is evident in the hospital’s patient and production 
oriented strategies.  The efficiency-oriented approach to hospital production 
at hospital no. 2 also is attributable to its community clinic classification.  
The focus is on serving its local patient constituency in close cooperation 
with first-line health care institutions.  
 
A common frustration is expressed with respect to administrative 
prescriptions on production based cost reimbursement programs.147  Ward 
criticism encompasses both the logic of DRG and the time required for its 
administration: 
 
“ The problem surrounding the clinical dialogue is that the pressure 
to be efficient results in “per item” treatment. A patient who is 
admitted with an intestinal infection is treated for that complaint even 
if she also has gallstones and is on the waiting list for gallstone 
treatment.  Because of the time pressure the situation is such that a 
patient who has had an operation for cancer in the large intestine is 
not subject to more than one check-up here. Then the patient must go 
elsewhere, outside of the hospital because it is not lucrative for the 
hospital to carry out the check- up and we have limited resources.  The 
clinical dialogue then evaporates.” 
 
”You learn to get round the system. This has to do with main diagnosis 
and other diagnoses.  If you get an epileptic patient, then it is easy to 
                                                 
146 For the definition of the particular class hospitals and the corresponding medical 
functions ascribed, pls. view thesis section 3.3.1 “Hospital services functions”. 
147 For an explanation of hospital financing systems, pls. view thesis section 3.4 
“The emergence of corporate logic”. 
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record the diagnosis as epilepsy. But it is not so easy to record that in 
fact he also has diabetes, as this is a little irrelevant in this case.  
However if you do record it, then you get more money.”     
 
Equally compelling is the argument on the time required by medical staff to 
assign DRG classifications relative to patient diagnosis. 
 
”You can say that 20-30% of my time as a doctor goes to DRG-
coding” 
 
State sector initiatives to remedy the problem of hospital treatment waiting 
lists are not met with ward cooperation, as expressed at hospital no. 3:  
 
”Political direction has been of little consequence to us in our every 
day work.  We have had some friction in the system regarding the 
matter of sending patients abroad for treatment.  This has basically 
been unsuccessful because the professionals have on the whole 
considered it to be either wrong or unnecessary.” 
  
Further testimony to the hospital wards’ non-agreeable position on 
administrative decrees is evident in hospital reorganization programs.  
Through the Government white paper NOU 1997:2148 (later promulgated in 
the proposition of new health laws, Ot prp nr 10 (1989-99)149 and 
subsequently made into law July 2nd, 1999150), prescriptive announcements 
were made on the introduction of unitary leadership (enpersonsledelse)151.  
However, ward medical staff is still voicing its opposition.  The matter of 
ward supervision also represents a conflict between the medical doctors and 
nursing employee federations as to what professional background is required 
for ward leadership.  A medical doctor’s view may here be representative of 
the medical profession’s point of view: 
  
“Unitary leadership or singular leadership is a political prerequisite. 
It is my belief that this will have very little impact on the day-to-day 
running, because things will just continue as before.”  
 
The ward’s organizational structure represents the most important and 
visible element in the medical doctor’s career structure.  On a national level, 
                                                 
148 NOU 1997:2 ”Pasienten først: Ledelse og organisering i sykehus” 
149 Ot prp nr 10 (1998-99) “Om lov om spesialisthelsetjenesten mm” 
150 “Lov om spesialisthelsetjenesten m.m.”; Rundskriv I-59/2000 
151 For a review of hospitals’ functional organization models, pls., view thesis 
section 3.3.5 “Hospital management and the administrative functions”, p. 46. 
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State sector governance determines the distribution of medical staff 
geographically, by hospital types and at organizational levels152.  This 
arrangement is part of a sector prescription to ensure an efficient and just 
distribution of the nation’s medical resources.  A ward nurse informant 
perceives the present-day governance prescription of ward staffing and 
organization as follows: 
 
”The hospital is run on an old-fashioned patriarchal system with a 
strong focus on roles and reporting lines, i.e. who the boss is. The 
doctors reign supreme.” 
 
10.3.2.3.1.2 Clinical ward development 
Informants all express their professional commitment to and personal 
interest in the success of the clinic.  The clinical ward is the arena for health 
professionals.  Actor credibility is determined on educational background, 
professional qualifications and professional field associations.  Ward 
planning processes and managerial style are reported to be informal and non-
bureaucratic.  Administrative management appears to have less governing 
value: 
     
“Here there are documented goals for each clinic.  But in reality we 
don’t take any notice of what is written.  Our reality is about giving 
the best possible service to our community.  It is the management’s job 
to ensure that we have the necessary resources to ensure just that, i.e. 
patient treatment and service.” 
 
Management strategy processes are disregarded because of their perceived 
irrelevance to ward operations.   
 
“The strategy document is in my opinion just paper.  Most staff here 
do not relate to it, neither do they perceive it to be realistic.  It is an 
exercise, which maybe of value, but I think it will take time before it 
becomes an integrated part of our every day work, if indeed it ever 
does.”   
 
                                                 
152 National advisory boards are appointed by the Department of Health to ensure 
abidance by the legislated rules on medical educational and staffing: (1) “Nationalt 
råd for prioritering i helsevesenet”; and (2) “Nasjonalt råd for spesialistutdanning av 
leger”.  
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Ward strategy, although not the result of comprehensive planning processes 
and not formulated in strategy documents, focuses on securing self-
sufficiency and operational autonomy: 
  
”The strategy for my clinic is to ensure optimal medical staffing with 
doctors and nurses and qualified administrative support.” 
 
The medical staffs’ perceived self-governing rights to organize its clinical 
activities, becomes apparent through the interviews.  A medical 
representative expresses the traditional working of a wards’ operational 
infrastructure as follows: 
  
“When it comes to treatment and the extent of it, then there is no doubt 
in my mind that it is the doctors who set the agenda.  Law regulates 
part of this. However, there is no doubt either that the nurses and their 
leaders have the greatest influence on such important issues as how 
the wards are organized, a strong say in the organization of the out-
patients function, and resource priorities regarding ward and out-
patients. In sum, they define the hospital’s capacity to deal with the 
patients. In the main it is the nursing and auxiliary staff who define the 
number of out-patients which can be dealt with during a week, the 
number of operations which can be carried out, the number of X-ray 
patients we can deal with, and how many we can rehabilitate on the 
ward.” 
 
Other informants also confirm the face value of this functional segmentation 
to hospital operations. Medical doctors supervise the patient treatment 
regimen and associated resource application. Staff nurses impact the 
efficiency of logistical resources’ application. Ward nurses largely determine 
facilities’ utilization.   
   
While the wards seem to have an established division of labor between the 
two major health professions, informants relate their cultural differences.  
The significance of culture is important as this influences the professions’ 
ability to work along side each other.  Medical doctors and nurses perceive 
this cultural distinction differently.  A ward manager looks at it this way: 
 
”Doctors have a kind of anarchy culture which comes from our 
university background.  The nursing culture is one from colleges of 
higher education, i.e. a “flock culture”.  They are used to following 
the leader and being part of the flock. Almost like sheep walking over 
the edge of a cliff.  But it is a very good culture.  They take care of 
each other.  If you have a conflict amongst doctors, then you have a 
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conflict amongst people who basically think alike.  If you have a 
conflict between a doctor and a nurse then you have a kind of double 
conflict; both a personal and a cultural conflict.  The nursing culture 
requires time, process, caring, and emotions in the process of solving 
conflicts. It is not a question of problem solving.  It is a question about 
relationships.” 
 
Evidence of the medical profession’s hegemonic stature is present in the 
following statement: 
 
”Most surgeons think that it is great fun to operate.  It is kind of like 
being in heaven. You are doing something practical, something 
worthwhile.  Something exciting. You have everyone waiting on you.  
If someone comes and says something to you, then you can just snap 
back at them, and worst case, apologize afterwards.” 
 
A ward supervisor with a nursing background looks at it this way: 
 
”Nurses are looked upon as a painful necessity so that the doctors can 
carry out their medical treatment.  If only one could see the error in 
this kind of thinking then things would be managed differently.” 
 
In the hospital internal discussion on unitary management, the issue of 
professional background is paramount as to who is best qualified to lead the 
clinical ward.  The still unresolved issue concerns how and if ward managers 
should themselves participate in active clinical work.  Medical doctor 
informants all agree that lack of medical training disqualifies from becoming 
ward managers. At the same time it is important to ensure that ward 
managers with medical training can uphold their professional knowledge and 
skills.  According to one medical informant this has a dual aspect: 
 
“You ought to uphold your medical qualifications and thus your 
credibility as a supervisor of clinical activities.  To effectively lead you 
need to know what goes on in practice and to realize the consequences 
of your actions.  To do this you need to uphold your professional 
identity.  To accomplish this, I believe it is important to ensure 10 to 
30% clinical activity while working as a ward manager” 
 
With respect to nurses’ ward managerial qualifications, one medical doctor 
has the following assessment: 
 
“Medical doctors generally represent basically the best recruitment 
source for ward manager candidates.  Better than nurses and any 
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other candidates from other health professions.  Doctors generally 
represent the best type human resources (“menneskemateriell”) for 
this type of job.  I here speak in terms of intellect and not social 
status”. 
10.3.2.3.1.3 Subscription to professional field development 
A rapid growth of new technologies improves patient treatment through 
better medicine, more advanced equipment and safer and more accurate 
procedures.  In the thesis analysis one looks at how the ward acts to secure 
the continual need for staff’s competency development.  The informants’ 
views are relevant in assessing stakeholder groups’ access to and impact on 
clinical ward’s decision-making.     
 
In a report from SINTEF/UNIMED, one concludes that hospital institutions 
employing the largest amount of medical field specialties see the greatest 
growth in resources allocation (Hansen 2001).  The report also confirms a 
high frequency of hospital mergers during the 1990s.  As the restructuring 
creates larger hospital units, these hospitals have been granted a larger scope 
of medical field specialty functions (Hansen 2001). This permits the 
particular hospital to develop ward units with a greater scope of medical 
field activities.  The development is confirmed at hospital no. 1: 
 
”We have sorted the medical specialties into separate units.  In other 
words, the general medical fields have been subdivided.  We have had 
to reorganize the ward into a general part and one with specialist 
units whereby the specialists serve the general sections upon demand”   
 
Ward informants welcome this development.  It offers the promise of staying 
professionally abreast.  New staff brings in new knowledge, new procedures 
and better medicine:  
 
”Technology has played a major role in the development of the 
Norwegian Health Service. New things are introduced centrally and 
spread as a result of better training and because the technology 
becomes cheaper.”  
 
The rapid dissemination of technology and specialist staff is made possible 
partly by a rapid internalization of required knowledge and skills.  In this 
process, the role of other constituent agent groups such as the critical 
suppliers and proxy agent groups play an important role in facilitating 
technology, supplies and opportunities for knowledge development.  Ward 
informants confirm their direct interaction with critical suppliers of medical 
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equipment and supplies.  Ties to external suppliers appear organized around 
the clinics’ field specialty groups.  However, relationships with suppliers are 
also connected to individual physicians. Ward managers consider this an 
unacceptable situation, as supplier contact is lost when the ward contact 
leaves the hospital.  Thus, the practice of stakeholder suppliers appears to be 
partially outside the supervisory control of ward management. 
 
The speed of technology and medical innovation creates a constant pressure 
to improve skills.  Capital investments lag behind assessed needs 
(Vandeskog 2000).  The acquisition backlog represents a serious challenge 
as technology depreciation and replacement does not keep up with real time 
development:  
 
”In terms of depreciation we say that equipment has a 10-year life-
span.  From a professional, medical point of view, the average 
lifespan for our type of equipment is approximately 3 years.” 153   
 
This is a critical vantage point for ward management in its balancing 
between the scope of governance resources provided and the needs for 
continuous upgrade.   
Ward management also recognizes the near-term impact of medical research 
and development on hospital structures.   
 
”You would have to be naive not to realize that what goes on at 
molecular level today will have consequences for our infrastructure.”  
 
The issue of medical research and its significance to hospital operations and 
strategic choices appears not to be cohesively acted upon at ward 
management level.  A concluding excerpt from a ward informant serves to 
dramatize this point. 
 
”A medical-professional strategy is basically non-existent” 
10.3.2.3.1.4 Patient orientation 
In the ongoing national debates on public health, the role of the patient 
appears paramount.  One issue concerns the hospitals’ capacity to deliver 
services on demand.  Treatment waiting lists are used to exemplify system 
incapacities.  New service management principles seek to transform the 
hospital institutions into a client-oriented sector, attentive to patients’ 
expressed needs. A new law specifically designed to empower hospital 
                                                 
153 The issue of capital depreciation is discussed by Myklebust and Selvig in a HMT 
editorial (HMT No. 6/2000, p.p. 36-37). 
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patients, requires the medical wards to respond in kind to patient 
expectancies.154  In the thesis’ analysis of ward patient orientation, the focus 
is on clinic interactions with patient-related issues.   
 
Patient attentiveness involves ethics, empathy and treatment regimen to cure 
and to ease pain.  Here, each profession argues its uniquely qualified 
position.  The following nurse informant argues against the professed 
exclusive dialectic position between doctor and patient referred to as the 
clinical dialogue:    
 
”The doctor-patient relationship is critically important but it also has 
a tactical agenda tied to the profession of the medical doctor.  In the 
real world, professions other than the doctors have the closest 
dialogue with the patients.  The doctor comes in as a consultant.  
However, only nurses stay with the patient 24 hours a day. No 
singular health professional group has the right to claim exclusivity in 
the dialogue with the patient.  The Association of Medical Doctors has 
upgraded its ethical basis bringing in values such as mercy and care. 
The Medical doctors’ association’s Ethical Advisory Board has on 
their part attacked the nursing profession for professing a monopoly 
on patient care values.  This is, however, is part of upholding the 
medical professions’ own hegemonic position in the hospital” 
 
The national employee federation; i.e., Dnlf’s involvement in the issue of 
doctor-patient dialogue, is by the nurse informant considered not credible: 
 
”The Association of Medical Doctors does not raise critical issues 
regarding the relationship with the patient.  The Dnlf is an employee 
federation. The specialist associations within the Association of 
Medical Doctors do from time to time raise issues related to 
professional merits but rarely raise issues regarding the doctor-
patient relationship.” 
 
Nurse informants stress the nursing profession’s commitment to patient 
values as representing its core professional objective.  Also expressed is the 
                                                 
154 Passed into law July 2nd., 1999; “Lov nr. 63: Lov om pasientrettigheter.  
Rundskriv I-60/2000” gives: (1) patients legal rights to receive medical attention 
from the public health delivery system (§2); (2) patient rights to be properly 
informed about his/her medical condition and to participate and approve of 
treatment regimen (§ 3); (3) patient rights to consent to any health treatment (§ 4);  
(4) patient rights to have access to his/her medical journal (§5). 
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special nature of working in a hospital environment as being different from a 
profit-making industrial concern: 
 
”Managing a hospital is particularly demanding because we are 
dealing with human life. When hospitalized, patients are going 
through a major crisis in their lives, either because they are acutely 
ill, or because they are in a situation with the onset of an illness that 
will seriously affect the rest of their lives.  It is particularly 
challenging to work with people in such situations. Thus I believe that 
hospital work is based on much deeper rooted values that may not be 
so prominent in other organizations.”   
 
The national focus on the need for patient attentiveness has triggered a range 
of sector governance financed projects and studies155.  The Public health and 
social services departments have financed a number of hospital internal 
projects focusing on patient improvement programs.  No descriptive analysis 
of these programs is available. At hospital no. 1, a “Patient 1st” - project 
attracted national attention to its professed broad engagement in patient 
related issues. A hospital nurse informant shares her view on the project 
viability: 
 
”The whole ”Patient First” project was based on a ”bottom up” 
principle.  However, securing buy-in or ownership of the project, 
throughout the organization has been a problem. We have had many 
projects linked to this central project, but ambitions have not been 
realized and then the whole thing loses focus. We are still struggling 
with the basic philosophy of the “Patient First” project. One reason 
could be the fact that there has not been enough focus at management 
levels.  Personally I think that is the major reason.  Also the fact that, 
given the situation, it was not possible to realize some the issues the 
project group focused on at clinical level, and in some cases at 
hospital management level.”  
 
 
                                                 
155 A special national public sector advisory forum for hospital organizational 
development (“Forum for organisasjonsutvikling i sykehus”) was established 
following the publication of government white paper NOU 1997:2 “Pasienten først!” 
(“Patient 1st!”).  While the forum is chiefly concerned with organizational structures 
and management development, patient attentiveness is one of the prioritized focus 
areas; “Faglige satsingsområder og forumets arbeidsmåter”, February 23, 1998; see 
section  4.2.1 “Pasientmedvirkning og kommunikasjon med pasienter”. 
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The significance of patient proxy groups on patient issue matters, is by one 
informant expressed this way:  
 
”It is in any case continual food for thought that the attention and 
priority a patient receives while in the hospital depends upon the 
power and influence the patient group has.  It is all about priorities.  
About choosing between resources allocated to transplantation 
surgery versus the chronically ill or the old.”  
 
The significance of medical research in the search for discoveries of new 
medicines is expressed as a problem of priorities.  An ethical dimension is 
introduced with the competing interests in research aimed at alleviating pain 
and improving patient care. 
 
”Politically, the focus has been on care of cancer patients, while a 
large proportion of financing has gone to stem cell research.  Little 
has gone to the relief of the suffering. There has also been much 
national focus on geriatric care but in reality there is still little being 
done for old aged patients”.  
 
Mention is also made of some particularly resourceful patients calling on 
their personal network to secure favorable treatment.  Again the logic of 
medicine seems to prevail. 
 
”There are a few resourceful people who force their way through. But 
all this about resourceful patients is a farce because medical priorities 
form the basis for decisions.  It takes a lot to get around this”. 
10.3.2.3.2 Summary evaluation 
Managerial attentiveness: 
The analysis confirms a ward environment that affords little support for 
operations management prescriptions. Comprehensive hospital planning 
processes are written off as time consuming administrative exercises 
insignificant to ward interests.  The ward shows a marginal engagement in 
participating in resolving over-all hospital problems and integrated solutions.   
Hospital cost reimbursement programs are partially based on clinical cost 
norms. This necessitates the involvement of medical staff in diagnostic 
(DRG) coding and in cost reimbursement audits. Ward management is 
critical of having to spend their professional time on securing correct and 
timely payment for clinical services.  Ward informants also relate how the 
DRG-coding system serves to erode the patient-doctor dialogue and thus act 
to negatively influence treatment regimen.  Increased ward participation in 
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the financing regimen surrounding clinical activities breaks with the 
autonomy afforded medical professionals. Vike (Vike et al. 2002) labels 
conflicts of this nature as the ambivalence of actor agents in the Welfare 
state.  The ward is caught in the conflicting and unsettled situation 
established between responsibility, resources and recognition common to 
public health governance. According to Vike, ambivalence is subject-
oriented where dilemmas are resolved through the participant’s perceptual 
orientation.  While sector governance is vested in the moral precept of public 
health, it becomes the duty of the clinical arena to bridge system intentions 
and clinical capability.  Case hospital analysis shows how the medical ward 
acts and reacts to protect ward autonomy to fulfill clinical obligations related 
to medical professional merits. 
 
The informants’ dismay with managerial initiatives stems largely from the 
two largest case hospitals, namely the university and the county hospital.  
Both hospitals have recently participated in hospital-wide strategy processes.  
Smaller scaled planning processes have been conducted at the community 
hospital.  At the university hospital, ward staffs are particularly critical to the 
hospital’s lack of a research and development focus.  The county hospital is 
concerned about a perceived lack of operational focus as reflected in the 
strategy planning documents. 
  
At the time of the empirical fieldwork, unitary management was legislated 
with a uniform implementation deadline governing all public hospitals. Its 
introduction both at the university and community hospital were delayed.  
Ward representatives still voice their objections.  At the county hospital, 
however, implementation was already introduced in front of the imposed 
deadline.  The Norwegian Parliament first promulgated the governance logic 
of unitary management in 1996156.  A comprehensive line of arguments in 
support for unitary management in public hospitals was formally introduced 
in government white paper NOU 1997:2.  New legislation on hospitals was 
passed into law July 2nd 1999 containing the same line of argument.  The 
law’s prescription on organizing clinical activities was in accordance with 
the principles of unitary management157.  The fact that the logic of unitary 
management still remains contested reflects the influence of the medical 
profession.  Ward resentment and its capacity to ignore the legal intent of 
unitary management evidence the incapacity of the case hospitals’ operations 
management. Vrangbæk (Vrangbæk 1999) views clinical autonomy as 
                                                 
156 Government white paper Ot prp nr 10 (1998 - 99) “Om lov om 
spesialisthelsetjensten m m”, section 3.9 ”Ledelse i sykehus”, p.p. 66-70. 
157 Sosial- og helsedepartementet; Rundskriv I-59/2000: ”Lov om 
spesialisthelsetjenesten m. m.”, §3-9 ”Ledelse i sykehus”, p. 30.  
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representative of a governing rationale of the medical profession.  According 
to Vranbæk, the medical profession works first and foremost to ensure the 
ward’s professional members’ clinical competence development. The 
profession’s ethical rationale is based on the objective of securing the best 
possible medical regimen afforded the individual patient.  A breech with the 
established hierarchical structure and embedded rationale is by the ward 
managers perceived as a threat to an autonomy required to safeguard its 
evolvement as practicing medical doctors.   
                                                
Ward development: 
Clinical autonomy is reemphasized in the informants’ view on ward 
development.  Jakobsen  (Jakobsen 1999) points to the dangers of 
internalizing economic efficiency measures and rituals suppressing 
traditional clinical prescriptions.  The implicit dangers, as pointed out by 
Måseide (Måseide 1983), is represented by the critical problem of 
implementing governance reforms while at the same time permitting the 
continuance of the established system of social order.  The case hospital 
analysis points to a situation in which governance administrative 
prescriptions precede the transition of clinical logic.  Ward members resent 
the rigor of administrative management.  Administrative system standards do 
not serve merits tied to clinical rewards.  Thus, ward development progresses 
on its own cognizance. 
   
Hospital informants confirm a ward regimen built on the preference of the 
medical members.  Doctors set the ward’s agenda.  Doctors and nurses work 
professionally in unison, but remain disintegrated in their clinical precepts.  
The nursing staff ensures the workings of the medical wards’ structural 
interaction thus upholding regimen logistics.  Herein lies the power to 
influence system resources allocation and deployment.  Nurses secure the 
procurement of clinical supplies, its acquisition and consumption.  Doctors 
administer structural means and measures.  Ward development thus reflects 
the cultural disparity between doctors and nurses.   
Informants relate how differentiated logics uphold cultural barriers to work 
integration.  Informants confirm shared ward functions based chiefly on 
professional membership and less on individual qualifications.  Both the 
professions of doctors and nurses rely on the ward’s formal structural power.  
Members of the clinical ward are continuously being socialized into the 
chambers of this cultural subdivision.  Employee federations with their in-
house full time union representatives, actively work to uphold group 
objectives and their structural positioning.  The medical doctors’ culture of 
autonomy and elitism is expressed in a practice of non-integration.  As such, 
it serves to uphold the medical hegemony opposite other professions and 
maintaining a distance to other managerial functions.   
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University hospital informants express the traditional barriers between 
professions most poignantly.  Still structurally entrenched in the traditional 
pattern are also the ward members at the county hospitals. With the problems 
associated with unitary management still untested, the community hospital 
informants are less adamant in their expressions of professional cultural 
distinctions.   
 
Subscription to professional field development: 
A ward manager is in charge of supervising the professional fields of the 
assigned scope of clinical duties.  Herein lies the responsibility to uphold the 
expected standard of clinical performance.  The clinical ward represents the 
architecture for collaborative medical practice in a professional field that is 
said to abhor structure. Within the hospital, a ward’s organizational structure 
affects the interconnections between the health professions.  Informants 
confirm the existence of differentiated cultures vested in their structural 
positions and by the nature of their respective professions.  A commonality 
between health professions is their need to stay abreast in their knowledge 
and skills development.  This also harmonizes with a ward strategy to attract 
patients and resources.   
Contextual analysis and informant feedback both confirm the active 
development of field specialization.  Wards are continuously reorganized to 
accommodate development of new medical fields.  Hospital informants 
reveal an organizational strategy to accommodate medical fields’ structural 
requirements.  Ward members’ professional acumen is the best guarantee for 
rapid internalization of new technology and field specialty requirements.  
With scarce resources for investments in new technology, access to external 
suppliers is critical. Suppliers offer a link with empirical fields and 
professional networks.  Recognizing public hospitals’ shortage of funds for 
education and development, suppliers offer applicable training programs.  
This is a practice benefiting both doctors and nurses.  The extent of it has not 
been measured within the empirical field being analyzed.  Hospitals’ 
operations management does not exhibit a practice of interfering in the 
practice of wards’ supplier group associations.  Neither do ward managers 
exercise any supervision of its staff members’ industry associations.  It is 
generally accepted that opportunities avail themselves in a way to improve 
upon their professional development. On a larger scale, suppliers present 
opportunities for participating in research and development programs.  Such 
programs are attractive both in terms of the resources provided and in the 
professional merits awarded. As the ward is organized around the knowledge 
system it employs, the status of its members is reflected in their involvement 
with professional networks.  The extent of the individual’s involvement in 
recognized knowledge networks, the higher the professional status. The 
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medical suppliers furnish critical resources that the sector governance does 
not find itself in a position to provide.   
 
The thesis analysis of informant statements projects an image of clinical 
wards without a cohesive approach to handling industry advances.  Pending 
initiatives are mentioned at the university hospital to learn the scope of 
industry arrangements between ward member groups and industry suppliers.  
Hospital internal initiatives are considered that may seize control over 
unwanted ward practice.  However, ward management itself does not speak 
of such initiatives to bring about formally approved standards for industry 
relations.  There is no common perspective on shared standards determining 
supplier selection. Neither hospital board directors nor operations managers 
bring up any concern for an overall strategy for the hospital’s medical field 
development.   
 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1984) speaks of how capital resources may take on 
different forms.  As expressed by Vike, (Vike et al. 2002) resources may be 
converted for political purposes.  This presupposes, however, that monetary 
funds may be transformed into cultural capital.  According to Vike this may 
be expressed through symbolic representations.  In the case of the public 
hospital, it may serve to facilitate access to the ward’s clinical members.  In 
terms of the position of stakeholder groups, industry suppliers wield 
important influence as the resources presented may be converted to satisfy 
professional field merits.  One may in other words say that industry – ward 
cooperation represents an exchange network between structural systems.  
The medium of exchange may be understood in terms of how the nature of 
value creation may be converted into a differentiated value circulation.  In 
the case of public hospitals, the clinical ward members themselves 
determined the rate of exchange.   
The practice of industry cooperation is seeing its widest practice at the 
university hospital.  These program initiatives stem from ambitious ward 
members who are motivated by the hospital’s academic standing.  The 
practice of industry association is considerably scaled down at the county 
hospital.  This is caused by the hospital’s pronounced strategy of non-
academic medicine.  The issue of supplier association is also present at the 
community hospital. Here industry cooperation is not presented as a 
problematic issue.  Informant feedback does not confirm a broad scaled 
practice of industry cooperation.  Supplier presence is confirmed, as are the 
miscellaneous benefits of training and development programs offered 
clinical ward members.   
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Patient orientation: 
 Vike (Vike et al. 2002 p. 209) makes reference to the phrase “welfare 
positivism” (velferdspositivisme) in explaining the near universal belief that 
the welfare state’s problem can be solved. While resolutions may vary, 
problems are believed to stem from a combination of resource shortages and 
inefficient operations.    The common societal expectations remain firm.  All 
citizens have the rights to receive public hospital services irrespective of 
income, position, age, gender, and location.  This universalism in welfare 
ambition creates a special set of premises for the pubic hospital.  According 
to Vike, the public sector works on the premises of a continual crisis of 
resource shortages, growth in welfare services demands and a universal trust 
in public sector’s capacity to reconcile conflicting interests.   
This institutionalized welfare positivism has perhaps been transformed into 
the national call for an improved patient orientation. Government white 
paper NOU 1997:2 prescribes a broad set of normative values on patient 
values considered relevant to the public hospital.158.  The general sentiment 
is that of reclassifying the receiver of hospital services from having been a 
patient to becoming a valued client.  Parallel legal prescriptions introduced 
to empower patients, reinforce the need to recognize patients’ rights.  The 
underlying premises of “Patient first” prescriptive codes have been the 
presumption that a patient lacks the resources necessary to establish a 
balance in actor-agent relations. 
The “Patient 1st.” program, as cited by the university hospital informants, 
represents a hospital internal project aimed at improving hospital 
attentiveness to patient rights.  Informant perception relates an impression of 
a project that failed to realize its intended objective.  A contributing reason is 
reported to be a missing ward-management commitment. The project-
organizing model did not properly connect with the formal alignment of 
ward responsibilities.  Such informant contentions challenge the popularized 
norm of patient care as presented in the health professions code of ethics.  
The two health professions analyzed both make claim to patient-dialogue 
exclusivity.  The professions argue on the merits of patient attentiveness 
applying the sector’s own prescriptive logic.   
Case hospital nurses caution against the power of special patient proxy 
agents, as they disfavor non-aligned patients. Medical doctors hail the 
cooperation with proxy agent organizations as they bring in valuable 
resources to medical field programs. Certain diagnosed ailment groups 
                                                 
158 NOU 1997:2 identifies ten (10) items that should represent core focus areas for 
patient satisfaction; these are (1) Services accessibility, (2) Patient attentiveness, (3) 
Professional knowledge, (4) Field professionalism, (5) Accountability, (6) 
Punctuality, (7) Openness, (8) Holistic approach, (9) Courteousness, (10) Mutual 
respect.  
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attract resources provided that the field medical regimen is aligned with 
supplier interests.  Case hospital nurses are concerned about the direction of 
medical research as supplier resources favor new medical development in 
place of a focus on patient relief.  
The prevailing ward policy favoring industry cooperation is prevalent at the 
university hospital.  Both operations management and ward informants at the 
county and community hospital promote patient orientation outside of a 
strong industry attachment.   
A rather social patient codex as outlined in government white paper NOU 
1997:2 is not expressed by hospital informants. Rather, the myth of the 
resourceful patient is strongly contested by some informants.  Medical logic 
and university medicine prevails.  Nurses promote non-secularized nursing 
as the only genuine patient care philosophy159.  Ward management confirms 
a non-aligned patient care philosophy between the health professions of 
doctors and nurses.              
10.4 Informant interviews: An analysis of actor agent 
perception 
10.4.1 Interpretative framework 
In line with the analytical focus, interview data is presented in this segment 
of the analysis to provide a comprehension of the nature and dynamics of 
stakeholder perception. As outlined in table no. 20, “Differentiated analytical 
framework”, the informant interviews are to facilitate an insight into the 
actor-agents’ perceptual traits.  Such traits are considered determinants of 
organizational decision-making.  Interview data has firstly served to describe 
the processes surrounding the hospital’s formal decision-making at key 
organizational levels. Informant feedback furnishes information of a 
perceptual nature.  These perceptual records are next to facilitate the analysis 
of the informants’ cognitive properties. Based on aggregate informant 
perceptions, stakeholder groups’ cognitive characteristics are identified.  The 
ultimate research objective is to develop an instrumental basis for how 
stakeholder group cognition influences organizational decision-making. 
In meeting the challenge of informant bias, as described in section 8.3.1 
“Informant approach”, the survey respondents selected are representative of 
specific hospital-internal organizational decision-making levels; i.e., 
administrative management, medical ward and clinical operations. 
Informants have been identified who are considered competent to report on 
dyadic relationships in an organization (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993) 
                                                 
159 The establishment of the Norwegian nurses association (NDF) in 1912 formally 
introduced the nursing profession disassociated from practitioners’ religious beliefs.   
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160.  This also subscribes to the methodological contention of Seidler.  
Seidler (Seidler 1974) relates the trends in sociological research where one 
relies on a small number of knowledgeable participants with the capacity to 
observe and express constituent relationships. Selecting representatives who 
are key decision-makers and members of the two traditionally strongest 
health professional groups, follows the previously outlined research rationale 
on informant methodology161. Accordingly, this consensual approach has 
been used where cognitive characteristics of multiple informants are mapped 
relative to their shared stakeholder position.     
The analytical constructs applied in the analysis of stakeholders’ cognitive 
characteristics, are shown in the following illustration. 
 
Illustration No. 15: Interpretative framework: Actor agent perception 
Actor-agent
perception
Cognitive
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Change
affirmation
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Directional
preference
 
                                                 
160 The modern day sociologists Antony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu both support a 
methodological contention of the research object as being reflexive and 
knowledgeable in nature.  We all have the capacity to understand what we are doing, 
to observe what is taking place around us and have the capacity to reflect on our 
own situation (Jerdal 1998).   
161 Pls. view thesis table no. 5 “Informant selection methodology”. 
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The conceptual foundation of the informant interviews rests on the research 
model’s theoretical prescriptions162. The intent is to identify the respondents’ 
cognitive characteristics relative to issue matters that reflect decision-making 
properties.  The research strategy partly draws its support from Cyert and 
March (Cyert and March 1992) in their analysis of organizational goals.  
Accordingly, the point of entry is the construct variables that affect 
organizational decision-making.  These are reflected in the conceptual 
categories and their properties selected and shown in the next table.  These 
are to serve as perceptive determinants of the informants’ cognitive 
characteristics. 
 
Table No. 28:  Conceptual analysis: stakeholder cognition 
Conceptual focus Conceptual categories Conceptual category 
properties 
Constituent recognition The informants’ 
recognition of constituent 
interest groups significant 
to hospital operations 
Change  
Affirmation 
The informants’ 
recognition of sector 
changes and implicit 
consequences to hospital 
operations 
Operational 
Significance 
The informants’ 
acknowledgement of 
operational performances 
and factors attributable to 
hospital output 
Leadership acceptance The informants’ 
acceptance of the 
relevancy of leadership in 
hospital operations 
Cognitive characteristics 
Directional preference The informants’ preferred 
hospital decision-making 
process to successfully 
meet strategic and 
operational challenges 
    
                                                 
162 See thesis section 7.2.3 “Thesis research model: Informant interviews” and 
illustration no. 5. 
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10.4.2 Analysis and findings 
10.4.2.1 Analytical approach 
The next illustration represents the analytical model for identifying 
informant cognition.  The model’s designated interpretative framework is 
made up of the five conceptual categories inherent in the design school 
strategizing model163. Aggregate perceptual traits recorded in response to 
decision-making issue matters are considered to be representative of 
stakeholders’ cognitive characteristics. The model’s issue-processing 
pathway follows the logic of the cognitive pathways as shown in Illustration 
no. 4: “Processing pathway” around which informant questions are formed 
(see Illustration no. 12: “Informant interview structure”. 
 
Illustration No. 16: Analytical model: Stakeholder cognition 
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According to Schwartz (Schwartz and Strack 1985), there is a wide 
agreement on the cognitive processes involved when respondents seek to 
answer questions optimally. Krosnick (Krosnick and Fabrigar 1998) makes 
                                                 
163 See illustration no. 5: “Thesis research model”. 
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reference to the great amount of cognitive work required to generate an 
optimal answer to even a single question. Cumulative work required to 
answer a long series of questions on a wide range of issue matters, represents 
a substantial effort on behalf of the informant.   
 
According to Golledge (Golledge 1999), “the information processing 
approach of cognitive psychology is an effort to understand human 
performance as the consequences of mental operations (cognitive processes) 
executed on incoming information acquired from perception on stored 
information (representations)”.  Informants’ responses thus involve several 
stages of information processing.  In the interview, these various stages are 
all established in the interview setting.  The selected conceptual categories 
and their properties are taking the informant through: (1) a recognition stage 
through which the relevancy of issue matter is noted; (2) an acknowledge 
level where the informant analyzes the contextual situation involving the 
presence of other stakeholder interests; (3) a stage of assessing issue matter 
priorities based on their perceived contextual relevancy; and (4) an ultimate 
decision-making point of departure based on the informant’s “landmark 
destination”164.  This latter term is applied by Golledge when pointing to an 
informant’s need to employ a strategic or holistic focus to assist spatial 
decision-making. The call for an informant’s ultimate decision-making 
position implying a directional preference, may be said to cause “landmark 
cognition significance”(Golledge 1999).  In other words, contextual issues 
take on salience through the vested nature of stakeholder group interest.   
 
The next illustration traces the informant’s spatial navigation relative to the 
parallel stages of the informant’s perceptual processes within the framework 
of cognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 This concept is introduced in the theses in section 7.2.2 “The logic of spatial 
decision-making”. 
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Illustration No. 17:  Stages of spatial navigation 
Recognition
Acknowledge
Prioritize
Make
decisions
Issue awareness:
Issue compartmentalization
Issue selection
Issue operationalization
Cognitive pathway Perceptual processes
Retrieval of alternatives
Spatial 
navigation
Issue 
relevancy
Power
perspective
Contextual
relevancy
Landmark
destination
 
 
Informant data gathered in the interviews does not provide for a descriptive 
basis that permits the construction of a cognitive map with any exact 
geometric properties. Recording the informants’ perceptual processes 
facilitates, however, a conceptualization of the cognitive processes.  
According to Eden, cognitive mapping serves as a proxy of “unseen target 
phenomena” (Eden and Spender 1998). The interview structure follows the 
informant’s cognitive pathway165. The illustration’s spatial navigation 
processes illuminate the stages along which cognition serves its role as a 
perceptual screening device. 
 
The informant’s spatial navigation may be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 For a review of the theories of cognitive mapping, pls., view thesis section 4.5.3 
“Cognitive mapping and decision-making”. 
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Illustration No. 18: Spatial navigation   
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The thin (red) line symbolizes and traces the informant’s perceptual process 
in response to informant interview questions.  The process is taking place 
within a spatial range representing the subject’s cognitive boundaries.  The 
solid (blue) line represents the informant’s cognitive profile.  The model is 
purely conceptual, as informant feedback does not permit precise perceptual 
measures.  According to Anderson, cognitive psychology hypothesizes two 
modes of cognitive processing.  “One is automatic, invoked directly by 
stimulus input.  The second requires conscious control, has severe capacity 
limitation, is possibly serial, and is invoked in response to internal goals” 
(Anderson 1983 p. 126).  Relying on informant feedback linked to a loosely 
traced cognitive structure is therefore at best an exploratory technique to 
better explain stakeholder group behavior.  Lindsay (Lindsay and Norman 
1977) makes a distinction between data-driven and conceptually driven 
processes.  In the case of the informant interviews, responses called for are 
conceptual in nature, invoking responses that “start at the bottom of the 
cognitive system” (Anderson 1983).     
Stakeholder groups have become institutionalized through their common 
interests and community action.  The research model’s conceptual structure 
facilitates a type of community response analysis on behalf of the informant 
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groups.  According to Ouchi, “the mechanism that transforms narrow self-
interests into a balanced state of cooperation among independent individuals 
is the network of like-minded individuals kept together by common vested 
interests” (Ouchi 1984 p. 204).  Studies of cognitive consensus inquire into 
the degree to which cultural orientation of groups are congruent (Etzioni 
1971).  According to Etzioni, organizations differ in the degree of consensus 
they require in various consensus-spheres.  “Cognitive consensus 
encompasses concurrence about shared references and an agreed-upon set of 
canons for empirical perceptions” (Etzioni 1971 p. 232). Informant feedback 
is thus expected to render empirical evidence representative of stakeholder 
group’s cognitive coherence.   
 
The thesis research has assembled a categorization of stakeholder group 
perception as shown in table nos. 29 through 31.  Perceptual traits have been 
aggregated and grouped into the selected conceptual categories employed in 
the interpretative framework.  As such the table columns and rows are 
representative of the selected stakeholder groups’ cognitive consensus within 
the conceptual categories analyzed. A subsequent table, no. 32 is a 
compartmentalization of stakeholder group cognition applicable to each case 
hospital. 
 
The analysis shows a cognitive profile or consensus, unique to each 
stakeholder group. Stakeholder responses on issue matters within each 
selected conceptual category, show the perceptual mobilization along a 
narrow spatial range.  Informant responses on management, medical doctors 
and nurses all appear grounded in “a logic of appropriateness” (Roberts and 
Greenwood 1997); that is, a rationale that is to be expected by their 
particular group.   
10.4.2.2 Stakeholder cognition 
10.4.2.2.1 Characteristics of management cognition 
Management appears cognitively constrained in their perceptual views on all 
conceptual categories invited.  The prevalence of the theorems of New 
Public Management (NPA) permeates all issue perception.  Constituent 
recognition is framed to fit NPM prescriptions as augmented by the 
hospital’s executive governance.  Stakeholder affirmation of sector changes 
is narrowed down to their interpretation of reform signals that are verifiable 
through governance white papers, decrees and prescriptions.  Issues of 
operational significance are perceived of in terms of their relevance to 
resource efficiency and improved production output.  Planning ranges are 
viewed strictly in a budgetary context void of value creation considerations 
within a strategic framework.  Thus, issues on medical services, research and 
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associated investments in competence development are awarded little 
perceptual merit.  Issues on hospital leadership reaffirm management’s call 
for resource administration and targeted supervision.  The major obstacle to 
succeed in achieving economically sound operations outcome is believed to 
be the medical staff’s lack of adequate cost management focus.  Thus, the 
directional preference of hospital management is a course chartered through 
the hospital reform favoring a full range of NPM practices.  Management 
cognition appears to work effectively as a rationalizing force thus 
representing the stakeholder group’s cognitive consensus. By grafting 
cognitive constraints into organizational goals and decision-making, 
management appears biased in favor of efficiency frameworks.  
Management’s cognitive characteristics as identified along the research 
model’s perceptual processing pathway, demonstrate how non-choice 
behavior (Roberts and Greenwood 1997) persists through actions of 
convention, convenience and governance obligation.  The analysis thus 
depicts a taken-for-granted nature of cognition replacing a broader 
perceptual nature that may have invited rational choice processes. 
 
Management group cognition between case hospitals shows distinguishing 
characteristics.  Both hospitals nos. 2 and 3, display firm commitment to cost 
austerity, resources efficiency and a production oriented logic.  Hospital no. 
1 is fixed on the potential gains of its university status.  Governance is 
perceived of as an obstacle to accredited academic function.  Strained 
relationships marked the management’s perception of administrative 
prescription to curb costs and to meet budgetary requirements.  Community 
hospital management perceives its mandate to manage within resources 
allocated.  All other activities are mobilized to serve this end. Governance 
liaison is viewed as critical to good reporting relationships.  Management 
perceives county reporting lines as critical. The management team members’ 
cognitive sphere appears congruent on governance prescriptions.  A 
management development program serves to internalize management values 
and a shared logic on hospital administration. 
Much of the same precepts of the community hospital are noted among 
management at the county hospital, although the management team appears 
less congruent in their cognitive characteristics.  The management team of 
ward directors has newly replaced a previous administrative leadership.  
Members are cautious towards managing director’s grand enthusiasm for the 
new formal hospital structure (Fylkeskommunalt foretak) removing the 
country from its line of reporting matrix.  Medical ward leaders are uncertain 
as to how ward issue matters ought to be brought to the attention of hospital 
management. Management at the county hospital appears to be in a 
transition stage without uniform cognitive characteristics. 
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Management decision-making behavior partly attains its legitimacy through 
a cognitive isomorphism between its members (Fligstein 1991).  In Scott’s 
view (Scott et al. 1998), the cognitive characteristics in organizations are 
grafted through organizational structuration. As developed by Giddens, 
(Giddens 1979) the concept of structuration involves the patterning of 
activities that constrain and shape action over time.  Brint (Brint and Karabel 
1991) employs structuration when referring to the extent to which the 
behavior of organizational constituents patterns shared information. 
10.4.2.2.2 Characteristics of medical staff cognition   
From the informant interviews, a cognitive congruence also appears among 
the medical staff but is vested more in a sociopolitical legitimacy rather than 
in an institutionalized consensus.  Management group action achieves its 
rewards and legitimacy through utilizing acceptable structures and their 
associated governance prescription (Pouder 1996). The explanation for 
organizational isomorphism shared between medical staff is less vested in 
the logic of structuration.  According to Roberts (Roberts and Greenwood 
1997); constituent action is grounded in a social context that specifies its 
reasonableness in terms of social rules and guidelines for behavior.   
As is evident from table no. 30, the cognitive consensus perspective of the 
medical doctors appears congruent on all conceptual accounts analyzed.  
Medical field issues are shown to take on precedence opposite all other 
decision-making matters.  The concerns of other constituents are considered 
subservient to those related directly to medical practice.  This position 
governs both the profession’s relationship with managerial representatives 
and its orientation towards representatives of other health staff.  While 
administrative prescriptions are recognized and validated, doctors’ 
involvement in management processes precludes any close integration with 
the ward and issues of clinical concern.   
Their affirmation of sector change processes is equally channeled outside 
ward venues.  The effect perceived relevant to their clinical autonomy is 
considered marginal.  Structural and organizational changes are not believed 
to change appreciably their formal and informal influence within their wards.  
The clinical infrastructure is believed to remain intact.  This belief in the 
survival of the clinic and its embedded autonomy, fits Brint’s (Brint and 
Karabel 1991) contention that organizational accomplishment may be less 
dependent on performance than on the reassuring sense of order it conveys.  
The medical staff’s disinterest in participating in administrative planning 
processes, thus effectively precludes any efficient organizational diffusion 
processes of management action.  Roberts (Roberts and Greenwood 1997) 
speaks of reduced operational efficiency caused by diverse and powerful 
organizational environments exposing “a pre-conscious” constraint.  Thus, 
the field of medical staff in the hospital acts on their cognitive limitations, or 
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bounded rationality vested in their perception of operational issues. The 
choice of the medical staff are structured by the socially mediated values and 
normative frameworks of their constituent group.   
Hospital leadership acceptance is low as the administrative leadership is 
judged as excessively bureaucratized and carrying little significance to ward 
operations.166  None of this is surprising when related to a more or less 
conventional sociology of the medical profession.  Evident in the final 
analysis of directional preference, professional autonomy appears as an 
organizational imperative of the public hospital.  Medical staff’s exclusivity 
is a source of inertia and a summons to justify stakeholder group behavior or 
practices.  According to Selznick, this justification “encourages institutional 
mimicry or mimesis, which means that the organization is highly sensitive to 
the cultural environment within which it lives” (Selznick 1996).   
 
The community of medical doctors in the public hospital may be said to 
represent a consensus sphere kept together by common cultural orientations.  
Such perceptual commonality is vested in the congruent orientation on their 
profession.  In Etzioni’s (Etzioni 1971) analysis of complex organizations, 
the importance of shared values concerning the rights to exercise power, are 
stressed.  Cultural consensus particularly attached to status groups is critical 
in forming normative values and determining social integration.  Cognition 
plays an important role in shaping the complexity of organizations.  In 
Selznick’s view, cognitive boundaries reinforce group structures that 
circumvent functional task and employment status.  Greenwood (Greenwood 
and Hinings 1996) stresses the organizational importance of powerful groups 
such as medical doctors in the public hospitals.  The extent to which medical 
doctors in the hospital access and control key decision-making, is a result of 
the impregnable exclusivity supported by their group cognition.   
Medical staff group cognition shows distinctively different patterns between 
hospitals.  At hospital no. 1, medical staff is uniform in their recognition of 
the importance of safeguarding their academic obligations.  This perception 
is in contrast particularly to the community hospital.  Management at the 
community hospital has succeeded in establishing acceptance for managerial 
norms on cost efficiency and effective production.  This is contrasted by the 
medical staff’s perception of their own management as spending too much 
time on management processes serving little or no purpose for their ward 
objectives.  While management and the executive board at the community 
                                                 
166 Reidun Førde associated with The Norwegian Medical Association’s “Senter for 
medisinsk etikk” at the University of Oslo, argues in favor of professional autonomy 
in an article appearing in the recently published series on democracy and power, 
mentioning particularly the burden of excessive bureaucracy (“I dag blir medisinsk 
praksis i aukande grad overstyrt av byråkratiet” (Førde 2003). 
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hospital claim success with comprehensive business oriented planning 
processes, the medical staff considers this a wasteful exercise.  The county 
hospital appears to be the only institution in which management has 
managed to establish a uniform acceptance for NPM-inspired management 
principles.  Here, its managing director and his management team are 
perceived to be effective in working with governance representatives and in 
promoting hospital interests.  This latter issue perception highlights 
Bourdieu’s emphasis of the significance of communication as a means to 
power and influence (Engelstad 2003).  Engelstad points to the fact that 
influence is based on power exercised at executive levels, through 
organizational groups, institutions and through the aggregate of stakeholder 
interests.  Medical staff’s perception of management’s capacity to effectively 
mobilize these communication levels reaffirms management credibility.  
Selznick emphasizes the significance of the organization’s interaction with 
its environment.  From this perspective, it seems clear that power may be 
defined in terms of the capacity to promulgate stakeholder interests (Brint 
and Karabel 1991).  The fact that the very same managing director also is a 
medical doctor provides perhaps added credence to management’s position.  
Support for this contention may be drawn from Durkheim (Durkheim 1950) 
who is placing emphasis on the genesis of the institution and the staff’s 
association with core value chain developments.  Studies of group consensus 
support the proposition that congruent cognitive orientation of various 
individuals and groups stem from common professional affiliations (Etzioni 
1971).   
10.4.2.2.3 Cognition of nurses 
According to Vike (Vike et al. 2002), there is a commonality amongst 
modern private firms in their clear separation of what is internal and what is 
to be regarded as external to the organization.  The latter receives the 
services of the former governed by a limited supply of goods in a dynamic 
interplay between supply and demand.  Within the modern welfare services 
organization this demarcation of internal and external constituents is not that 
clearly evident.  External agents of the public hospital are equally present 
internally as the internal production is governed by external public 
prescriptions of universal coverage, irrespective of patients’ capacity to pay.  
One may therefore speak of the public hospital as being without boundary 
limitations in services scope and access.  Political ownership internalizes its 
governance through administrative prescriptions. Ward medical staff 
promotes the advances of medical science with the promise to upgrade 
diagnostic means and to expand cure regimen.  At the public hospital’s 
operational level, one faces the diversities and paradoxes between public 
ambitions and the institution’s capacity to perform.  Vike here brings in the 
argument that the hospital internal stakeholders do not possess the capacity 
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to comprehend the broad and embedded nature of the public hospital’s 
services system.  According to Vike (Vike et al. 2002), power or influence in 
the welfare state is a question resolved by decentralizing or internalizing the 
dilemmas of political ambition.  Internalization of hospital objectives takes 
place through complex institutionalized processes filtered through the 
perceptual fields of key stakeholder groups.   
 
The unbroken philosophy of trust between medicine and politics that marked 
the development of our modern welfare state is today contrasted by an 
incapacity to govern. Complex budgetary techniques and production 
incentive systems do not facilitate 1st line hospital actors in their day-to-day 
routines.  Nor is hospital management an integrated leadership function that 
serves operational processes. The impact of unresolved decentralized 
problems is most clearly dramatized opposite hospital nurses.  Nurses 
supervise the logistics of patient regimen services. Their operational 
autonomy testifies to yet another supervisory sedimentation de-coupled from 
ward and administrative management.  Contrasting other stakeholder group 
cognition, nurse informants uniformly express patient interests as paramount 
to all hospital operations.  Elements of an institutional competitive position 
are noted particularly opposite the medical doctors.  Nurses perceive the 
doctors’ acclaimed hegemonic position related to patients’ care regimen as 
unjustified. The so-called clinical dialogue or communication with the 
patient is claimed to be equally a dialogue entertained by the nurses.  
Concern is also voiced by the nurses on the continual trend towards 
specialized medical development.  Here, nurses perceive a subsequent need 
to upgrade their own qualifications to broadened the hospital’s patient care 
regimen.   
Hospital NPM-inspired change processes are welcomed, as they are 
perceived to ultimately alleviate problems caused by resources shortages.  
Equally well perceived is the legislation on patient empowerment as this is 
viewed congruent with their professional code of ethics.  Nurses are eager to 
participate in management’s planning and control schemes, as these are 
believed to bring broader attention to the challenges of clinical supervision.  
The new organizational models emphasizing a participative leadership style, 
is in line with the nurses’ support for process-based work organization and 
supervision.  New legislation introduced that empowers health professionals 
other than medical doctors is perceived of as improving the position and 
esteem of hospital nurses.   
 
The profession of nursing is a generalist occupation. While the hospital 
institution is marked by increased specialization, the nurses’ professional 
identity centers on a broadening range of patient services functions (Vike et 
al. 2002). This seemingly institutional paradox becomes evident when 
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analyzing the cognitive characteristics of stakeholder groups between 
hospitals. Generally, nurses display a uniform cognition profile between 
hospitals. Patient values are expressed as paramount.  Prioritizing a 
participative leadership style is perceived as benefiting problem 
identification and improving chances for finding better solutions.  Nurses are 
focused on getting-the-job done; that is, resolving logistical challenges of 
patient flow across department and wards. 
Cognitive characteristics distinguishing nurses between case hospitals are 
particularly evident between hospital no. 1, the university hospital and the 
other two hospitals.  At the university hospital, nurses express a stronger 
opposition towards what they perceive as the medical doctors’ profiled 
professional dominance.  Nurses project a need for a stronger independent 
professional identity opposite the medical profession.  Some of the values 
upheld by the nurses at the university hospital, are identical to those 
promulgated by the medical doctors.  An academic perception of nursing is 
more prevalent at the university hospital than what is expressed by 
informants at the other two case hospitals.  What Pettigrew (Pettigrew 1987) 
confirms as “dominating beliefs or ideologies” for the medical profession 
within the hospital, serve as ideational templates also for the nursing 
profession.  Supporting this is DiMaggio’s (DiMaggio and Powel 1991) 
analysis of the need for professions to conform to professionals’ constituent 
expectations.  The latter is viewed as paramount to gain legitimacy and to 
increase their probability of survival as an acclaimed stakeholder group.  
Templates of isomorphism between medical professions particularly within 
an academic hospital institution, appears to induce nurses to adopt similar 
values.  This contention is supported by Greenwood in his configurational 
research. Greenwood (Greenwood and Hinings 1996) suggests that 
organizational structures and systems provide the underpinnings of ideas and 
values that serve as interpretative schemes throughout an organization.  As 
nurses and medical doctors work closely within the same structures and 
organizational schemes, professional mimesis may, however, be considered 
a response to uncertainty on behalf of the nurses (Selznick 1996).  
 
The presence and influence of the academic institution is not present among 
the informant nurses at the community and county hospitals. The 
institutionalized values of the acclaimed “non academic” hospital167 appear 
to dominate informant cognition. Management of both hospitals promulgates 
the importance of resolving problems of resource allocation and 
administration.  This priority meets with the approval of nurse constituents, 
                                                 
167 See particularly quotes from the informant interview with case hospital managing 
directors; Thesis section 10.3.2.2 “At operations management level”; view in 
particular sub-section 10.3.2.2.1.2 “Institutional perspective”. 
 192
as resources deployment is interpreted to support autonomy in their patient 
oriented work.  According to Vike (Vike et al. 2002), the nurses’ perception 
of their own capacity to work with and resolve challenges, serves to establish 
a professional identity different from the complexities exposed in higher 
organizational echelons of the hospital. The cognition of nurses, as a 
stakeholder group thus seems less constrained by structures, as does hospital 
and ward management.  Nurses also appear less influenced by the presence 
and conformity pressures of the sociopolitical aspects found valid for the 
medical doctors. The ideology of nursing appears cognitively on firm ground 
vested in the ethical philosophies of patient care inherent in the emotional 
and practical character of patient-nurse relationship168. 
                                                 
168 In Vike’s (Vike et al. 2002) analysis of power and influence in the welfare state, 
he discusses particularly recent changes in phenomenology within the profession of 
nursing; see particularly “Den fenomenologiske vendingen i sjukepleiefaget”, p.p. 
165-168. 
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Table No. 29:  Stakeholder groups’ Cognitive characteristics: Management 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Constituent 
recognition 
Change affirmation Operational 
significance 
Leadership acceptance Directional 
preference 
Management Attention particularly 
addressed to 
executive and 
governance 
stakeholders. 
 
Management 
resources spent 
largely on aligning 
itself with 
constituents 
representing 
administrative 
prescriptions, policies 
and audit operations. 
 
Marginal recognition 
of external 
stakeholder groups 
working directly with 
hospital internal 
operations. 
Positive perception of New 
Public Management 
reforms (NPM).  NPM 
viewed as reinforcing 
administrative governance. 
 
New structural and 
organizational prescriptions 
welcomed, as they are 
perceived to be 
strengthening medical 
staff’s managerial logic. 
 
Patient rights reforms 
equally welcomed, as new 
prescriptions are expected 
to enhance hospital service. 
A strong perceptual trait in 
management’s focus on 
resources planning and follow-
up. 
 
Administrative prescriptions 
consume the major focus as 
hospital operations are 
interpreted in a resource 
management context. 
 
Long-term planning 
prescriptions and supportive 
rationale are absent in 
management operations and 
resources administration 
viewed in a value creation 
persepctive. 
Strong belief in the relevancy 
of structuralized governance. 
Hospital leadership is 
perceived connected to the 
logic of NPM.  The hallmark 
of an outstanding hospital 
leader is one who masters “the 
art of” balanced budgets.   
Instrumental leadership action 
is tied to measures that ensure 
subscription to ISF/DRG. 
Leadership potential is 
perceived realized only when 
medical staff accepts the logic 
of NPM. 
Management’s rationale 
for hospital development 
is vested in the logic of 
NPM.  Measures favoring 
resources efficiency and 
productivity, receive chief 
attention.   
 
Management concern for 
medical services 
addresses instrumental 
ramifications tied to cost 
allocation and 
consumption. 
 
Public health services’ 
structural reforms are 
welcomed in as much as 
they create improved 
governance along with 
expanded operational 
autonomy. 
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Table No. 30:  Stakeholder groups’ Cognitive characteristics: Medical doctors 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Constituent 
recognition 
Change affirmation Operational 
significance 
Leadership 
acceptance 
Directional 
preference 
Medical 
doctors 
A compartmentalized 
perception of other 
hospital stakeholder 
groups.  Medical 
doctors, as a 
professional group are 
considered paramount 
among all competing 
constituencies. 
 
Medical field issues 
take precedence to any 
other stakeholder 
claim. 
NPM reform generally 
disregarded as just another 
wave of administrative 
governance.  “The clinic 
prevails” as the doctors’ 
judgment calls are 
perceived representative of 
the hospital’s true 
operational authority.  
 
The medical professional’s 
established working pattern 
of relationships to patients, 
staff and other external 
stakeholder groups are 
expected to remain 
rfelatively unchanged 
irrespective of external 
events and internal change 
processes. 
Medical staff disinterest in 
management planning 
prescriptions as content is 
considered insignificant to 
their own interests. 
  
Value of participation in 
strategy processes is perceived 
a waste, as one does not 
recognize benefit to clinical 
operations. 
 
Budgetary developments 
afforded relatively marginal 
attention as internal 
deficiencies are believed 
partly made up for through 
benefits gainted through 
associations with external 
networks. 
 
 
Hospital management 
leadership is perceived 
separated from the logic and 
relevancy of clinical 
supervision. 
 
Ward autonomy is considered 
paramount to good 
functioning hospitals. 
 
Ward leadership may only be 
executed by medically trained 
staff. 
 
Professional autonomy for 
nurses and other health 
personnel is perceived to be 
endangering clinical 
operations.  
Expressed concern for what 
is perceived to be a low 
level of medical research. 
Hospital management is 
perceived to be 
instrumental in securing 
governance acceptance for 
funded programs over and 
above operations budgets. 
 
Ward autonomy is 
considered critical to the 
future of medical 
performance; diagnostics, 
treatment and cure. 
 
Reform measures 
empowering patients and 
other health staffs are 
considered political reforms 
without significance to 
health services. 
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Table No. 31:  Stakeholder groups’ Cognitive characteristics: nurses 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Constituent 
recognition 
Change affirmation Operational 
significance 
Leadership 
acceptance 
Directional 
preference 
Nurses Rationalizing all 
stakeholder claims 
relative to patient 
centered activities. 
 
Patient care interests 
expressed as 
paramount to all 
competing issues in 
the hospital. 
 
Argues on nurses 
acclaimed position on 
the supervision of the 
“clinical dialogue”. 
 
Argues on the need for 
a strengthened 
autonomy for nursing 
operations. 
 
 
NPM’s organizational-
reform measures welcomed 
as changes are expected to 
positively influence patient 
rights, and thus enhancing 
the significance of the 
nursing profession. 
 
Affirmative position 
expressed on nurses’ goal 
to acclaim new 
management postings in 
hospitals. 
 
Concern expressed over 
lack of medical research 
and the nursing 
profession’s low 
participation in R&D 
projects 
 
 
A generally positive attitude 
towards management 
planning processes, as nurses 
share in management’s 
perception of resource 
shortages to be a major 
problem to hospital 
operations. 
 
Affirmative views on need to 
improve patient logistics and 
care regimen. 
Administrative leadership is 
accepted as nurses are invited 
to participate in processes 
impacting their own 
operations.  
 
Nurses are in strong support 
of participative leadership.  
Such leadership styles more 
important than the leader’s 
professional (medical) 
qualifications. 
 
Empowering nurses and other 
health service staff is 
perceived important, as this is 
considered critical to 
improved patient care. 
Empowering more health 
professions than merely 
medical doctors are 
perceived important for the 
future of patient health 
treatment and care. 
 
Hospital reorganizations 
and new management 
philosophies are believed 
important to create a 
holistic form of ward 
leadership and patient 
regimen. 
 
Patient 1st philosophies are 
perceived of as 
instrumental to improved 
public health programs and 
hence better hospitals. 
196 
Table No. 32: Between case hospital analysis 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Case hospital no. 1 
University hospital 
Case hospital no. 2 
Local hospital 
Case hospital no. 3 
County hospital 
Management Focus on hospital’s 
university status as 
strategy to secure new 
and expanded resources.  
Governance emphasis on 
NPM priorities viewed 
as threat to strategies 
supporting medical 
services development. 
Frustration with complex 
governance structure and 
its complex reporting 
routines. 
Management team 
perceived to be spending 
excessive leadership 
resources on cost cutting 
programs due to growing 
operational deficit. 
 
 
 
Aggressively pursuing 
NPM-reforms as means 
to reduce waiting lists 
and improve production 
performance.   
Successful at balancing 
governance agencies and 
executive administrative 
institutions. Pleased with 
own efforts to 
promulgate cost austerity 
programs in the wards. 
Involves both 
administrative and ward 
management in decision-
making processes.  
Prioritizes management 
development programs 
for top management 
team members. 
Actively reaffirming vision 
of a non-academic, 
production oriented 
institution “where the 
patient ranks first!”  
Reaffirming the hospital’s 
interest in remaining in 
close contact with 
community health and 
social services; the latter 
considered the “recruiting 
ground” for new patients. 
Compatible with new 
board’s priority focus on 
cost austerity and 
production management 
logic.  Involving large 
number of ward staff in 
developing new hospital 
“patient oriented” 
strategies. 
Medical 
doctors 
Ward leaders in 
opposition to hospital 
management in general, 
as too little emphasis is 
believed placed on 
securing and 
safeguarding university 
obligations.  Ward staff 
dismayed with hospital 
management as too little 
influence is being spent 
working to influence 
executive board and city 
health administration.   
Ward is opposed to being 
involved in too much 
administrative planning 
processes believed to 
have little relevance to 
clinical operations. 
A present situation of 
management credibility 
stems from ward’s 
perception of its 
administrative leadership 
as commanding good 
relations with 
governance agencies. 
General consensus on 
hospital management’s 
resources administration 
focus.   
Hospital planning 
processes generally 
accepted by ward. 
Little focus on lack of 
formal hospital programs 
on medical research. 
Hospital top management 
generally accepted among 
ward staff as new 
management team of ward 
leaders has replaced a team 
of administrative leaders.   
General ward acceptance of 
“working hospital” 
strategy; i.e., its chosen 
“non-academic” venue. 
 
Non-agreement with use of 
comprehensive strategy 
processes as these are 
viewed as nonessential to 
ward operations. 
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…continued 
Nurses Nurses are strongly 
marking their opposition 
to medical doctors’ 
professional dominance.  
A strong need for 
reaffirming a 
professional identity of 
their own. 
 
Nurses share in the 
medical staff’s general 
concern over the 
hospital’s perceived 
inaction on their 
university status and 
obligations 
Nurses are in support of 
management’s resource 
administration. 
Professionally in 
opposition to medical 
staff’s claimed 
hegemony in the 
“clinical dialogue”. 
 
Takes pride in the 
hospital’s self 
proclaimed patient 
orientation. 
 
Generally a strong 
affirmation of “working 
hospital” philosophy. 
Nurses are focused on 
“getting the job done” 
along the lines proclaimed 
by the managing director.   
 
Nurses relate to the 
“working hospital” culture 
as part of their patient 
orientation.  
10.5 Organizational focus: Data obtained from hospital 
archival records 
10.5.1 Interpretative framework 
The archival records obtained from the respective case hospitals render 
important insights relative to how each hospital chooses to fulfill its 
obligations.  As the public hospitals were in a governance transition during 
2001169, one has decided to place particular analytical emphasis on what the 
new laws on hospitals prescribe as core hospital functional 
responsibilities170.  The revisions enacted and passed into law January 1, 
2001, serve particularly to confirm the hospitals’ research and development 
functions.  Medical research is, however, already established as a core 
hospital function through previous addendum or prescriptions to the original 
law on public hospitals (“Sykehusloven”). The latest hospital law 
(“Spesialisthelsetjensteloven”) revision (§3-8), also introduces training and 
education of patients, this to permit the patient to function better once 
discharged from the hospital.  This part of the law is particularly addressing 
the caring needs of the chronically ill.  As the new law underscores that care 
regimen is not to be regarded as a core hospital activity, patient education 
and training will be excluded from the thesis’ empirical analysis.  In the new 
law’s introductory comments, (“Merknader § 1-1”, p. 17”), it is emphasized 
that proper patient care always is integrated in a medical regimen established 
for hospitalized patients. 
                                                 
169 See thesis section 3.2 ”The governance model”. 
170 See thesis section 3.3.1 “Hospital services functions”.   
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In order to learn what type of decisions are prioritized, meeting protocols for 
2001 have been analyzed.  Decision-making (DM) priorities identified are 
expected to provide insight into the significance of stakeholder presence.   
An analytical framework, as expressed in the following illustration has been 
applied.   
 
Illustration No. 19:  Analytical framework: Organizational focus 
Organizational
focus
System
rationality
Sustainability of
structuration
Structural
justifications
Modality of
operations
 
 
The model renders a sequential structure and an analytical perspective that is 
expected to catch the nuances of organizational decision-making in the 
selected case hospital.   Thus, the summary analysis of meeting protocols 
will (1) identify issue matters called to the attention of the particular 
decision-making forum, (2) classify these decision-making issue matters as 
to their affirmative nature, and then (3) seek to commodify or identify the 
nature of each particular issue matter relative to the hospital’s mandated 
functions171.  This latter interpretive approach serves to determine the 
                                                 
171 These are introduced and discussed in detail in thesis section 3.3.1 “Hospital 
services functions”, and conceptualized in illustration no. 8:  “A model of public 
hospital stakeholder s”. 
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presence and impact of stakeholder groups.  Reference is here made to 
Morgan’s (Morgan 1988) contention on the significance of vested interest 
parties in pluralistic organization172.  As such, the records obtained carry the 
potential for having inferences to the research question.   
 
To facilitate a comprehension of data details found in the meeting protocols, 
the protocol records have been related to other archival sources as outlined 
in thesis table no. 19 “Archival records 2001”.  The thesis’ analytical 
procedure viewing each case hospital relative to the interpretative model 
proposed, will be followed by a summary analysis incorporating all case 
hospitals. 
 
10.5.2 Hospital no. 1 
10.5.2.1 Decision-making meetings as conducted by the board of 
directors (BDM) 
10.5.2.1.1 Structural characteristics of the BDM 
The law on public hospitals (“Sykehusloven”) specifically calls on hospital 
owners to establish hospital boards to safeguard governance interests.  
However, hospital board structure, mandate and membership vary as county 
hospital owners exhibit different board structure and practices173. Some 
hospital boards draw their membership from its county political electorate. 
Other hospitals are governed by boards where members are selected from the 
county administration.  Then there are also the so-called professional boards. 
Here an electorate from outside the county’s political and administrative 
governance constitutes the boards’ recruiting ground. Still, other hospitals 
set up boards made up of members from within the hospital and supervised 
by the county health sector administration; i.e., so called operational boards 
(Driftsstyrer). 
Hospital board options available to public hospital owners are expressed in 
the law on county and communes174. 
                                                 
172 Pls. view thesis section 2.6 “Organizational decision-making in hospitals”. 
173 This matter is addressed in NOU 1997: 2 “Pasienten først” Ledelse og 
organisering i sykehus”; section 10.2.4 “Styrets rolle”, p.p. 94-95.  The new law on 
hospitals (“Spesialisthelsetjenesteloven”) does not call for changes in the county and 
commune organization governing public hospitals (Rundskriv I-59/2000, 
“Merknader til § 2-1”, p. 18). 
174 “Lov om kommuner og fylkeskommuner av 25. september, 1992” 
(”Kommuneloven”).  Governing implications of this law on county hospital 
governance is expressed in NOU 1999:15 “Hvor nært skal det være?”; section 5.2.2 
“Den fylkeskommunale forvaltningsmodellen”, p.p. 36-41. 
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A professional board of directors governs the university hospital175. The 
hospital director has a dual reporting responsibility, answering both to the 
chairman of the board of directors as well as to the city commissionaire in 
charge of public health administration.  The formal line of communication 
between the commissionaire and the hospital director does not constitute a 
traditional superior - subordinate relationship. The hierarchical 
organizational line relationship is formally vested in the chairman of the 
hospital board of directors acting with a mandate to supervise the hospital’s 
governing interests.  However, the City commissionaire carries full political 
accountability for hospital performance, and thus assumes full governance 
rights and mandate to initiate interventions deemed necessary. 
10.5.2.1.2 Meeting demographics 
The BDM appointed December 10, 2000 consists of seven regular members 
of whom two are hospital employee representatives. The hospital’s 
managing director has been present at all BDM meetings conducted in 2001. 
In accordance with various legislative provisions of the State health services 
(Statens helsetilsyn) detailed in the Law of State Audits (Tilsynsloven)176, the 
County Doctor General (Fylkeslegen) has the right to be present at all BDM 
meetings, representing the auditing function of the State’s Health 
Supervisory Board.  Having examined the respective BDM protocols for 
2001, the County Doctor General is noted as not being present at any one of 
these meetings.  In addition to the regular board meeting members, protocol 
records document a practice whereby hospital representatives other than the 
hospital director are invited in on particular issue cases brought before the 
board.  During 2001, in all 30 persons were recorded as having appeared in 
front of the board on particular agenda issue matters.   
Typically, a BDM is scheduled to be completed in 3 hours.  In 2001, there 
were conducted nine such board meetings.  Based on the meeting attendance 
of the regular board membership and the hospital director, an estimate shows 
that the BDM meetings at hospital no.1 required 189 man-hours during 
2001.   
Effective August 1st, a newly appointed hospital director replaced the acting 
hospital director. The acting hospital director had served in a temporary 
capacity since December 1999. The new hospital director now became the 
regular hospital representative present at the last two of the BDMs in 2001. 
 
                                                 
175 For case hospital details; pls. view thesis section 9.3.2 “Case hospital selections”, 
and particularly Table no. 16 “Selected case hospitals”. 
176 ”Tilsynsloven” was placed into law March 30th 1984. 
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A special board meeting was called, December 17 at which time the 
commune governance board was dismissed. A new executive board was 
formally instituted, appointed by the new State hospital owner in accordance 
with the new on hospital governance implemented January 1, 2002177.  
10.5.2.1.3 Issue matter roster 
In going through the BDM protocols for 2001, all issues on the meeting 
roster were examined and catalogued in following the analytical model 
introduced in Illustration no. 10: “Analytical framework: Stakeholder 
influence”. Issues falling outside the three main areas of hospital 
accountability have been specified as administrative items. Based on the 
board’s ruling on each agenda item, each case matter has been entered into 
the protocol as either an item decided on, or as an item not ruled on; i.e., 
introduced for the purpose of the board’s orientation or as an item which the 
board decided not to take an affirmative stand on.  All issue items brought 
before the board are considered to be within the confines of the board’s 
acting mandate.    
 
The following table shows the board case matter issues arranged as per the 
distribution key outlined above. 
 
Table No. 33:  Process overview: Hospital No. 1 Hospital Board of Directors 
Meetings in 2001 
Agenda issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: Issue 
items 
Patient treatment related 5 2 7 
Staff education 0 0 0 
Research 0 0 0 
Administrative items 16 9 25 
Sum total agenda issue items 21 11 32 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the meeting agenda represents the majority of items acted on by 
the board.  The next table details the type case issue items making up the 
sum total of the agenda’s Administrative items. 
 
                                                 
177 (LOV av 15. juni 2001 nr. 93 (Helseforetaksloven) 2001). 
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Table No. 34: Process overview: Hospital No. 1 Distribution of Administrative type 
issues attended to by the BDM in 2001 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: 
Items 
Staffing 0 0 0 
Training and development 0 0 0 
Salary administration 0 0 0 
Personnel administration 2 0 2 
Administrative procedures 1 1 2 
Strategy development 0 0 0 
Budgeting 6 0 6 
Accounting and finance 2 5 7 
Building and maintenance 1 0 1 
Organization 2 3 5 
Information technology (IT) 0 0 0 
HMS (Health-Work 
Environment-Safety) 
0 0 0 
General information 2 0 2 
Sum total administrative issue 
items 
16 9 25 
 
10.5.2.1.4 Analysis and findings: 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
hospital BDM agenda, the following findings may be concluded: 
1. The board has acted affirmatively on 34% or on 1/3 of the agenda 
roster for 2001.  In all, 66% of the agenda case item total are items 
recorded as “orientation issues” or items deferred for later board 
reviews.   
2. The case item category of administrative issues represents a total of 
78% of the agenda items reviewed by the board.  In all 9 out of 25 
administrative issue items, or 36% were items that were 
affirmatively acted upon by the board.   
3. In all 7 agenda case items; i.e., 22% of the agenda sum total acted 
upon by the board of directors, addressed patient related issues.  Of 
these latter cases, 2 issue matters were affirmatively acted upon, 
representing 6 % of the sum total agenda case items. 
4. The board did not invite any research oriented or staff education178 
issue matters as case agenda items during 2001179. 
                                                 
178 According to the Law on hospitals, § 8 (Lov av 19. juni 1969, Nr. 57: “Om 
sykehus m.m.”; as amended July 30th 1992), it is the duty of the hospital institution 
to facilitate the education of all medical professions employed. A duality exists as to 
the responsibility to remain professionally qualified.  Reference is made to Law on 
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10.5.2.2 The decision-making processes as conducted by the hospital 
director and the top management team (TMT) 
10.5.2.2.1 Structural characteristics of the TMT 
The hospital law in force at the time of the empirical fieldwork (LOV av 19. 
juni 1969 nr. 57. Om sykehus (Sykehusloven) 1969) did not prescribe any 
clear-cut model for organizing or conducting hospital leadership.  However, 
hospital management generally, and the leadership role of the hospital 
director specifically, received much national and sector specific attention 
throughout the 1990s.  This attentiveness to the leadership role and its 
execution may partly be related to the emergence of the so-called corporate 
logic taking on a dominating position in public debates on sector 
governance180.  Also, various government white papers during the 1990’s 
issued prescriptive statements on hospital leadership possibly influencing 
hospital selection of management models and leadership practice181.  
Particularly the government white paper: NOU 1997: 2, affirmed a 
                                                                                                                   
the profession and practice of medical doctors ( Ref.: § 49 in “Lov av 13. juni, 1980 
Nr. 42 Om leger”; as amended July 30th 1992) and Law on nursing (Ref.: § 8  (“Lov 
av 8. januar, 1960 Om godkjenning av sykepleiere) prescribing it a duty for the 
individual doctor and nurse to remain professionally updated (ref.: § 25).   
This duality is further strengthened through national arbitration agreements between 
the employee federations of doctors (Dnlf) and nurses (NSF) and the owners of the 
respective hospitals.     
Another reference that underscores the importance of hospital supervised education 
and training may be found in the national advisory boards on medical doctors and 
nurses (Ref.: “Legeloven” § 49 and “Sykepleierloven”, § 12). 
179 Also the first Law on hospitals (“Sykehusloven”) prescribes for R&D to be 
conducted in all public hospitals.  As an arena for highly skilled and specialized 
professions, it is important for hospitals to be associated with new development and 
advances within medicine and its practice.  In government white paper; NOU 
1997:2, Section 5.5.3 “Forskning og utvikling” the hospitals’ R&D is expressed as 
an existing responsibility particularly relevant for university hospitals and larger 
county and community hospitals.  However, the law does not preclude any public 
hospital from the responsibility of R&D as this is considered precursory to 
maintaining a qualified medical staff.  Again, the national associations for medical 
doctors and nurses respectively both proclaim R&D to be an integral part of their 
education and development and precursory to fulfill their legal accountability to 
professional conduct and performance (Ref.: “Lover for Den norske lægeforening; 
sist revidert oktober 2001” and “NSFs formål, prinsipprogram og vedtekter. 
Gjeldene fra Landsmøtet 2001”).  
180 Pls. view thesis section 3.4 “The emergence of corporate logic”. 
181 See specifically: “Ledelse I sykehus”, Sosialdepartementet, 1990; “Samarbeid og 
styring.  Mål og virkemidler for en bedre helsetjeneste”, St.meld.nr. 50, 1993-94; 
and NOU 1997: 2 ”Pasienten først! Ledelse og organisering i sykehus”. 
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governing norm with respect to the role of hospital top management.  
Specifically in its section 10.3.2.2 “Utøvelse av toppledelsesfunksjonen” 
(Conducting the top leadership function), emphasis is placed on the hospital 
director’s responsibility for practising strategic management and the 
development of a management culture vested in an attentiveness to patient 
issue matters.  Finally, the new law on hospitals, 
“Spesialisthelsetjenesteloven” places particular emphasis on the importance 
of the leadership function and the expectancy of the leadership role in the 
public hospital. 
   
The managing director at hospital no. 1 had adopted a management concept 
in which the hospital director and the ward directors made up the hospital’s 
top management team (TMT).  At the time of the empirical fieldwork, the 
hospital ascribed to the shared ward leadership model or “consensus 
management”182.  However, the consensus management model was only 
partially in force as three of the hospital’s medical clinics were managed by 
singular ward directors; i.e., unitary management.   
10.5.2.2.2 Meeting demographic: 
In 2001 there were a total of 16 regular members of the hospital’s TMT.  In 
all 40 TMT meetings were conducted, each meeting scheduled for 2 ½ 
hours.  As with the BDMs, hospital staff was invited to attend the TMTs on 
particular case issue items.  A total of 143 hospital staff members outside the 
regular TMT-members were called on case specific issue matters.  An 
estimated total of 1.600 man-hours were spent attending the scheduled 
TMTs during 2001.  
The transition between the newly appointed hospital director and the acting 
hospital director, took place effective August 1st.  The new director assumed 
supervision of all subsequent TMT meetings in 2001.  The new hospital 
director of hospital no. 1 is, as her predecessor, a medical doctor.         
10.5.2.2.3 Issue matter roster 
As with the BDMs, all protocoled issue matter items placed on the meeting 
roster were examined and catalogued according to the analytical model 
introduced in Illustration no. 10: “Analytical framework: Stakeholder 
influence”.  Issues falling outside of the three main areas of hospital 
accountability have been specified as “administrative” matters.  Each case 
matter has been entered into the protocol as either an item decided on, or as 
an item not ruled on; i.e., introduced for the purpose of orientation or as an 
item where no affirmative stand is taken. All issue items brought before the 
                                                 
182 Pls. view thesis section 3.3.5 “Hospital management and the administrative 
functions”. 
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management team are considered to be within the confines of operations 
mandate.    
A formalized set of hospital goals applicable to 2001, were first issued April 
5th, 2001 and later revised June 6th (“Måldokument 2001”).  The document 
lists 10 prioritized hospital objectives.  All are due to be accomplished by 
December 31st, 2001.  These are as follows: 
 
1. Implementing the new health governance laws 
2. Continue improving on organizational structures 
3. Increasing cost efficiency to ensure improved capacity 
utilization, particularly on day-based surgery activities 
4. Implementing new reporting concepts on quality and 
productivity 
5. Implementing management development programs 
6. Supporting recruiting programs related to critical functions 
7. Working on improved utilization of hospital building facilities 
8. Establishing a strategy plan  
9. Establishing a decentralized staff specifically supporting ward 
activities 
10. Establishing a budgeting concept for research activities 
 
Additionally, sector and ward/clinic specific plans are recorded in the 
document amounting in all to 367 prioritized goals for 2001 (June 6th 
revision). 
 
The hospital also has an official strategy plan governing research and 
professional field development. (“Strategiplan for forskning og fagutvikling 
1998 – 2001”), dated December 16th 1998, formally in force through 2001183.  
The strategy plan lists no specific research projects otherwise connected to 
the hospital’s operational strategy and associated budgets.  Rather the plan 
may be viewed as a policy document on the importance of conducting 
hospital research and development projects. 
  
The following table shows the distribution of case matter issues as per the 
distribution key outlined above. 
 
                                                 
183 ”Strategisk plan for forskning og fagutvikling 1998 – 2001”. 
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Table No. 35: Process overview: Hospital No. 1 Hospital Top Management Team 
(TMT) 
Agenda issues Orientation 
items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: Issue 
items 
Patient treatment related 13 4 17 
Staff education 2 1 3 
Research 4 0 4 
Administrative items 196 30 226 
Sum total agenda issue items 215 35 250 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the TMT’s meeting agenda, represents the majority of items called 
to the attention of hospital management.  The next table details the type case 
issue items making up the sum total of “Administrative items”. 
 
Table No. 36:  Process overview: Hospital No. 1 Distribution of Administrative type 
issues attended to by the TMT 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum:  
Items 
Staffing 0 0 0 
Training and development 4 1 5 
Salary administration 3 1 4 
Personnel administration 26 5 31 
Administrative procedures 40 8 48 
Strategy development 1 1 2 
Budgeting 3 1 4 
Accounting and finance 25 4 29 
Building and maintenance 1 0 1 
Organization 70 6 76 
Information technology (IT) 4 2 6 
HMS (Health-Work Environment-Safety) 4 1 5 
General information 17 0 17 
Sum total administrative issue items 198 30 228 
10.5.2.2.4 Analysis and findings: 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
TMT agenda, the following may be concluded: 
1. In all 86% of the agenda case item total are items recorded as 
“orientation issues” or items deferred for later management reviews.  
Thus, the TMT has acted affirmatively on 14% of the agenda roster 
for 2001. 
2. The case item category of administrative issues represents a total of 
91% of agenda items reviewed by the TMT. In all 30 out of 228 
administrative agenda items were affirmatively acted upon by the 
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board, representing a total of 13% of the accumulated agenda case 
items. 
3. In all 17 agenda case items; i.e., 7% of the agenda sum total, 
addressed patient related issues. Of these latter cases, 4 issue matters 
were affirmatively acted upon, representing 1,6% of the 
accumulated agenda case items. 
4. The number of research case issues handled by the TMT came to 4 
singular cases of which none were affirmatively acted upon. 
5. Staff education issues reviewed amounted to 3 cases on the agenda, 
or 1,2% of the total number of case matters listed on the agenda in 
2001. 
6. The hospital management did not incorporate into its management 
meetings during 2001 any structured follow-up process to account 
for either the progress of the over-all hospital goals (“Måldokument 
2001”) or the hospital’s strategy plan research and professional field 
development (“Strategiplan for forskning og fagutvikling”). 
 
10.5.3 Hospital No. 2 
10.5.3.1 The decision-making processes as conducted by the board of 
directors (BDM) 
10.5.3.1.1 Structural characteristics  
Hospital no. 2 is a county- owned and governed local community hospital 
(Lokalsykehus).  A turbulent county-political period was experienced in 
1997 – 1998.  This was precipitated by political criticism following hospital 
cost deficits. It was hence decided by county governance authorities to abort 
the practice of having hospital-internal boards.  The predominant view 
shared by county political and administrative officials claimed that the 
operational boards act counterproductive to effective hospital management.  
Approval for having hospital-institutional boards was legally enacted, 
September 25, 1992 (Kommuneloven, Chapter no. 2, § 11). A county 
proposal to implement “professional” hospital boards was approved 
September 29, 1998184.  Case matter documentation confirms a limited scope 
of executive authority for the hospital board.  County administration, 
however, retained its executive rights (instruksjonsmyndighet) opposite the 
hospital director. The board of directors was to report directly to the county’s 
                                                 
184 Reference is made to County governance case file no. 55/98 (Akershus 
fylkeskommune; “Sak nr. 55/98”). 
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political governing body185.  The board chairman functionally became 
accountable to the director in charge of the County commission on health 
and social affairs (Hovedutvalg for helse og sosialsektoren) a committee 
membership made up of officials from the County’s political arm 
(Fylkestinget).  
10.5.3.1.2 Meeting demographic 
The BDM of hospital no.2 appointed September 29th, 1998 consisted of 
seven regular members of which two are employee representatives.  It is 
noted that in the absence of the hospital director who has the right of 
attendance at all board meetings, the hospital’s head nurse is present.  It is 
also noted from BDM protocols that the County Doctor General 
(Fylkeslegen) did not attend any one of the board meetings during 2001.  In 
addition to the regular board meeting members, protocol records document a 
practice whereby representatives other than the hospital director, are 
introduced and present on particular case matter issue brought before the 
board.  During 2001, in all 30 persons were recorded as having appeared on 
such occasions.   
Typically, the BDMs in 2001 were scheduled for 3 hours.  Eleven such 
board meetings were held during 2001. Estimates show that the BDM 
meetings at Case hospital no.2 required 231 man-hours. 
10.5.3.1.3 Issue matter roster 
In going through BDM protocols for 2001, all issue matter items placed on 
the meeting roster at hospital no. 2, were examined and catalogued according 
to the analytical model introduced in Illustration no. 10: “Analytical 
framework: Stakeholder influence”.  Issues falling outside the three main 
areas of hospital accountability have been specified as “administrative” 
matters.  Each case matter has been entered into the protocol as either an 
item decided on, or as an item not ruled on; i.e., introduced for the purpose 
of orientation or as an item where no affirmative stand is taken.  All issue 
items brought before the board are considered to be within the confines of 
board mandate.    
The following table shows agenda case allocation according to the issue 
matter distribution key outlined above. 
 
                                                 
185 Reference is made to a legal opinion expressed by J.F.Bernt as entered into the 
county case records stating that the hospital board does not have executive authority 
opposite the particular hospital as the hospital director is confirmed as a section 
supervisor subordinated the county administration (Jnr./dok.nr./år: 7177/5/98; 
arkivkode 034H; arb.nr.: a980441). 
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Table No. 37:  Process overview: Hospital No. 2 Hospital Board of Directors 
Meetings in 2001 
Agenda issue Orientation 
items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: Issue 
items 
Patient treatment related 9 0 9 
Staff education 1 0 1 
Research 0 0 0 
Administrative items 62 7 69 
Sum total agenda issue items 72 7 79 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the BDM agenda, represents the majority of items acted on by the 
board.  The next table details the type case issue items making up the sum 
total of the agenda’s “Administrative items”. 
 
Table No. 38:  Process overview: Hospital No. 2 Distribution of administrative type 
issues tended to by the BDM in 2001 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Item 
Decision 
Item 
Sum:  Items 
Staffing 0 0 0 
Training and development 0 0 0 
Salary administration 2 0 2 
Personnel administration 1 0 1 
Administrative procedures 1 0 1 
Strategy development 0 0 0 
Budgeting 1 1 2 
Accounting and finance 17 0 17 
Building and maintenance 15 3 18 
Organization 9 3 12 
Information technology (IT) 0 0 0 
HMS (Health-Work 
Environment-Safety) 
0 0 0 
General information 15 0 15 
Sum total administrative issue 
items 
61 7 68 
10.5.3.2 Analysis and findings: 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
BDM agenda, the following findings may be concluded: 
1. In all, 91% of the total agenda case matters ruled on, are items 
recorded as “orientation items”.  Thus, the board has acted 
affirmatively on 9% of the agenda roster brought before the board in 
2001. 
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2. The case item category of administrative issues represents a total of 
87% of the total number of agenda items reviewed by the board.  In 
all seven, or 10% of the administrative agenda case items were 
affirmatively acted on.   
3. In all nine agenda case items, (11%) acted upon by the board of 
directors addressed patient related issues.  Of these latter cases, no 
issue matters were affirmatively acted upon. 
4. With respect to staff education type issues, the board did address one 
such matter, representing 1,3% of the total BDM-case load for 2001. 
5. The board did not invite any research issues as agenda items during 
2001. 
10.5.3.3 The decision-making processes as conducted by the hospital 
director and the top management team (TMT) 
10.5.3.3.1 Structural characteristics of the TMT(s) 
The director at hospital no. 2 has established a managerial model consisting 
of two management teams.  The hospital director supervises both teams.  
The distinguishing characteristics are based on the respective team’s 
representative make up.  The hospital director’s “Director’s management 
team” (Ledermøter; i.e., “DMT”) includes clinical and administrative 
managers.  The hospital director’s “Administrative advisory group” 
(Administrasjonsrådet; i.e., “AAG”) includes only representatives of the 
administrative staff.   
The case hospital has throughout 2001 maintained a “consensus” type 
organizational structure for nearly all medical wards, with the exceptions of 
the oncology- and surgery unit.  Both the director-supervised teams operate 
with a fixed meeting structure with formally scheduled meetings and 
planned agendas.  All management meetings have been protocolled. There is 
no formal mandate distinguishing or otherwise ranking the two forum’s 
respective managerial authority. 
10.5.3.3.2 Meeting demographic 
The DMT membership in 2001 counted 22 regular participants.  There does 
not seems to have been a practice of inviting special guests to attend on 
special case matter issues, as only seven such invitees were present in 2001.  
It is noted however, that the DMT experienced noticeable participant 
absenteeism.  Throughout the period covered, in all 30 participants were 
recorded as absent.   
In 2001 DMT-protocol records confirm 13 meetings, each one scheduled to 
last 4 hours.  Thus an estimated 1144 man-hours were spent attending DMT-
meetings. 
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10.5.3.3.3 Issue matter roster 
As with the BDMs, all protocoled issue matter items placed on the DMT 
meeting roster were examined and catalogued according to the analytical 
model introduced in Illustration no. 12: “Analytical model of stakeholder 
influence”.  Issues falling outside the three main areas of hospital 
accountability have been specified as “administrative” matters.  Each case 
matter has been entered into the protocol as either an item decided on, or as 
an item not ruled on; i.e., introduced for the purpose of orientation or as an 
item where no affirmative stand is taken. All issue items brought before the 
management team are considered to be within the confines of operations 
mandate.    
 
The following table shows the distribution of case matter issues as per the 
distribution key outlined above. 
 
Table No. 39:  Process overview: Hospital No. 2.   Hospital Top Management Team 
(DMT) 
Agenda issues Orientation 
items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: Items 
Patient treatment related 10 0 10 
Staff education 0 0 0 
Research 0 0 0 
Administrative items 65 2 67 
Sum total agenda issue items 75 2 77 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the DMT agenda, represents the majority of items processed at the 
meeting.  The next table details the type case issue items making up the sum 
total of “Administrative items”. 
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Table No. 40:  Process overview: Hospital No. 2 Distribution of Administrative type 
issues attended to by the DMT 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: 
Issue items 
Staffing 0 0 0 
Training and development 0 0 0 
Salary administration 2 0 2 
Personnel administration 1 0 1 
Administrative procedures 10 0 10 
Strategy development 0 0 0 
Budgeting 0 0 0 
Accounting and finance 14 0 14 
Building and maintenance 5 0 5 
Organization 20 2 22 
Information technology (IT) 2 0 2 
HMS (Health-Work 
Environment-Safety) 
0 0 0 
General information 11 0 11 
Sum total administrative issue 
items 
65 2 67 
 
10.5.3.4 Analysis and findings 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
DMT agenda, the following may be concluded: 
1. In all, 97% of the total agenda case matters ruled on are items 
recorded as “orientation items”.  Thus, the DMT has acted 
affirmatively on 3% of the agenda roster for 2001. 
2. The case item category of administrative issues represent a total of 
87% of agenda items considered by the DMT.  In all 2 out of 65 
administrative agenda case items were affirmatively acted upon by 
the DMT, representing a total of 3% of the accumulated agenda case 
items. 
3. In all 10 agenda case items, or 13,0% of the agenda sum total acted 
upon by the director and his DMT, addressed patient related issues.  
Of these latter cases, none were affirmatively acted upon. 
4. There were no research nor staff education issues raised during the 
year. 
 
The DMT group has developed a list of prioritized management goals.  
These are supervised separate from the DMT meeting format.  Focus areas in 
the plan are: 
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o Division of work assignments between hospital owner and 
hospital management 
o Financing model in a new governance model 
o Increase in market share 
o Cost management model 
o Patient satisfaction analysis 
o Patient training center  
o Geriatric team  
o Cancer treatment program 
o Strategy planning process 
 
The goals are detailed on focus area and date planned to have action 
completed.  However, aside from objectives within management 
development programs, all other goals are stated in general terms; i.e., 
Follow-up on…..; Continue development of….; Prepare plan for…..; 
Prepare proposal for….”; Establish a pilot project….; Coordinate plans 
for….; Identify regulations governing…..; Continue work on ….; 
Evaluate……; Preliminary evaluation…..  
10.5.3.4.1 Meeting demographic: Administrative advisory group (AAG) 
The AAG membership in 2001 counted 5 regular participants.  The AAG 
management team includes the director of each of the hospital’s 
administrative staff; i.e., accounting, personnel, head nurse’s office and the 
office of the chief medical doctor.  An AAG-management document was 
prepared for 2001, listing overall hospital objectives (Utfordringer; i.e., 
Challenges) with the following focus: (1) strategic issues, (2) patient 
improvement processes, (3) resource efficiency, and (4) staff recruiting and 
development. 
Protocol records confirm 43 AAG meetings in 2001, each one scheduled to 
last 3 hours.  This brings the man-hours spent on attending DAG meetings to 
645 man-hours. 
10.5.3.4.2 Issue matter roster 
As with the BDMs and DMTs, all protocoled issue matter items placed on 
the AAG meeting roster were examined and catalogued according to the 
analytical model introduced in Illustration no. 10: “Analytical framework: 
Stakeholder influence”.  Issues falling outside the three main areas of 
hospital accountability have been specified as administrative issues.  Each 
case matter has been entered into the protocol as either an item decided on, 
or as an item not ruled on; i.e., introduced for the purpose of orientation or as 
an item where no affirmative stand is taken.  All issue items brought before 
the management team are considered to be within the confines of operations 
mandate.    
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The following table shows the distribution of case matter issues as per the 
distribution key outlined above. 
 
Table No. 41:  Process overview: Hospital No. 2. Hospital Top Management Team 
(AAG) 
Agenda issues Orientation 
items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: Issues 
Patient treatment related 24 13 37 
Staff education 1 0 1 
Research 1 0 1 
Administrative items 209 80 289 
Sum total agenda issue items 235 93 328 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the AAG agenda, represents the majority of items called to the 
group’s attention.  The next table details the type case issue items making up 
the sum total of “Administrative items”. 
 
Table No. 42:  Process overview: Hospital No. 2.  Distribution of Administrative 
type issues attended to by the AAG 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: Issues 
Staffing 0 0 0 
Training and development 0 0 0 
Salary administration 7 3 10 
Personnel administration 10 4 14 
Administrative procedures 57 23 80 
Strategy development 0 0 0 
Budgeting 4 4 8 
Accounting and finance 9 6 15 
Building and maintenance 22 5 27 
Organization 67 30 97 
Information technology (IT) 3 5 8 
HMS (Health-Work Environment-
Safety) 
2 0 2 
General information 28 0 28 
Sum total administrative issue items 209 80 289 
10.5.3.5 Analysis and findings 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
AAG agenda, the following may be concluded: 
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1. In all, 72% of the agenda case item total are items recorded as 
“orientation issues”.  Thus, the AAG has acted affirmatively on 28% 
of the agenda roster for 2001. 
2. The case item category of administrative issues represent a total of 
88% of agenda items reviewed by the AAG.  In all 80 out of 289 
administrative agenda case items were affirmatively acted upon by 
the AAG, representing a total of 28% of the accumulated agenda 
case items. 
3. In all, 24 agenda case items, or 7% of the agenda sum total acted 
upon by the director and his AAG, addressed patient related issues.  
Of these latter cases, 13 or 35% of sector items or 4% of total 
agenda cases were affirmatively acted on. 
4. There was one research item and one staff education issue raised 
during the year. 
 
10.5.4 Hospital No. 3 
10.5.4.1 The decision-making processes as conducted by the board of 
directors (BDM) 
10.5.4.1.1 Structural characteristics 
Hospital no. 3, is a county community hospital (Sentralsykehus)186.  The 
hospital governance model as applied under this county administration is 
unique as the concept implemented may be considered a precursory to the 
new law on hospital governance implemented January 1, 2002 
(“Helseforetaksloven”).  Prior to the implementation of this latter law, the 
Norwegian parliament passed new legislation on organizational models 
applicable to county or community owned business or operational ventures.  
As an addendum to the Law on counties and communes of 1992/93 
(Kommuneloven), based on governmental provision Ot. prop.no. 53, 1998, 
counties were now permitted to establish “corporations” (“Foretak”) 
replacing the previous nomenclature of county or community “firms” 
(“Bedrift”).  The political assessment bringing this addendum forth was an 
expressed interest in finding an organizational structure that permitted an 
explicit focus on business-oriented management (“Forretningsmessige 
                                                 
186 See thesis section 9.3.2 ”Case hospital selection”; and particularly its Table no. 
16: “Selected case hospitals”. 
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hensyn”).  This replaced a practice of administrative supervision to better 
ensure governance interests (“Forvaltningsinteresser”)187.   
 
Within this new corporate governance structure, hospital no. 3 has a 
professional board with its director reporting directly to the county’s 
political branch.  However, unlike the other case hospitals, the hospital board 
director reports directly to the County mayor (Fylkesordfører) rather than to 
the politically appointed county offices (as with hospital no. 2) or city (as 
with hospital no. 1) commissionaire on public health.  This new provision 
was established to avoid any governing conflicts stemming from the 
previously confirmed dual reporting prescription.  
10.5.4.1.2 Meetings’ demographic: 
The BDM at Hospital no. 3 consisted of seven regular members, two of 
whom were employee representatives. The hospital director is noted as 
having been present at all BDM meetings conducted during 2001.  Having 
examined the protocols of all BDM meetings in 2001, it is also noted that the 
County Doctor General has not been present at any one of these meetings.  
In addition to the regular board meeting members, protocol records 
document a practice of hospital representatives being present and introduced 
on particular agenda case matter issues brought before the board.  During 
2001, in all 17 persons were recorded as present and available on particular 
case matter issues brought before the board.   
Typically, the BDMs in 2001 were scheduled for 3 ½ hours.  In 2001, nine 
such board meetings were held. This brings the estimate of the BDM 
meeting attendence at hospital no.1 to 220 man-hours.  
 
Responding to the new hospital law enacted July 2nd, 1999, a new hospital 
board was elected December 12, 2001. 
10.5.4.1.3 Issue matter roster 
In going through the BDM protocols for 2001, all issue matter items placed 
on the meeting roster were examined and catalogued according to the 
analytical model introduced in Illustration no. 10: “Analytical framework: 
Stakeholder influence”.  Issues falling outside the three main areas of 
hospital accountability have been specified as “administrative” matters.  
Each case matter has been entered into the protocol as either an item decided 
on, or as an item not ruled on; i.e., introduced for the purpose of orientation 
                                                 
187 This interpretation is based on NOU 1999:15 ”Hvor nært skal det være”, chapter 
6 ”Kommunalt foretak og forvaltningsbedrift”, section 6.1.1 ”Bakgrunn for nye 
tilknyttingsformer”, p. 53. 
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or as an item where no affirmative stand is taken.  All issue items brought 
before the board are considered to be within the confines of its mandate.    
 
The following table shows the distribution of case matter issues as per the 
distribution key outlined above. 
 
Table No. 43:  Process overview: hospital no. 3.  Hospital Board of Directors 
Meetings in 2001 
Agenda issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: 
Agenda 
items 
Patient treatment related 0 2 2 
Staff education 0 0 0 
Research 0 0 0 
Administrative items 22 16 38 
Sum total agenda issue items 22 18 40 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the meeting agenda, represents the majority of items acted on by 
the board.  The next table details the type of case issue items making up the 
sum total of the agenda’s “Administrative items”. 
 
Table No. 44:  Process overview: hospital no. 3.  Distribution of Administrative type 
issues attended to by the BDM in 2001 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum:  
Issues 
Staffing 0 0 0 
Training and development 0 0 0 
Salary administration 0 0 0 
Personnel administration 0 0 0 
Administrative procedures 5 3 8 
Strategy development 0 1 1 
Budgeting 0 3 3 
Accounting and finance 12 4 16 
Building and maintenance 0 2 2 
Organization 1 2 3 
Information technology (IT) 0 0 0 
HMS (Health-Work Environment-
Safety) 
0 0 0 
General information 4 1 5 
Sum total administrative case items 22 16 38 
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10.5.4.2 Analysis and findings 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
BDM agenda, the following findings may be concluded: 
1. In all, 55% of the agenda case item total is items recorded as 
“orientation issues” or items deferred for later board reviews.  Thus, 
the board has acted affirmatively on 45% or of the agenda roster for 
2001. 
2. The case item category of administrative issues represent a total of 
95% of the agenda items reviewed by the board.  In all, 16 of a total 
38 administrative agenda case items (42%) were affirmatively acted 
upon by the board. 
3. In all 2 agenda case items, or 5% of the agenda sum total acted upon 
by the board of directors, addressed patient related issues.  Both of 
these case issues were affirmatively acted upon. 
4. The board did not invite any research oriented or medical staff 
education issue matters as case agenda items during 2001. 
 
10.5.4.3 The decision-making processes as conducted by the hospital 
director and the top management team (TMT) 
10.5.4.3.1 Structural characteristics 
In conjunction with the aforementioned change in the hospital’s formal 
reporting structure, the hospital director introduced a new membership 
structure for the top management team.  From having a team consisting of 
staff administrative leaders, the director now established a new team made 
up of the hospital’s clinical ward managers. As outlined in NOU 1997: 2, 
Norwegian public hospitals vary with respect to the make up of the 
director’s management staff188.  According to a survey completed in 
conjunction with the NOU 1997: 2, common to most director teams is the 
inclusion of the chief medical doctor, head nurse, personnel director and the 
chief accountant. 
 
In addition to the hospital director, the management team consisted of seven 
medical ward supervisors and the director in charge of technical support 
(Driftssjef), all reporting directly to the hospital director.  Ward supervisors 
were all internally recruited following a selection process in which 
management interests and qualifications were emphasized as required 
candidate qualifications.    
                                                 
188 See NOU 1997: 2 “Pasienten først: Ledelse og organisering I sykehus”, section 
5.6.3.1 “Direktøren og direktørens stab”, p. 37. 
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10.5.4.3.2 Meeting demographic 
The concept of consensus management was aborted early 2001 in 
conjunction with establishing unitary management.  Subsequently, there 
were now a total of 9 regular members of the hospital TMT.  In all 16 TMT 
meetings were conducted in 2001, each meeting commonly scheduled to be 
completed in 3 hours.  Thus an estimated 432 man-hours were spent 
attending the scheduled TMTs during 2001.  There seems to have been no 
practice of inviting other hospital staff members to be present on particular 
issue matter cases, as TMT protocols has no record of such guests  
10.5.4.3.3 Issue matter roster 
As with the BDMs, all protocoled issue matter items placed on the meeting 
roster were examined and catalogued according to the analytical model 
introduced in Illustration no. 10: “Analytical framework: Stakeholder 
influence”.  Issues falling outside the three main areas of hospital 
accountability have been specified as “administrative” matters.  Each case 
matter has been entered into the protocol as either an item decided on, or as 
an item not ruled on; i.e., introduced for the purpose of orientation or as an 
item where no affirmative stand is taken.  All issue items brought before the 
management team are considered to be within the confines of its mandate.    
 
Based on a board initiative in the second half of 2000, the hospital 
management supervised a strategy planning process resulting in the 
hospital’s first formal strategy plan covering the period 2001 through 
2004189.  The strategy plan was approved by the board, January 17, 2001 and 
had the following action program: 
 
1. Improved patient flow 
a. Increased production 
b. Expanded treatment capacity 
c. Improved technical support 
d. Improved system coordination 
e. Inaugurate new medical wing to cut down on waiting list 
patients 
2. Improved flow and continuity in patient treatment 
a. Remove discontinuity items and improve treatment 
efficiency 
3. Improve joint actions with primary health care lines 
a. Efficient completion of patient journals 
b. Application of technology based patient reference services 
4. Improved patient- and public information services 
                                                 
189 ”BSS Strategiplan 2001 – 2004”. 
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a. Develop and subscribe to communication and media 
strategy 
b. Reduce/remove number of complaints on poor 
communication 
c. Cut down on time consuming administrative procedures 
d. Improve patient satisfaction 
5. Improved application of professional skills and knowledge 
a. Reduce number of vacant nursing positions 
b. Reduce staff turnover 
c. Improve change-management skills 
d. Induce research and development programs 
 
The plan announces management’s intentions of a supervised follow-up on 
development action plans throughout 2001, while the overall strategy plan is 
to be revised on an annual basis. 
 
The following table shows the distribution of case matter issues as per the 
distribution key outlined above. 
 
Table No. 45:  Process overview: hospital no. 3.  Hospital Top Management Team 
(TMT) 
Agenda issues Orientation 
items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: 
Agenda 
items 
Patient treatment related 24 20 44 
Staff education 2 2 4 
Research 0 0 0 
Administrative items 94 22 116 
Sum total agenda issue items 120 44 164 
 
As is evident from the above table, the number of administrative type issues 
placed on the meeting agenda, represent the majority of items called to the 
attention of the TMT.  The next table details the type case issue items 
making up the sum total of “Administrative items”. 
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Table No. 46:  Process overview: hospital no. 3.  Distribution of Administrative type 
issues attended to by the TMT 
Administrative issues Orientation 
Items 
Decision 
Items 
Sum: 
Issues 
Staffing 4 4 8 
Training and development 1 0 1 
Salary administration 0 1 1 
Personnel administration 6 0 6 
Administrative procedures 26 6 32 
Strategy development 0 1 1 
Budgeting 0 0 0 
Accounting and finance 22 2 24 
Building and maintenance 0 1 1 
Organization 4 7 11 
Information technology (IT) 0 0 0 
HMS (Health-Work Environment-
Safety) 
0 0 9 
General information 31 0 31 
Sum total administrative case items 94 22 116 
10.5.4.4 Analysis and findings 
In reviewing the above listed tables on case issue matters making up the 
TMT agenda, the following may be concluded: 
1. In all, 73% of the agenda case item total are items recorded as 
“orientation issues”.  Thus, the TMT has acted affirmatively on 
27% of the agenda roster for 2001. 
2. The case item category of administrative issues represent a total 
of 71% of agenda items reviewed by the TMT.  In all 19% or 22 
out of 116, of the administrative agenda items were 
affirmatively acted upon by the hospital director and its 
management team, representing a total of 13,4% of the 
accumulated agenda case items. 
3. In all 44 (27%) agenda case items acted upon by the TMT, 
addressed patient related issues. Of these latter cases, 20 issue 
matters, or 46% were acted upon affirmatively. 
4. There were no research cases issues attended to by the TMT 
during 2001. 
5. In all 4 staff education case issues were addressed by the TMT, 
representing 2% of the total number of cases handled by the 
TMT during 2001.  Half of these, or 2 were affirmatively acted 
upon.  
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10.5.5 Summary findings: Analysis of archival records 
10.5.5.1 Analytical approach 
Viewing the case hospitals’ archival records serves two purposes. Firstly, 
meeting protocols and other supportive documentation confirm a decision-
making agenda and ultimate decision-making choices.  This is important 
data as it serves to verify which constituent cases succeed in reaching 
important hospital decision-making forums and which cases are decided 
upon.  Secondly, archival records in general, and meeting protocols in 
particular, are important pieces of collaborative evidence when viewed 
opposite informant interviews.  As such, the sum analysis of case hospitals’ 
organizational preferences and its organizational dynamics bring the thesis 
closer to having answered the research question. 
10.5.5.2 The significance of structure  
In Giddens (Giddens 1984) view, structure represents governing rules and 
resources.  It may therefore be relevant to speak of the hospital board in 
terms of the legitimacy it represents by the origin of its constituency.  The 
board models applied by county and commune governance vary in their 
systemic justification.  The governing structures of the university hospital 
and the community hospital are established within a parliamentary 
framework.  However, as has been determined in the analysis of the 
structural ramifications, the parliamentary scheme has been discounted to fit 
its call for a reporting duality.  Herein are the requirements for the directors 
to report to a matrix of county office representatives.  In addition, these two 
directors are also obliged to maintain a formal hierarchical dialogue with 
their respective boards.  The distinguishing structural characteristics of the 
county hospital make the hospital director exclusively accountable only to 
the board. The straight line of command is further extended with the board 
itself reporting directly to the county’s political branch represented by its 
county mayor. 
 
This structural differentiation may in part be attributable to the latter board’s 
superior merits relative to its record of affirmative decision-making. 
Viewing the board from the perspective of agenda cases processed, the 
community hospital is clearly the superior performer.  However, the 
relatively high number of information case matters introduced may partially 
explain the output imbalance.  Discounting further for the same hospital’s 
relatively large number of case items connected to facility expansion 
projects, all three case hospitals turn over a relatively equal volume of 
agenda cases. The county hospital acting outside the system realm of a 
matrix reporting relationships displays the most assertive decision-making.  
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The absence of complex interceptive communication contributes to its 
affirmative actions.   
10.5.5.3 The sustainability of structuration and the rationality of 
systems190 
Subscribing to Durkheim’s (Durkheim 1962) rationale of social structures, 
structural legitimacy is represented by an asymmetric set of powers. Such 
systemic powers are represented by their enabling and constraining measures 
and serve to open up certain possibilities of action.  Some measures may be 
of a restrictive nature. The constraining power of the board is represented by 
responses to remain uncommitted on operational issues.  Giddens (Giddens 
1984) refers to these as negative sanctions.  However, by the very nature of 
its structural power, the board may also represent capabilities to bring about 
intended outcomes of action benefiting yet other stakeholder preferences.  
The case hospitals show a clear preference for reviewing administrative case 
items.  Their major focus is directed towards budgets and resources 
allocation.  As such, board priorities reflect the focus of their governing 
constituencies. This functionalistic interpretation of agenda priorities 
demonstrates what Giddens (Giddens 1984) labels system morphology, said 
to persist between matrix actors of common political structures.  
 
Giddens post-structuralistic interpretation recognizes actor agents’ relational 
codes existing below surface manifestations.  Such manifestations here refer 
to the prescribed board mandate. The board directors are all tenured 
politicians experienced in county and commune politics having been part of 
their embedded structural properties. This serves to secure the reproduction 
of relations and the endurance of system logic. In Giddens’ view, the 
practices of actor agent interaction within the totalities of its governance 
system, serve to institutionalize governance.  Thus the contextual logic of 
hospital boards is embedded in the case matter preference of its superior 
governance actors. 
 
The analysis shows that the case hospital boards do not address contextual 
matters rooted in hospital value creation processes.  Along the lines of 
Habermas (Habermas 1991), one may argue that the boards’ lack of 
contextual insight precludes it ever to profess any sector expertise and thus 
permits agendas void of value creation issues. Habermas’ makes reference to 
the mounting bureaucratization of the administration in State and society.  
His claim is that it is inherent in the nature of the case that the know-how of 
highly specialized experts would necessarily be removed from supervision 
                                                 
190 Giddens (Giddens 1984) refers to structuration theory as conceptually 
representing structure, system and duality of structure.   
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by rational debating bodies.  Habermas’ concludes that the control of the 
state’s political bureaucracy is possible only by means of society’s political 
bureaucracy.  Consequently, the public hospital is subject only to the control 
within the framework of its own governance.  In as much as this is a 
structural matter within one and the same governance body, it is not possible 
to arrive at an appropriate relationship between governance decrees and 
board deliberations.   
 
The decision-making pattern as exhibited by all the respective case hospital 
boards confirms a preference for economic and financial issue matters191.  
With its attention generally detached from patient treatment issues, research 
and development and staff education, the boards do not fulfill a role as 
promulgated by sector governance.  However, it must be stated that county 
and commune prescriptions are not uniformly clear in their detailing of 
hospital mandate.  Board instructions for hospital no. 1 are the clearest in 
their specification of governance prescriptions and on the diversity of 
mandated functions. The formal board mandate states unequivocally that it is 
the board’s duty to plan and coordinate hospital activities regarding 
treatment, research and staff education192.  At hospital no. 2, the county 
authorities are less detailed on the formal mandate.  Board instructions 
emphasize that it is the board’s duty to ensure that the hospital is managed so 
as to secure long-term and over-all hospital needs in line with county 
strategy.  This makes the board responsible for establishing a hospital 
strategy and programs for its supervision and control193. The mandate 
established for the board at hospital no. 3, the instructions are stated in terms 
where one cannot read into it any prescriptions validating neither the law on 
hospital nor later governance prescriptions detailing staff education and 
medical research194.      
                                                 
191 According to Mørkved (Mørkved 2001), the national focus on maximizing the 
efficiency of public governance saw its most significant initiative with governmental 
provision: St.meld. nr. 4 (1987-88) “Perspektiver og reformer i den økonomiske 
politikken”.  A so-called  “New State (“Den nye staten”) was to be noted for its 
improvement in effective and efficient resources administration.  A governmental 
white paper in 1991; NOU 1991: 28 “Mot bedre vitende”, was also considered an 
important follow-up, further outlining government reform intentions based on the 
logic of New Public Management (Mørkved 2001).   
192 “Instruks for styrer ved Oslo kommunale sykehus”; § 6 ”Styret skal planlegge og 
koordinere etatens virksomhet og utbygging på feltene praktisk medisin, forskning 
og undervisning; jfr. § 1” (1989) 
193 “Felles vedtekter for styrene ved SIA/Stensby, Bærum og Ski sykehus etter 
Fylkestingets behandling. Vedtak i Fylkestinget 20.02.01”. 
194 Buskerud fylkeskommune: Saksframlegg 18.11.99; referanse 99/01520-1: 
”Etablering av fylkeskommunale sykehusforetak fra 1 januar 2000”. 
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The boards’ uniform record of non-compliance may thus be considered 
indicative of a system reproduction of ignorance opposite the complex 
contextual properties making up the public hospital.   
10.5.5.4 The modality of operations 
Applying the logic of Giddens (Giddens 1984), the conditions governing the 
continuity of structural intentions, determine how an organization is 
facilitated in its operational processes.  Thus, the manner in which the board 
executes its mandate, confirms its legitimacy through the domination exerted 
on the hospital agenda.    
 
In analyzing the case hospitals’ decision-making record, the pattern of case 
matter issues processed resembles that of the respective boards.  Between 80 
and 90% of all agenda cases are of an administrative nature, dominated 
largely by organization, accounting and salary administration issue matters.  
Excluding for the moment the AAG management team of the community 
hospital, all case hospitals’ operations management teams include ward 
managers.  What makes this observation particularly revelatory is the fact 
ward representatives do not use the top management forum to promulgate 
ward issues.  The lack of agenda attentiveness to medical, research and staff 
education confirms this latter contention. 
 
The hospital operations management’s lack of interaction with value creation 
issues, confirms a scope of influence confined to administrative matters. A 
stakeholder group ceases to be a viable force when it does not apply its 
influential power. Such a link between power and action presupposes the 
capacity to deploy a range of causal measures.  As the top management 
teams uniformly fail to position themselves on operational issues, their 
insignificance to the respective hospital’s value creation processes is 
confirmed.   
 
The pattern of management focus resembles that of their respective board of 
directors.  The county hospital shows a superior affirmative decision-making 
track.  A higher attention devoted patient related matters, shows a 
managerial focus levelled more at operational issues than that which is 
observed in other case hospitals. A strategy plan initiated by its board of 
directors, further reaffirms a goal-oriented management. However, the nature 
of strategic objectives is still resource efficiency and a production 
achievement orientation. 
The community hospital with its practice of two management teams shows 
no particular distinctive traits in agenda focus. Both the DMT and the AAG 
prioritise administrative issues.  Judged by the frequency of meetings, 
 226 
caseloads processed and the higher rate of affirmative decision-making, it 
appears quite clear, however, that the director’s AAG management group is 
representative of the hospital’s top management team. 
 
Thesis findings from the informant interviews are supported by the analysis 
of archival records.  Structural conditions shape both the nature and 
efficiency of communication as it also influence decision-making focus.  
Board informants verify both the structure complexity and partly an 
ambivalence associated with the governing agenda.  County and commune 
governance focus is on measurable entities instrumental in impacting 
resources deployment.  This permeates the hospital boards’ agenda priorities 
and executive attention.  Hospital informants verify a decisional 
sedimentation culture within the case hospitals.  The archival records 
analysis also supports a view of hegemonic ward operations. Ward 
properties are by medical staff choice, not brought forward to be included in 
the agenda of hospital management.   
 
Giddens (Giddens 1984) labels properties implicated in the reproduction of 
contextual totalities, as structural principles.  Subsequent practices evolving 
over time within such totalities make up embedded institutions.  As such one 
may confirm case hospital management as institutionalized administrative 
regimes where its powers are exerted in the process of sanctioning 
administrative system prescriptions.  The modes of management conduct 
reflected in the case matter agenda, reaffirms an executive and management 
function vested outside the hospital’s value creation processes.  As such, 
stakeholder group informants manifest the existence of governance 
morphology.   
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11 Summary and conclusions 
11.1 Empirical significance and population conformity: 
Findings generalization 
The thesis objective has been to arrive at an explanation of how hospital 
organizational decision-making is influenced by stakeholder groups.  In the 
context of constituent representation, stakeholder groups are conceptualised 
as they converge on organizational decision-making. The thesis model 
developed, has established a conceptual construct abstraction of the 
interaction between constituent interests.195  To arrive at research closure, the 
thesis has identified relevant hospital stakeholder groups and their vested 
interests in hospital operations. Empirical findings show constituent 
perception and preference on issue matters tied to public hospitals. Thesis 
analysis shows how stakeholder groups work to influence decision-making 
at various levels of the public hospital organization.  The following table 
depicts hospital stakeholder groups and their matrix interaction. The 
conceptual foundation is based on the thesis’ stakeholder model as shown in 
Illustration no. 8: “A model of public hospital stakeholders”.  Stakeholder 
convergence has been (colour-) coded to indicate the nature of group 
interrelationships.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 See thesis section 8.3.2.1 “Methodological approach”. 
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Table No.  47: Stakeholder group interaction in public hospitals  
Relationship 
maintained on 
research projects, 
product evaluation and 
networking
Contact established 
when following up on 
patient rights 
violations
Contact maintained 
through employee 
federation 
organization
Supervisory 
relationship vested in 
Hospital’s  formal 
organization
Clinical 
Supervisors
Matrix relationship 
supervised by hospital 
medical staff
Relationship 
dependent on patient 
initiative and/or 
patient diagnosis 
qualifying for special 
proxy interests 
No formal relationship 
nor matrix cooperation 
identified
Special audit offices 
and/or audit policies 
and procedures 
established to 
safeguard patient 
interests
Patients
No formal relationship 
nor matrix cooperation 
identified
No formal relationship 
nor matrix cooperation 
identified
Close contact 
maintained to ensure 
over-all affiliate 
strategies
Contractual 
relationship delegated 
Hospital Management
Work-Force 
Representation 
groups
Administrative staff 
engaged in contract 
administration to 
ensure abidance by the 
hospital’s  contractual 
terms and conditions
Diagnostic groups for  
the chronically ill 
working with hospital 
management to ensure 
patient rights 
Relationship governed 
by negotiated 
agreements on 
employment terms and 
conditions
Hierarchical 
relationship governed 
by mandates, rules and 
regulations
Hospital top 
management
Critical 
Suppliers
Proxy AgentsProfessional 
Affiliations
Sector 
Governance
External 
Stakeholder               
Groups
Internal
Stakeholder 
Groups
1 2                                3                                       4
5                                      6                        7                                         8
9                              10                                        11                   12
13                                     14                       15                                     16
 
 
             Formal hierarchical stakeholder relations (1,2,5,9,13) 
             Employee federation based interaction (6,14) 
              Contractually governed stakeholder relations (3,4) 
             Services exchange relationships (11,12,15,16) 
             No known stakeholder interaction (7,8,10) 
 
The empirical field covered is limited to three case hospitals.  Case hospital 
no. 1 represents the university hospital and/or county hospitals assigned 
regional and university-clinic functions.  Case hospital no. 2 is representative 
of the four-functioned somatic structure of community or local hospitals.  
Case hospital no. 3 is representative of the county hospital, also assigned 
various community hospital functions.196   
                                                 
196 This combination of functional assignments across standard hospital 
classifications is a common governance practice.  Detailed documentation on public 
hospitals’ classified status and additional functional assignments is available in 
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The population of case hospitals satisfies sampling property requirements 
that qualify for contextual richness and case category representation.197  The 
thesis research strategy has established a conceptual and methodological 
venue relevant for generalizing the thesis’ empirical findings. Case sample 
validity testing as shown in table no. 15: “Validity assurance control”, 
supports within and across comparisons for different classes of case 
hospitals.  Thesis research validity is strengthened through the use of the 
uniform nature of constructs selected. External validity is present, as 
descriptive patterns have been identified across case hospitals. Thesis 
replication logic is supported by the sampling conformity test as shown in 
table no. 14: “Sampling conformity test”.  With the exception of regional 
class hospitals, county and community case hospitals fit the sampling 
conformity test relevant for public hospitals.  Uniform empirical 
characteristics have been identified through the research methods conformity 
tests.  In summary, it is the thesis position that the findings herein may be 
generalized to fit the national population of county and community hospitals. 
It is therefore important to recognize that also the case hospital referenced in 
the thesis as a university hospital, fits the category of county hospitals.  
Larger county hospitals are commonly assigned regional and 
university/country functions.  These two classes of public hospitals represent 
92 % of the total population of Norwegian public somatic hospitals198.  
Certain structural nuances exist within the sample case hospital population. 
These are identified as significant sampling factors making them important 
either as a “political case”, “typical case” and/or an “opportunistic case”.199  
The distinctiveness of the commune governance model applicable to Case 
hospital no. 1 makes it both a unique political case as well as an 
opportunistic case200.  Case hospital no 2, as a typical local hospital case, 
attracts empirical attention due to its structural commonalities with all local 
hospital institutions.  The incorporatization of Case hospital no. 3 
(Fylkeskommunalt foretak) makes for a opportunistic governance case201.  
Equally, the latter hospital may be considered representative of a typical 
case, due to its county hospital status shared with all other county hospital 
institutions. The descriptive analysis of case hospitals is important when 
interpreting the significance of governance structure.  
 
                                                                                                                   
SINTEF/UNIMED’s SAMDATA publications.  On 2001; see SAMDATA sykehus 
Tabeller; 2/02; particularly chapter 8 “Aktiviteter og kostnader”; p.p. 129-155. 
197 See thesis section 8.3.5 “Case sampling properties”. 
198 See thesis section 9.1 “The national population of public hospitals”. 
199 See thesis table no. 14: “Sampling conformity test”. 
200 See thesis table no. 16: “Selected case hospitals”. 
201 Ibid. 
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To ascertain the true significance of thesis findings, efforts have been made 
to relate relevant organizational and sociological theories.  Hospital culture, 
values and habitats interact with governance choice processes.  Stakeholder 
groups continuously evolve around the hospital organizations’ decision-
making processes.  Actor-agents’ relational influence on organizational 
decision-making is confronted with the structural powers of hospital internal 
actor agents.  The subsequent summary and conclusions are a stylistic 
rendering of the thesis findings that denotes the internalization of decisional 
power within the public hospital.  
11.2 Methodological justifications 
In the opinion of Grimen (Grimen 2000), the quality of qualitative empirical 
data is measured by its sociological representation of the empirical field.  
Such a sociological representation is achieved when the analysis provides an 
over-all picture of the social activity of a group, an organization or a society.  
The thesis research’s ontological assumptions has been followed (Morgan 
and Smircich 1980).  Morgan’s position emphasizes the importance of 
understanding the empirical context in a holistic fashion202.  Ontologically, 
the thesis rests on its principle presumption as to what constitutes a social 
phenomenon and in what way it is manifesting itself.  In the thesis’ 
contextual analysis one has identified stakeholder groups interacting with 
hospital organizational decision-making.  Actor agents have been analyzed 
as to their interaction and influence on decision processes and priorities. 
Stakeholders’ cognitive properties have been determined through an 
interpretation of informants’ perception of relevant hospital contextual 
issues. As such, the thesis’ descriptive analysis is representative of 
stakeholder group behavior as it is manifested in hospital decision-making.   
The thesis’ position on what constitutes social phenomenon, merges 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism203.  
Methodological individualism calls for the social phenomenon to be 
explained exclusively by the characteristics that govern individual behavior.  
Methodological collectivism, calls for social phenomenon to be explained by 
laws governing holistic events and by explanations of individual behavior 
related to the positions served within the societal system.  With respect to the 
analysis of hospital stakeholder groups, one is looking at societal actions 
representative of constituent group interests. Stakeholder group constituents 
                                                 
202 See thesis section 5. “Research question”. 
203 Harald Grimen discusses in his book “Samfunnsvitenskapelige tenkemåter” the 
theoretical precepts for merging methodological individualism and collectivism 
vested in the philosophies of George C. Homans and J.W.N. Watkins.  See 
particularly chapter 8, p.p. 218-240.  
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act based upon their common positions, feelings and values relative to the 
nature of the hospital organization.  The thesis is therefore looking at the 
perceptions and actions of individual constituents behaving in unison to 
induce social phenomenon represented by hospital decision-making.   
 
In analysing and explaining social phenomenon, the methods chosen reflect 
the prescribed ontological position.  Selected construct variables measure 
individual action and serve to explain relational properties.  The thesis’ 
epistemological stand rests on its ability to collect data representative of both 
collective and individualistic social phenomenon. Through data acquired 
from the case hospitals’ decision-making processes, one has solicited what 
may be referred to as social events.  Such events are representative of the 
institution’s structural contingencies. Empirical data provide the accounts of 
social phenomenon.  These are representative of individual actions linked 
together to constitute aggregate pictures of stakeholder characteristics and 
actions.  Thus, through respondent perception, the aggregate accounts of 
cognitive logic are representative of the group responses to social 
phenomenon.  It is therefore the thesis position that the empirical/descriptive 
accounts are representative of research merits rooted in scientific ontological 
and epistemological considerations. 
11.3 The reification of leadership 
The thesis research question has addressed the issue of organizational 
decision-making.  As has been documented in the analysis of research data, 
decision-making processes in the public hospital subscribe to formal 
prescriptions along complex structural webs of governing authorities. 
The sociologist Max Weber (Jones 2002) and his purported views of 
(Occidental) rationalism  claim that bureaucratization leads to reification or 
an abstraction of formal relationships.  Leadership abstraction serves to stifle 
motivational incentives to rational conduct of performance.  To the extent 
that the public hospital is part of a larger sector governance structure, thesis 
contentions on leadership reification take on a revelatory position.  
Organizational decision-making in public hospitals is representative of an 
extensive interplay of constituent actor-agents or stakeholder groups.  
Affirmative actions made at the various organizational decision-making 
levels project a rationale embedded in their respective structural positions.  
While executive and operations management are shown to merge largely in a 
common symbolic and a myopic substance of supervision, the clinical ward 
acts in a detached fashion supported by an embedded position of clinical 
autonomy.  This largely detached form of hospital decision-making 
processes supports a contention of leadership reification.     
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This section summarizes thesis contentions that imply a status of leadership 
reification in public hospitals. 
11.3.1 Implicating governance structure 
To enable a final conclusion on the empirical findings and to consider its 
implications, it is necessary to integrate in the analysis the philosophies and 
principles of hospital governance.  These have partly been brought forward 
in the thesis’ contextual and archival records’ analysis.  It is here important 
to look at the nature of hospital services as a welfare state benefit viewed 
opposite the logic of open market transactions.  The issue of welfare state 
principles carries important implications for the governance structure. 
Marshall (Marshall 1950) quotes social citizenship as representative of the 
core idea of the welfare state.  According to Espin-Andersen (Espin-
Andersen 2000), if social rights are (i) granted legal and practical status of 
property rights, (ii) if they are inviolable, and (iii) granted on the basis of 
citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a de-commodification 
status for individuals vis a vis the market.  De-commodification occurs when 
a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain 
services access without reliance on the market.  Thus it is important to view 
the welfare state not only in terms of the rights it grants, but also take into 
account how Government activities are interlocked with the role of the 
market.  “The mere presence of social assistance may not bring about such a 
de-commodification unless they also emancipate the individuals from market 
dependence” (Espin-Andersen 2000). Thus, the concept of social citizenship 
also involves social stratification.  The welfare state’s objective is to 
maintain a structure of equality in its own right.  If workers are market 
dependent, obviously they are difficult to mobilize for solidaristic action.   
Thus, the welfare state becomes an active force in the ordering of social 
relations. In European welfare state development, the issue of de-
commodification has been contested.  The Scandinavian welfare states tend 
to be the most de-commodifying. By guaranteeing benefits tailored to 
modest expectations, a synthesis of universalism in coverage has so far 
blocked off the market.  Notably Norway and Sweden have succeeded in 
retaining universalism.  However, a certain degree of political consensus is 
required to preserve a political support for the high taxes that such a welfare 
model require (Espin-Andersen 2000).   
In the thesis conclusion, it becomes necessary to understand the State’s 
capacity to uphold its governance model.  The model needs to be capable of 
maintaining a necessary degree of social stratification while upholding the 
status of de-commodification.  The implication rests with system governance 
structure and the impact carried on organizational decision-making.   
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In Dingstad’s contention (Dingstad 1998), the Scandinavian welfare state is 
erected within a governance structure based on a philosophy of close 
supervision204.  The Corporative state as developed following Second World 
War, bears a close resemblance to what Sejersted (Sejersted 2001) refers to 
as the merging of ideology and special interest groups.  According to 
Sejersted, the ideological guideline has been to harmonize a collective of 
vested interests.  The function of ideology in the Scandinavian welfare 
system has been to merge constituent and societal interests into a credible 
alliance.   
The basis for this development is rooted in a structuralist form of power 
dissemination found in Norwegian constitutionalism in the late 19th Century.  
The latter is generally known as the principle of legality (Sejersted 2001).  
All public initiatives should be vested in approved legislation.  The duty of 
public governance was to operationalize the legal prescriptions entailed in 
such initiatives. This constructivist principle in the infallible nature of public 
governance was vested in a new and optimistic faith in the capacity to 
supervise national developments.  The inclination to increasingly legislate 
the practices of society represented a philosophy that viewed legislation as 
an instrumental force to implement national strategies.  According to 
Sejersted, this utilitarianism was rooted in moralistic perceptions tied to the 
distribution of welfare goods.   
 
The furtherance of the social democratic reforms following 1950 depicts a 
pattern reminiscent of the early constructivist development.  The liberalistic 
state of the preceding century was based on a program to diminish the 
State’s power through legislation.  Governance should ensure instrumental 
developments in the sense that future events should be predictable and 
manageable.  Now, a new state governance principle emerged. The previous 
principle of legality presupposed the laws of court to precede the judgements 
of governance.  The new governing practice developed through localized 
empowerment prescriptions (Fullmaktslover)205. Here governance actors 
were expected to take the initiatives in place of market-based solutions.  The 
principles of legal facilitation had thus become replaced by a principle of 
governance process supervision.  The new principle of process governance 
ensured a liberalization of centralized government.  This philosophy entailed 
a democratisation of governance through a wider societal participation.   
                                                 
204 See thesis section 3.1.2 “From pre modern- to late modern hospitals”. 
205 These prescriptions (“Fullmaktslover”) were originally viewed as controversial 
measures of governance as they entailed a principle of having the executive branch 
of the Government (“Regjeringen”) independently prescribe the mandate, rights and 
scope of authority vested in each particular area of application.   
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Legislation introduced in Norway between 1960 and 2000 demonstrates the 
operationalization of the new principle of process governance206.  The thesis 
demonstrates how this new governing rationale became embedded in the 
hospital governance structure. Parallel to the introduction of process 
governance, came a structural resolution. The latter developed as a 
consequence of conflicts with vested interest parties that did not succeed in 
accessing the parliamentary processes. The constitutional issues centred 
around how to legislate democratic participation that served special interest 
groups critical to the general welfare of citizens. The issue of governance 
was one of institutionalising a parliamentary form of democracy that ensured 
localized democratic processes for constituent interest groups. Corporate 
pluralism207 became the outcome of a constitutional wave of reforms that 
follow the inception of the principle of localized process governance.  
Corporate pluralism opened up for conflicts to be resolved between 
organized special interest groups. A modern and complex society with a 
growing demand for public regulations, required a framework for 
cooperation between those who regulate and the regulated (Sejersted 2001).  
The national arbitrations between hospital governance representatives and 
employee federations represent the institutionalised processes established to 
resolve differences between constituent actors.  In the next illustration, a 
model is developed to show the structurally based foundation upon which 
the public hospital rests. 
  
                                                 
206 See particularly thesis sections: 3.1.2 “From pre modern- to late modern 
hospitals”, and 3.2 “The governance model”. 
207 Term originally coined by Stein Rokkan (Sejersted 2001). 
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Illustration No. 20: The sustainability of hospital structuration208 
Constitutional 
entrenchm ent
Governance
m atrix
Em bedded 
structural
relations
M odality of
operations
The illustration is a conceptual abstraction of the structurally vested sector 
system of public hospitals.  The illustration’s constitutional entrenchment 
refers to the constitutional basis of the county and commune hospital 
governance.  Its legislative history confirms the entrenched nature of its 
institutional grounds.   
The model’s reference to governance matrix addresses the formal ownership 
system of county and commune governance.  Political and administrative 
actor agents make up the structure of governance.  Influence is facilitated 
through the legality of structure and the prescriptive nature of formal 
interaction with hospital management. 
The embedded structural relations depict the integrated nature of public 
hospital governance.  In addition to the presence of formal governance sector 
representatives, formalized contractual actor-agents are recognized 
stakeholders.  The principles and practices of corporate pluralism need be 
considered.   
The hospital’s modality of operations implies the totalities making up the 
organizational decision-making scene in public hospitals.  Here, all 
stakeholder groups convene in their efforts to influence decision-making.  
The model’s cylinders symbolize hospital internal stakeholder groups with 
their organizational roots legitimised in the hospital’s structural strata.  They 
                                                 
208 In thesis section 10.5.5.3 “The sustainability of structuration and the rationality of 
systems”, it is shown how Giddens (Giddens 1984) conceptualizes his structuration 
theory representing structure, system and the duality of structures.  
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represent the complexities of merging diversified stakeholder interests into 
integrated hospital goals and programs.   
The illustration label of “sustainability of hospital structuration”, points to 
the managerial complexities of governance system totalities.   
11.3.2 The significance of decision-making homogeneity  
Structurally, the thesis’ analysis provides an insight into the significance of 
system contingencies governing stakeholder interaction in public hospitals.  
Within this decisional framework, the focus has been on executive, 
operational and ward management levels.  Hveem (Hveem 1996) makes 
reference to a conceptualization of power that presumes the existence of a 
conflict acted out between two parties.  However, Hveem also points out that 
influential power may not only be exercised through affirmative decision-
making.  Reference needs also to be made to a conceptualization of power 
that includes the ability to defer decision-making or to prevent certain parties 
and processes from interacting (Lukes 1974).  When interpreting the nature 
of influence, a pattern of issue matter distinctiveness is present.  In the 
thesis, this manifests itself in a preferred constituent role-play attached to the 
respective organizational levels.  Stakeholders seek to safeguard their 
influential power through upholding their decision-making homogeneity.  
The latter makes reference to the decision-making preference for 
organizational matters that are unique to the particular constituent’s 
organizational level.   
The thesis analysis of hospital decision-making has provided an account of 
organizational priorities and decision-making rationale.  The analysis shows 
that the various organizational decision-making levels work in patterned 
ways to manifest their relative importance.  The major focus of both 
executive and operations management is on constraining actions attached to 
resources deployment.  The inductive norms are based on subscriptions to 
cost-effectiveness.     
 
The national pattern of hospital sector governance resembles that of the 
British National Health Services program outlined in the Government white 
paper: “Working for Patients” (1989) (Johnson 1993). According to Johnson, 
the reorganization of the British National Health Service  (NSH) was a 
product of neo-classical economics; i.e., a return to the primacy of market 
forces and a commitment to competition and effectiveness and consumer 
choice (Johnson 1993). New Public Management, evolved approximately 
twenty years ago from Anglo-American and OECD-related prescriptions 
(Vanebo et al. 2001). The public hospital sector reforms have largely 
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incorporated the NHS logic and operational rationale of the NPM governing 
philosophy209.   
Executive board directors and hospital operations management express a 
unison support for cost contingency philosophies.  The constituent agents’ 
cognitive rationale verifies the vested nature of the managerial missions of 
cost austerity.  However, these findings are representative of a rational 
choice paradox.  The paradox demonstrates a perceptual conflict between 
what constitutes prioritized operational choices and what formally is 
mandated as hospital objectives.  In public hospital management, operational 
means have replaced core functional output as the hospital’s ultimate end.   
 
One possible explanation of this sociological phenomenon is Habermas’ 
(Habermas 1991) contention on actors’ lack of contextual insight.  Another 
societal theory is proposed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) who 
makes reference to Aristoteles’ concept of the endoxa.  An endoxa 
represents the society’s common stance on an issue matter.  It enjoys the 
general public’s recognition, as it represents a prevailing political position.  
Statements representative of such a public stance generally receive popular 
support, as they are perceived to be in line with acceptable political thinking.  
In the analysis of the respondents’ perceptual views on hospital related issue 
matters, hospital governance constituents are supportive of sector 
prescriptions.  The existence of an endoxa of cost austerity in public 
hospitals appears well rooted among executive- and operations management.  
This sector endoxa has thus become the common sense stand or the general 
picture of hospital management reality (Solli 1998). 
 
The thesis’ confirms sector governance with a singular instrumental pursuit 
for public hospitals. Administrative measures preclude an equally 
affirmative pursuit of clinical performance.  An explanation for this skewed 
governance focus may be explained by Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality210. According to Johnson, governmentality rejects the notion 
of the State as a coherent, calculating subject whose political power grows in 
concert with its intervention into the civil society.  This is contrary to the 
constitutional development in Norway, which culminated in the present form 
of process governance (Sejersted 2001).  However, another interpretation of 
governmentalism, as introduced by Johnson, is the institutionalisation of 
                                                 
209 See thesis section: 3.4 “The emergence of corporate logic”. 
210 According to Foucault (Johnson 1993); “The form of government which came to 
have populations as its object of rule, and political economy as its principle form of 
knowledge, was an ensemble of institutions, procedures, analysis, calculations, 
reflections and tactics that in sum constitute governmentality; i.e., a very complex 
form of government”.  See also thesis section 3.1 “A historical review of the hospital 
organization”.   
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expertise in the form of professions.  Foucault was concerned with the 
professional expertise as it empowered radical extensions of the capacity to 
govern.  The face value of his propositions may be said to be a State’s 
recognized jurisdiction of medicine as a strategic measure to govern.  
Modern institutionalised medicine thus becomes part of the apparatus of 
governmentality.  The implications of Foucault’s theory of the State and the 
medical profession in it, confirms institutionalised medicine to be part of a 
governmental ploy.  In the latter interpretation, the autonomy and hegemony 
of the wards and their professional members may be viewed as a master 
pattern of social control (Johnson 1993). 
 
Ward autonomy provides for a hegemonic decision-making position.  It is 
Freidson’s (Freidson 1970) contention that once a profession is established 
in its protected position of autonomy, it is likely to have a dynamism of its 
own.  It develops new ideas or activities that may only vaguely reflect or 
even contradict those of the dominant elite.  Thesis analysis of empirical 
accounts supports the picture of a hegemonic position relative to the web of 
stakeholder groups addressing ward issues.  The thesis has not sought to 
assemble empirical support for a governance sector strategy.  However, 
Faucoult’s philosophical angle brings into contention Christensen’s 
(Christensen 1994) assessment of the public health’s institutional 
governance.  According to Christensen, the representation of members of the 
medical profession permeates all levels of public health governance211. 
11.3.3 Decision-making sedimentation 
The thesis has interpreted stakeholder group power in a hermeneutical focus.  
Stakeholder intentions have been viewed in terms of their vested interests 
evident in the outcome patterns of hospitals’ decision-making.  In the 
following illustration, focus is on hospital decision-making at the three 
analysed organizational levels212.  Thesis’ conceptual categories applied in 
the empirical analysis are shown as they have been employed in the 
informant interviews.  A conceptualization of management performance has 
been attached to each organizational level.  The diagnostic terms applied are 
indicative of the thesis view of stakeholder group influence.      
 
                                                 
211 See thesis section 6.2 “A pathway to a new paradigm on public hospital 
governance”. 
212 For the analysis of individual decision-making levels of executive, operations and 
ward management; pls. view illustration no. 9 “Hospital decision-making 
sectioning”. 
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Illustration No. 21: Decisional sedimentation 
Branch sensitivity
Authority assessment Impact recognition
Goal alignmentGoal orientation
Managerial attentiveness
Institutional perspective
Mandate interpretation
Issue perception
Professional field
development Patient orientation
Ward development
Symbolic management
Myopic management
Detached management
Executive
governance
Operations
management
Ward 
supervision
 
The conceptualization of hospital management dramatizes the divergent 
perceptions inherent at the various organizional levels.  In Vike’s (Vike et al. 
2002) analysis, the contention is that the power of governance actors is 
determined by their capability to decentralize sector dilemmas.  According to 
Vike, this is not consequential to a planned strategy.  It evolves out of 
complex institutional processes where actor agents lack insight into core 
operations and the ecology of decision-making processes.  The thesis 
findings partly subscribe to Vike’s proposition.  The empirical data 
represents a perceptual focus of executive, administrative and ward 
management levels. Decision-making commonalities are verified in their 
joint subscriptions to administrative governance. However, this managerial 
equilibrium replaces a differentiated perception of organizational priorities. 
The metaphorical decisional sedimentation conceptualizes a segregation of 
decision-making objectives.  Hospital boards’ lack of marginal sensitivity to 
mandated objectives, serves to distance itself from core hospital issues.  This 
is contrary to sector intent as expressed through legislature on hospital board 
role and executive scope of authority213. Governance prescriptions are 
                                                 
213 See “Lov av 25. september 1992 nr. 107 ”Om kommuner og fylkeskommuner”; § 
67 ”Styrets myndighet”. 
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prefaced in legislation governing public service organizations. In particular, 
the discussional introduction of legislative intent on public organizations, 
details the role of boards in public organizations214.   
As outlined in the thesis’ analysis, the board’s narrow scope of influential 
authority creates a governance distance from hospital value creation 
processes.  It is the thesis’ contention that boards act largely in a symbolic 
venue.  Symbolic management is representative of communicative efforts 
and relational activities serving a role of an executive figurehead. 
Consequently, lack of board involvement in organizational decision-making, 
precludes executive management from influencing hospital strategy and 
operational position.  Its messages of operational austerity and effective 
production performance is promulgated but without being linked to 
instrumental action. 
 
The importance of hospital operations management has been the focus of 
attention in all governance reform prescriptions over the last thirty years.  
Ever since the passing of the first law on hospitals in 1970, sector 
governance has sought to establish a modern leadership role.  The 
recruitment, selection and development of hospital leaders have had top 
political priority.  Particularly, with the introduction of the latest hospital law 
(“Spesialisthelsetjensteloven”)215, one seeks to ensure an organizational form 
that facilitates a professional form of leadership.  Thesis findings show a 
managerial practice operationally detached from wards’ value creation 
processes.  Management’s goal orientation is scaled to fit administrative 
services.  An active interaction with sector governance and hospital internal 
system audit groups, takes precedence.  Planning processes are confined to 
administrative subscription as introduced by governance representatives.  
Such facilitative measures carry little significance to strategic direction and 
prioritized actions.  Nor is operations management critical to the wards’ 
interaction with outside stakeholder groups. As with the board of directors, 
this narrow scope of operations management involvement is contrary to 
legislated and prescribed governance intent. Governance prescriptions on 
hospital leadership authenticate management involvement in the total scope 
of hospital activities.   
Drawing on marketing literature, and particularly Theodore Levitt’s criticism 
of John Kenneth Galbraith’s (1968) view of advertising as an artificial want 
creation (Grant 1999), the term myopic management is applied. The term 
“myopic” is defined to mean “shortsightedness or lack of discernment in 
                                                 
214 Ot prp nr. 53 (1997-98) “Om lov om interkommunale selskap og lov om 
endringer i kommuneloven mm (Kommunalt og fylkeskommunalt foretak); see 
specifically section 2.2.3 “Styets kompetanse”, p.p. 23-24. 
215 See specifically § 3-9 ”Ledelse i sykehus”. 
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thinking or planning”216. The thesis analysis of hospitals’ operations 
management establishes a picture of shortsighted organizational focus. The 
institutional perspective calling for over all strategic thinking and 
corresponding action, is lacking.  Missing too is the operational interaction 
with the clinical wards, normally assuring for contextual comprehension.   
 
The thesis analysis of stakeholders’ perceptual characteristics at ward level, 
confirms a regression within the health staff.  As the ward is organized 
around the knowledge system it applies, it explains the close integration 
existing between stakeholder groups. The health professional groups’ 
influential power is largely vested in the cultural basis of their own work.  
Managerial prescriptions are without merit for the medical profession.  
Ward’s health professional groups produce a tangent set of actor agents, with 
separate cultures and augmented logics. The thesis’ analysis depicts low 
ward attentiveness to management issues.  Focus on clinical development is 
marked by goal alignment along the logic of professions. Clinical staffs 
work together but in their separate ways. Differentiated professional logics 
warrant separate solutions to professional development and institutional 
orientation. This lack of integrated team-based operations makes common 
purposes harder to reach agreement on.  Parallel but incompatible cultures 
within the ward units make clinical work fragmented and difficult to 
supervise. Ward management works detached from other managerial levels 
within the hospital.  Within the ward, the respective stakeholder group work 
under differentiated perceptions of medical merits, patient care orientation 
and resources effectiveness.   
The contentions of ward professionals’ desire for autonomy may in part be a 
myth. According to Harrison (Harrison and Pollitt 1994), the autonomy 
presumably enjoyed by professionals, is partly illusionary.  The medical 
profession is heavily influenced by the socialization established with its 
external network.  The thesis confirms a close stakeholder liaison with 
critical suppliers.  A critical issue becomes one of determining and 
recognizing the stakeholder balance of power between ward actors and 
critical suppliers.   
The issue of hospital controversies generally concerns the access and 
availability of resources. This is the focal point of management-ward 
interaction. The empirically confirmed gap between operations management 
and ward supervision is a void of critical significance.  In so far as this 
managerial breach may be regarded as an absence of leadership, it makes 
room for staged and manipulative stakeholder behavior (Habermas 1991).  It 
is important therefore to recognize the purposive nature of decision-making 
by agent participants.   
                                                 
216 The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language. 
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11.4 A third dimension of stakeholder group influence 
11.4.1 Welfare state empowerment 
The thesis introductory quote from Jan Grund (Grund 1995), expresses a 
certain distress with what he perceives to be the “game” governing the 
exchange processes within the public hospital system217.  Vike (Vike et al. 
2002) confirms that this analogy is commonly applied to describe a 
relational dimension pattern of behavior between constituent actors in 
structural processes.  According to Vike, actor-agents at managerial levels, 
naturally keep an emotional distance to issue matters that are handled. 
Structural processes represent a second dimension of formalized or 
contractualized relationships.  Vike accepts the likelihood also of a third 
dimension, a moral dimension of such exchange processes.  However, any 
clear-cut boarder line between stakeholder “games” and value-based 
exchanges has not been empirically determined.  The thesis does not 
distinguish between good or bad stakeholder group exchanges.  Nor have 
any value-based issues been identified as opposed to clear-cut contractually 
vested accounts. However, the nature of welfare services developed does 
introduce the potential for a cultural dimension entailed in the moral 
dimension of exchange relationships. As such, it is important to account for 
how any value-laden residue from a cultural dimension impacts the level of 
influence as exerted by a stakeholder group. 
 
A common conceptualization of the public hospital is one whereby services 
are produced outside the intervention of the market forces of supply and 
demand (Vike et al. 2002).  Resource allocation processes vested in a 
predefined public health policy, governs its distribution.  Ogden’s (Ogden 
and Watson 1999) optimum stakeholder “fit” is attained when the 
expectations of stakeholder groups’ are balanced. Throughout the thesis’ 
contextual analysis, one has focused on the structural dissemination of 
power.  Decision-making authorities have been identified commensurate 
with constituents’ mandated position and the correspondingly vested scopes 
of authority.  Stakeholder groups’ interaction establishes a web of 
constituent actors where vested interests are addressed and acted upon.  The 
emerging pattern of influence may easily be interpreted as a continuum of 
stakeholder confrontations where hierarchical position and resource capacity 
are the only critical variables.   
 
Part of the thesis’ epistemological challenge has been to ascertain how the 
very nature of the welfare product itself may be representative of a source of 
power.  Vike (Vike et al. 2002) argues the relevancy  of a product’s 
                                                 
217 See thesis section: 1.1 “Intent of the study”. 
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symbolic value (tegnverdi)218.  This symbolic value associated with sector 
services entails a social codex grounded in the hospital’s value creation 
processes.  According to Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Bourdieu 
1984), the product codex functions as a “passionate force” rather than as an 
objective structural representation of the social phenomenon.  It is Vike’s 
argument that this codex or symbolic value is a cultural phenomenon serving 
to enhance constituent identity.  As such, it also serves to permeate the actor 
agents’ cohesive actions.  This contention may here be considered an 
extension of the relational dimension of stakeholder power.  A support for 
such a third dimension of power is also provided by Lukes (Lukes 1974) 
who purports that an issue matter’s ideological scope represents an 
influential force.   
  
Vike labels Bourdieu’s symbolic value as a driving force in an institution’s 
value creation system.  Thus, the actor agent’s proximity to an organization’s 
symbolic value creation enhances the stakeholders’ structural mandate and 
relation position.  It is Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 1984) contention that the 
control of the cultural capital, provides the constituent agent with a capacity 
to exercise influence by means of a manifested superior cultural position. 
The value creation and exchange processes in complex organizations thus 
become associated with a power differentiation in stakeholder exchange 
processes219.   
The thesis’ visualization of the welfare state’s structural and relational 
empowerment, as embedded in the cultural dimension of hospital 
stakeholder power, is presented in the following illustration: 
 
                                                 
218 Vike’s contention is drawn from Bourdieu in his “The Political Economy of the 
Sign” (1998). 
219 This contention follows Michael Kearny (1996) and the latter’s analysis of 
Baudrillard’s and Bourdieu’s perception of power as a medium of exchange. 
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Illustration No. 22: Welfare state empowerment220 
Welfare state empowerment
Symbolic value of 
welfare state production
Relational power
Habitat
Networks
Taste
Prestige
Structural power
Capital
Resources
Provisions &
allocations
Evident from the illustration is the transfer of the symbolic value of welfare 
state production, or the cultural contingencies attached to hospital health 
services.  Secondly, the structural and relational capital sources of power are 
displayed through the actor-agents’ influence. Such influence has been 
established through their professional networks and prestigious positions.  
Friedson (Friedson 2001) uses the term “ideology” when referring to the 
institutions of professionalism.  As shown in the analysis, doctors and nurses 
project claims, values and ideas that provide the rationale for their acclaimed 
views.  As such these ideologies permeate their vested positions on 
constituent issue matters.   
11.4.2 Relational influence on organizational decision-making 
The following table is developed based upon an analysis of the significance 
of stakeholders’ relational powers as applied to hospital organizational 
decision-making. 
  
                                                 
220 The conceptual categories “Habitat” and “Taste” is taken from Vike’s (Vike et al. 
2002) outline of Baudrillard’s contention on the symbolic value of product items 
(“The Political Economy of the Sign”, 1998). 
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Table No. 48: Relational power 
Professional 
network
Empirical access
Professional field 
association
Professional 
membership
Ward 
supervision
Operations 
management
Executive 
governance
Sources of 
inductive power
Organizational decision-making level
Strong decision-making influence
Marginal decision-making influence
Weak decision-making influence
With respect to managements’ interaction with external stakeholder groups, 
issue matter outcome is contingent upon the value based or ideological 
position.  As such, professional membership is significant as constituent 
power. The thesis has also found that membership in, or a professional 
association with a medical speciality, is equated with professional prestige.  
Such membership is assumed to ensure of proximity to professional 
networks and possibly access targeted resources221.   
It is equally a source of relational power, that constituents are able to provide 
credible evidence of access to patients as part of a larger empirical field 
consideration. Finally, represented by the medical profession, hospital 
institutions and industrial representatives, make up a formidable stakeholder 
grid based on common constituent interests. The synergistic forces of such a 
                                                 
221 This conclusion on the importance of networks reveals a close parallel with the 
distribution of power within privately owned firms, or corporations.  In Engelstad 
(Engelstad 1999) recently published work on the significance of societal power 
(“Mot en ny maktutredningen”), he emphasizes the significance of information flow 
and the organization of network alliances as significant sources of firms’ inductive 
power.  
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pharmaceutical/industrial - hospital complex222 carries significant 
implications for ward planning and operational direction.  
 
As shown in table no. 48, decision-making levels are reviewed applying 
sources of inductive power, as analytical agents.  A strong affirmative 
picture emerges with respect to the ward stakeholder groups’ influence; i.e., 
doctors and nurses, with a capacity to influence decision-making based on 
their relational powers.  As is shown in the table, both executive governance 
and operations management representatives are considered to carry only 
marginal influence based on the same analytical merits.  
11.4.3 Structural influence on organizational decision-making 
A similar comparative analysis has been developed on the hospitals’ 
structural power agents.  Strange’s (Strange 1988) analysis of political power 
systems, contends that structural power generally is more important than 
relational power.  The former commonly includes financial, production and 
knowledge systems’ power agents.  As the thesis has attached skills and 
professional knowledge to what is termed relational power, one is here left 
with the two agents governing resources allocation and deployment.  
Structural power as related to the public hospital sector is relevant to 
assigning and employing capital provision for hospital operations. The 
following table evaluates hospital stakeholders’ decision-making capacity 
related to their structural position.   
 
This distribution of inductive power as herein analysed, is reflected in the 
following table comparing the relative power of management agents.   
                                                 
222 Arnold S. Relman, editor of The New England Journal of Medicine, alerted his 
readers in 1980 to a rise of a “new medical-industrial complex” as the most 
important health-care development of the day.  Relman wanted to distinguish the 
growing business that sold health services to patients for a profit, such as walk-in 
clinics, health chain hospitals, dialysis centers and home care companies from the 
“old” complex of firms that sold drugs, equipment and insurance (Starr 1982 p. 
429).  
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Table No. 49: Structural power 
Employee 
federations
Production control
Sector network
Structural 
integration
Ward 
supervision
Operations 
management
Executive 
governance
Sources of 
inductive power
Organizational decision-making level
Strong decision-making influence
Marginal decision-making influence
Weak decision-making influence
The executive management’s proximity to the political and administrative 
governance agents confirms its access to sector governance. The hierarchical 
distance between sector governance and core clinical activity naturally 
precludes the ward’s immediate access to structural power regimes.  As 
concluded through both the informant analysis and the study of archival 
records, the dissemination of structural power is served by complex matrix 
solutions.  This is evident in a differentiated access to governance agents.  
However, as a general picture, the table depicts a linear communication 
structure. Here, managerial proximity to sector governance provides a 
correspondingly stronger negotiating position.   
A distinction is made in the table analysis between structural integration and 
sector network.  This implies that due consideration is given the complex 
web of hospital sector governance.  As has been discussed in the thesis’ 
contextual analysis, a range of sector audit offices partake in the supervision 
of hospital activities. To balance its operation and priority for clinical 
activities, it becomes a managerial prerequisite to incorporate the concerns 
of these audit groups.  Again, the thesis applies the same contextual logic of 
equating hierarchical distance with stakeholders’ inductive power. While the 
analysis of informant interviews confirms a somewhat differentiated picture 
between the hospitals, the general conclusion stays firm.    
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In her analysis of structural power in national and international politics, 
Strange (Strange 1988) emphasizes the significance of production control.  
Within the modern public hospital, resource allocation receives prominent 
focus as the public hospital sector is allocated a significant share of the 
nation’s resources223.  Divergent views reflect both differentiated 
philosophies on the welfare state as well as mirroring disbursed perceptions 
of governing logics.  However, as stated by Østenrud (Østerud 1999), the 
precondition for the welfare state is the adequacies of resources capable to 
ensure its growth.  The proponents of New Public Management place their 
trust in the efficient allocation of resources.  Such a strategy carries 
consequences for the production of welfare goods and the national economic 
well being in general224.  With the ward’s direct resources supervision, its 
impact on priorities and its efficient use is paramount. While executive and 
operations management clearly influence the budgetary processes, ward 
management is representative of a supremacy position. Ward staff members 
demonstrate their capability to impede and defer management measures 
addressing capital-intensive clinical activities. As proposed by Williamson 
(Williamson 1996), many dependency issues may be addressed in efficiency 
terms, whereupon power considerations largely vanish.  However, ward 
autonomy, combined with the health professions’ exclusive skills position, 
implies a significant control of resources deployment. Thus, the ward’s 
influential power vested in its structurally based position provides for an 
immense stakeholder position.   
 
The significance of employee federations in organizational decision-making 
issue matters is not uniformly confirmed. Managerial informants point to the 
federations’ in-house presence as being obtrusive to efficient resource 
administration.  Rigid, collectively arbitrated agreements on employment 
terms and conditions are said to impede flexible staffing solutions.  Judged 
by the contextual analysis and informant interview data, employee 
federations represent a strong stakeholder group position. Hospital internal 
employee federations’ integrated promulgation of their vested issues may 
carry a significant consolidated weight opposite hospital management. 
Christensen (Christensen 1994) traces this latter contention to the initial 
                                                 
223 An analysis published by Health Affairs (Anderson and Hussey 2001), ranks 
Norway fifth among OECD-countries on health care spending; i.e., 8.9% of GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product); behind the US (13.6%), Germany (10.6%), Switzerland 
(10.4%) and France (9.6%).  
224 Details on the Government’s public change program governing resources 
efficiency is published in government white paper NOU 1991:28 “Mot bedre viten.  
Effektiviseringsmuligheter i offentlig sektor”, and ”Stortingsmelding nr. 4, 1987-88, 
”Perspektiver og reformer i den økonomiske politikken”. 
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presence of the medical profession in governance agencies. According to 
Christensen, the medical profession is in a unique position to promulgate its 
position on what is to become the legalized practices of medicine.  Other 
associated prescriptions secure the placement of staff and their skills 
progression programs.  Committees staffed by members of the medical 
profession induce national policies governing patient grievances procedures. 
The Norwegian medical association (Dnlf) promulgates national strategies 
on the structure, organization, staffing and supervision of public hospitals. 
Nationally arbitrated agreements on employment terms and conditions 
represent the localized negotiation framework within the respective 
hospitals.  The remedial action subsequent to a local hospital labor conflict 
empowers the employee federations to deploy measures carrying significant 
impacts on the hospital’s resource position.   
Since its national inception following the Second World War, the principle 
of collective pluralism has established an organizational form of democracy.  
The purpose of this has been to secure rights and privileges commensurate 
with the ideals of the welfare state. One argument is that negotiated 
employment conditions ensure organizational stability and a good working 
climate.  In sum, this enhances productivity (Østerud 1999).  While the 
thesis does not take a stand on the issue of hospital efficiency, it finds 
empirical support for the influential position of employee federations.  Their 
strong stakeholder position is established in part by the comprehensive 
organizational framework of interconnectedness.   
11.5 Precursors to new organizational leadership 
paradigms 
11.5.1 Governance paradigm developments 
The major issues surrounding governance of the public health programs 
following World War II has centered around balancing between continual 
cost efficiency reforms on one side, with the politics of welfare on the other.  
The continual conflict of political vs administrative governance causes 
persistent tension.  Also, the governance model in operation at any one time 
influences the interplay between public hospital stakeholder groups. In order 
to assess the relevancy of public hospital decision-making, one needs to 
better understand past and present governance paradigms.   
Table no. 50 “Governance paradigms in Norwegian public hospitals” 
summarizes key development trends in public hospitals governance since 
1980.  Each decade identified, highlights the utilitarian governance that has 
permeated public health reform thinking. Each paradigm is given a 
conceptual label characteristic for the period’s prevailing governance logic 
and management rationale.   
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The governance prescriptions introduced in the 1980’s prioritized improved 
decision-making procedures subscribing to detailed planning processes.  As 
pointed out in the thesis’ contextual analysis, the prescriptive governance 
measures of the 1980’s came in response to preceding decades of capacity 
expansion.  Calls for expanded internal control regimes made for a rigid and 
inflexible governance system.  The Norwegian adoption for what in the 
1990’s became known as New Public Management, combined the planning 
and audit prescriptions of the 80’s with what may be called a neo-classical 
industrial logic that sought to optimize cost-efficiency and effective 
production systems.  The prevailing over-all political challenge has been one 
of determining how far one would be willing to go to facilitate operational 
autonomy independent of political control (Christensen and Lægreid 2001).  
It is Christensen’s contention that the NPM-programs to improve resource 
efficiency actually are compatible with established public management 
traditions.  The next decade of the new millennium (00’s) is so far 
recognized by an institutional logic supportive of contractual management.  
System changes have created a governance modality that lessens the broader 
scope of political supervision.  The overriding principle has been one of 
avoiding service units embedded in overlapping organizational structures.  
New and structurally divested entities are believed to improve value creation 
processes based on specialization.  In this new paradigm public hospitals 
distinguish between owner (eier), audit regulator (regulator), procurement 
agent (bestiller) and provider (utfører). (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
Consequently, the interactions between stakeholder actor-agents appear 
more pronounced. The NPM-dimension of contracting management 
incorporates exposing public services to open market competitive bids and 
privatization of non-core public services. The overriding logic is to have 
market mechanisms replace centralized governance and performance audits. 
The instrumental objective is improved cost efficiency of public services.  
An immediate problem thus becomes one of coping with differentiated 
services levels that introduce the potential for inequality, discrimination and 
social disintegration (Blomquist and Rothstein 2000). 
 
The accelerating rate of public service reforms, dramatizes the need for a 
continuous reassessment of the role of public governance. Paradigm 
anomalies may be identified both in terms of the context of discovery and in 
the justification of content (Kuhn 1962).  Following March and Olsen 
(March and Olsen 1984); “what we observe in the world is inconsistent with 
the ways in which contemporary theories ask us to talk”.  Present-day 
stakeholder theory is based largely on normative/philosophical theorems on 
the intrinsic value of all constituent interests.  Considerations afforded 
constituents are grounded in our societal norms and values.  From 
championing a State representing a “collective moralism” through a 
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“governing state”, Christensen perceives of “the State as a supermarket” 
(Christensen, Lægreid, and Zuna 2002).  Christensen perceives this scenario 
as an extension of to-days NPM governance prescriptions.  The State as a 
supermarket emphasizes service user participation.  Cost efficiency is 
achieved through open competitive solutions between actor-agents. Public 
governance excels through innovation and continuous improvement 
processes.  Under such governance regimes, organizational forms and 
management logic will increasingly emulate the private sector.  This 
supports the paradigm anomalies as pointed out by Christensen.  The next 
paradigm of public hospital governance may therefore be marked by a 
compliance logic toward competing stakeholder groups.  Decentralized 
governing structures and liberalized market operations will necessitate 
strategic management logic.  A consequence of this, public hospitals thus 
need to integrate management programs that promote a value creation logic 
rather than the present day cost supervision rationale.  Continued patient 
empowerment may introduce the opportunities for strengthening patient 
proxies.  The emerging hospital insurance programs may empower patients 
to seek treatment solutions established through national and/or international 
medical services networks.  Theoretical implications tied to this new public 
hospital governance paradigm will be introduced in the subsequent section.  
Public hospital paradigm characteristics are detailed in the next table.    
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Table No. 50: Governance paradigms in Norwegian public hospitals  
Strategic 
Management
Contractual 
Management
New Public 
Management
Prescriptive
Management
Value creation logic
Integrated 
solutions
Multiple source 
financing
Market 
harmonization
Patient 
empowerment
Dissolving 
professional 
hegemony
International health 
services networks
State ownership
Structural 
realignments
Reframing hospital 
organizations
Market 
liberalization
Management 
systems
Functional 
supervision
Balanced budgets
Production incentive 
systems
Cost based 
accounting and 
reimbursements
Expansion 
curtailment
Administrative 
systems control
Planning and 
achievement 
orientation
Governance actors’ 
resolve 
participation
10’s
Compliance 
logic
00’s
Institutional 
logic
90’
Industrial logic
80’s
Administrative 
logic
 
11.5.2 Paradigm relevancy to public hospital leadership 
11.5.2.1 Decision-making positions 
Hospital leadership is considered critical to fulfilling sector obligations225.  
The concept of leadership is in itself a term that contains many facets and 
invites many definitions.  Relevant definitions commonly distinguish 
between leadership that either is focused on: (i) prescription of procedures 
(ii) supervision of common goals (iii) subscription to over-all organizational 
strategies, or is focused on (iv) transformation type leadership that pursues 
visionary goals.  Entailed in all four leadership modalities is the need to 
make affirmative decisions. Within the context of public hospital 
organizations, leadership that secures organizational decision-making is 
                                                 
225 Reference is made to newspaper article in DN (Dagens Næringsliv), dated 
12.02.03 in which plans for a national leadership program is announced for leaders 
in public hospitals.  Excerpt quote: “We have assumed a State role for the national 
governance of public hospitals.  Now we will pursue a common national program 
for the development leaders.  We have many leaders in the public health sector, but 
too little leadership”. 
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critical to stakeholder influence at executive, operations and ward 
management levels.  Decision-making may also be considered a source of 
conflict as to what can be done and how it may be done (Freidson 1986). As 
such, organizational leadership requires managerial attentiveness to both 
structural and process-type operations.  According to Hemphill and Coons 
(Andersen 1995), “leadership is the behavior of an individual when he is 
directing the activities of a group toward a shared goal”.  Roach and Behling 
contend that leadership is “the process of influencing the activities of an 
organized group toward goal achievement” (Andersen 1995).  Erik Johnsen 
combines the attentiveness to leadership function and leadership action.  His 
sum leadership conception becomes one of goal-setting, problem-solving 
and communicative interaction between people (Busch and Vanebo 1996).  
The thesis has placed the conceptual extremities of decision-making 
processes within a coherent framework governed by decision-making style.  
The result is a conceptual illustration of the process requirements generated 
by leadership style.        
 
Illustration No. 23: Decision-making processes and leadership styles 
Procedural
leadership
Visionary
leadership
Strategic
leadership
Supervisory
leadership
Innovation
and
radical change
Structural
“games”
Change
And
improvements
Audit
&
Control
Pr
ed
ic
ta
bi
lit
y U
ncertainty
In order to identify the hospitals’ decision-making position, the properties of 
the various conceptual paradigm positions need to be defined. These are 
introduced in the next table.   
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Table No. 51:  Decision-making processes 
Decision-making 
processes 
Process characteristics 
Innovation and radical 
change 
Organization processes are marked by innovations and radical 
changes. 
Change and 
improvements 
 Organizations are marked by capacity to adapt to changing 
demands and improvement needs. 
Structural “games” Organization processes are marked by prescriptive governance 
that is vested in contractual relationships. 
Audit & control Organization processes are marked by detailed governance 
supervision of operations management. 
 
11.5.2.2 The distinctiveness of the hospitals analyzed  
In an analysis of the hospitals’ operational characteristics relative to 
decision-making processes evident in the thesis empirical research, the 
conceptual distinctiveness of class hospitals becomes evident.  This 
knowledge is important as it serves to solidify class hospital generalizations.   
All three hospitals analyzed are uniform in the sedimentary character of 
decision-making.  Executive and operations management’s resource based 
planning and control schemes clearly places particularly hospital no. 1 in the 
“audit & control” position (see illustration no. 24).  The hospital’s strained 
reporting relationship with both its board and its city health planning agency 
has so far precluded any operational autonomy progressing along the lines of 
newer paradigms of governance.  Hospital internal hegemonic decision-
making at ward levels serves to deteriorate management’s leverage position 
opposite its executive superiors. Hospital no. 1 is still governed by the 
paradigm of prescriptive management reflected in strict administrative 
supervision and control. 
 
At hospital no. 2, management acts within the confines of a governance 
paradigm of New Public Management and its industrial logic.  Governance 
rapport is good as hospital management conforms to calls from above for 
resource efficiency and budgetary prescriptions.  Subscribing to DiMaggio’s 
contention (DiMaggio and Powel 1983), abidance by governance 
prescriptions may not be for reasons of perceived operational efficiency, but 
to increase their legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities.  Thus, the 
thesis places hospital no. 2 in the leadership decision-making process sector 
of “structural games”.  Informants testify to management’s capacity to 
“play” governance actors in order to optimize sector norms and conditions. 
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Within its new incorporated ownership structure (Fylkeskommunalt 
selskap), hospital no. 3 is in transition from a New Public Management 
paradigm to the present logic of contractual management. Complex matrix 
relationships with executive board, political and county administrative 
governance agencies are part of the past.  Hospital management and its 
executive board are reframing a reporting relationship based on contractual 
properties.  While the hospital is still marked by sedimentary decision-
making, management is actively taking steps towards structured change 
processes.  While the informant feedback testifies to only marginal success, 
it nevertheless marks a concerted effort on behalf of management to 
integrate planning and controlling processes.  The position of the thesis is 
therefore to place hospital no. 3 in the category of “change and 
improvements” decision-making processes.  A continued practice along this 
type of decision-making requires attentiveness to a broad range of hospital 
stakeholder groups to alleviate risks associated with constituent compliance.  
 
The pattern of organizational decision-making processes confirms class 
hospital positions as shown in the following illustration.  
 
Illustration No. 24: Decision-making paradigm positioning 
Procedural
leadership
Visionary
leadership
Strategic
leadership
Supervisory
leadership
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radical change
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Hospital no. 2
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11.5.3 Theoretical contributions 
11.5.3.1 The nature of decision-making instrumentality 
The research question is believed to represent a significant societal concern.  
The thesis has set out to produce a plausible and empirically defensible 
explanation of the phenomenon of stakeholder influence.  The true task of 
the research has been to gain an insight into what one may call the empirical 
reality. The preceding summary and conclusion, represents the thesis’ 
descriptive analysis of relationships between hospital stakeholder groups.  It 
purports social relations based on construct relationships identified through 
empirical observations.  Stakeholder relationships have been shown as to the 
influence exerted on decision-making outcome. Contentions on stakeholder 
groups’ influential powers are based on ontological assumptions and an 
epistemological position on the realism of having captured targeted events.  
To guide this empirical process, the thesis has employed theoretical-
conceptual models that address contextual field phenomenon.   
 
The following propositions reflect thesis explanations of how stakeholder 
groups influence decision-making.  In Troye’s (Troye 1994) view, it is 
important that theoretical propositions reflect factual empirical accounts.  
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) points to a need for the researcher 
to practice reflexivity. This points to the need to consider both the empirical 
evidence and the reflections of the researcher.  According to Troye, the most 
important outcome of theoretical reflections is an awareness of the 
interpretative venues and how these influence the realizations of a contextual 
reality.     
 
Drawing on Troye’s (Troye 1994) conception of four critical domains for 
relevant research contingencies, one has tabulated the following research 
audit reference scheme.  
 
Table No. 52:  Audit: Four domains of research 
Substantial domain Decisional domain Theoretical domain Methodological 
domain 
• Stakeholder 
presence 
• Stakeholder 
behavior 
• Stakeholder power 
• Stakeholder 
achievements 
• Through Governance 
decrees and prescriptions 
• Through governance 
actions and interactions 
Organizational decision-
making 
• Stakeholder relations 
• Stakeholder interactions 
• Stakeholder theory • Informant 
interviews 
• Archival records 
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The thesis’ perceptual accounts appear uniform along horizontal 
organizational strata. However, viewed in a hierarchical context, the 
stakeholder groups’ cognitive profiles are non-congruent within the 
conceptual categories analyzed. The empirical field’s substantial domains 
show a clear presence of viable stakeholder groups.  Empirical data presents 
evidence of stakeholder interaction differentiated by environmental origin 
and vested interests.  Stakeholder power is shown to be disseminated in a 
detached fashion, where the stakeholders exert their influence along plateaus 
of hegemonic group reigns.   
 
Stakeholder theory seeks an instrumental position on how constituent 
interests may be balanced in decision-making situations.  The traditional 
stakeholder  “fit” (Ogden and Watson 1999) represents an ideal balancing 
point between the dynamic forces of supply and demand.  In the case of the 
public hospital, the governance of regulations, hegemonic positions, and 
societal norms replace the dynamism of open market operations.  Public 
service users, suppliers and proxy agents work in integrated patterns with 
hospital internal representatives to resolve system needs and constituent 
expectations. According to Etzioni (Etzioni 1971), compliance theory 
reflects a basic thesis that organizations differ along the suggested 
dimensions in the means of control they apply.  This situation effects 
organizational actors’ nature of involvement with lower participants.  
Compliance represents a major element of a relationship between those who 
wield influence and exert power over those on whom they exercise it 
(Etzioni 1971)226.  Complex organizations such as public hospitals require 
compliance in the multifaceted exchange relationships between constituent 
groups. The empirical analysis of the public hospitals shows a decision-
making sedimentation structure that differs in its compliance rationale.  Each 
decision-making level is shown to have cognitive spheres unique to its 
contextual position. The analysis of stakeholder informants shows how 
cognitive orientations differ between constituent groups relative to their 
organizational level.   
 
A stakeholder consensus model built on the presumptions of cognitive 
congruence, acknowledges the practice of differentiated influential means 
and their applications. The following illustration is a conceptualization of 
                                                 
226 Compliance refers here to both a relation in which an actor behaves in 
accordance with a directive supported by another actor’s power, and to the 
orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied.  By supported, Etzioni 
relates this term to “those who have the power manipulate means by which they 
command in such a manner that certain other actors find following the directive 
rewarding, while not following it incurs deprivation.  In this sense, compliance 
relations are asymmetric (or vertical)” (Etzioni 1971).   
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organizational decision-making addressing the multiplicity of the public 
hospital’s stakeholder groups.  The model’s instrumentality is vested in the 
universal relevancy of differentiated applications of influential means.  This 
is determined by organizational levels and by the nature of constituent issue 
matters. As such, instrumentality here connotes the predictability of 
differentiate influential means employed when faced with a diversity of 
stakeholder group interests.  
      
Illustration No. 25: The axiomatic characteristics of decision-making  
Ecology of
Context
Prevalence of
Affiliations
Salience of
Structuration
Presence of 
Proxies
Stakeholder 
Compliance
 
 
The salience of structuration, as identified in the empirical analysis, 
empowers formal governance through mandated tasks and authorized scopes 
of responsibility. Structural and systemic power normally incorporate 
remunerative measures. In the ecology of the organizational context, 
normative power mobilizes both structural and relational means of influence 
to attain desired objectives. Etzioni (Etzioni 1971) defines normative 
influence as resting on organizational manipulation of symbolic character.227  
                                                 
227 One may say that the interaction of hospital internal stakeholder groups are 
marked by what Greenwood labels “environmental determinism” (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996).  Such determinism is, according to Greenwood, based on “the 
political dynamics of intra-organizational behavior”. 
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The model’s prevalence of affiliations and the presence of proxies, connote 
the hospital’s relationships with external stakeholder groups. The presence 
of external stakeholder constituents and their exchange relationships with 
internal stakeholder groups, invites the exercise of coercive power. 
According to Etzioni (Etzioni 1971), coercive power rests on the application 
of sanctions and restrictions to control the exchange outcome through strong 
influential application.  These various forms of decision-making powers 
have all been identified in the thesis’ empirical analysis, as have been also 
the descriptive accounts of constituent interchange. 
11.5.3.2 A descriptive/empirical stakeholder theory 
The thesis’ empirical account of the hospital context disqualifies present 
normative paradigms on stakeholder management. Their theoretical content, 
rooted in classical and post-modern normative prescriptions, is not reflected 
in the thesis’ empirical reality. As hereby expressed in the thesis’ proposed 
“stakeholder theory of detachment”, stakeholder management is projected to 
work counteractive to the balancing of otherwise bona fide stakeholder 
interests. Empirical accounts show how public hospital governance promotes 
instrumental management action that suppresses an organizational focus 
based on the multiplicity of constituent interests. 
  
The following table outlines the proposed theoretical descriptive/empirical 
proposition as rooted in the thesis’ empirical reality and as vested in the 
reflexive consciousness of the researcher.  
 
Table No. 53: Propositions on descriptive/empirical stakeholder theory 
Theoretical 
proposition on the 
“Balance of 
stakeholder 
management” 
Descriptive nature of 
theoretical propositions 
Thesis summary reference to 
supportive empirical contentions 
“Stakeholder 
balance of 
detachment” 
Implies that stakeholder 
management in public 
hospitals balances 
stakeholder interests 
relative to an operational 
agenda within their own 
organizational confines. 
11.3.2 Decision-making 
homogeneity 
o The significance of 
decision-making 
homogeneity 
11.3.3 Decision-making 
sedimentation 
o The segregation of 
organizational 
decision-making 
 
It is believed that this theoretical proposition is consistent with the thesis’ 
descriptive summary, coherent in the structure and comprehensible as it 
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serves to reaffirm the answer to the research question. The table provides 
specific reference to the thesis’ analytical summary.  As such, it permits 
future research to confirm methods and procedures when research replication 
is sought.  Finally, the propositions’ theoretical position is vested in the 
venues of existing stakeholder theory.  The proposition introduced is focused 
on stakeholder group behavior as it explicates management of stakeholder 
group interests.   
 
Normative stakeholder theory emphasizes the present-day paradigm of 
connecting social values with social relations in stakeholder management.  
The thesis provides a descriptive account of how such relations purport to 
exist within a contextual environment.  Thus, the theoretical proposition is 
consistent with past and existing stakeholder theory in the sense that it 
focuses on stakeholder management vested in decision-making behavior. 
11.5.4 Implications of the present paradigm on organizational 
decision-making 
According to Haukaas (Haukaas 1997), whenever public organizations are 
established, positions of power are considered. Thus, the hospital sector 
authorities are continuously faced with the classical issue of politics: Either 
to conduct the politics of creativity (la politique politisante) or the politics of 
routines (la politique politiseè)228.  According to Sejersted (Sejersted 2001), 
the art of public governance is aimed at accomplishing a proper balance 
between these two forms of politics.  A logical presumption is one where the 
political considerations are viewed a priori; i.e., where the degree of 
governance leaves the substance of specific action to an autonomous 
operation (Sejersted 2001).  The welfare state in Norway rests on a 
philosophy that works to preserve a de-commodified public health service 
system in a fully stratified society (Espin-Andersen 2000).  This presupposes 
a governance of “la politique politisante “.  This entails that the welfare state 
rejects a transfer of the creative and specific action to market-based 
solutions.  Thus, public health governance has been exempt from the 
philosophy of the liberal State and its programs of process supervision.   
Prior to Januar 1, 2002, public hospitals were governed through a 
regionalized system vested in counties and communes. The sector favored 
instrumental measures that assured effective resource application.  The 
recent introduction of a state-based ownership and governance model, 
presupposes the continuance of a centralized hospital governance system 
                                                 
228 The concepts are from Jon Elster’s ”Contradiction” (Sejersted 2001 p. 26).   
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(Helseforetaksloven )229. This is evidenced in the governance white paper, 
published in 1997230, in which the need for a broader application of legal and 
economic measures associated with the new reforms, is reiterated. It may 
therefore be perceived to be a contradiction, when the latter initiative is 
announced as a measure for modernizing the public health sector.   
Starr (Starr 1982) makes reference to some critical observations associated 
with governements’ continued search for control over hospital expenditures.  
His contention is that the State’s continued striving for instrumental control 
over public expenditure, enforces a developmental trend towards turning 
public organizations into corporate enterprises.  According to Starr, such a 
development will have a profound impact on the ethos and politics of both 
medical care and hospital institutions.  The prognosis, as envisioned by 
Starr, is not simply the weakening of the sovereignity of the health 
professionals, but also the introduction of organizational disunity, services 
inequality and conflicts throughout the entire health care system. 
The thesis’ analysis depicts a situation in public hospitals reminiciant of 
Starr’s contentions. The public hospital sector acts supremely in its 
instrumental preference for curbing cost developments. The thesis also 
shows accounts of organizational decision-making where executive and 
operations management act oblivious to the nature and needs of the 
hospital’s value creation process.  The practice of  detached organizational 
decision-making, precludes integrated management solutions.     
 
Through the new law on hospital ownership, the State assumes the formal 
responsibility for all public hospitals.  Reorganization measures enacted into 
the new law on hospitals (Spesialisthelsetjenesteloven), challenge the 
autonomy of the medical profession.  Corporatization of hospitals and the 
implementation of unitary management, are intended to bring about a 
holistic approach to health services managment231. In the government white 
paper which previews the intent of the law, a broadened management 
mandate is perceived to be precursory to improved hospital governance.  The 
latter dramatizes the call for improved hospital leadership.   
 
The research project’s empirical findings support the contention of hospital 
leadership reification. The contention of reification rests on the empirical 
findings vested in the thesis’ theoretical propositions.  A disjointed approach 
                                                 
229 See particularly the promulgation preceding its legal introduction; Ot.prp. nr. 66 
“Om lov om helseforetak mm.”, 2000-2001; section 2.1.3 “Politisk styring”, p.p.11-
12. 
230 St.meld. nr. 24 (1996-97), „Tilgjengelighet og faglighet. Om sykehus og annen 
spesialisthelsetjeneste”; See particularly: 1.1 ”Meldings formål og bakgrunn”, p. 5. 
231 See chapter 1 (Helsesforetaksloven) “Sammendrag”, p. 7. 
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to a complex value creation process invites Williamson’s concern for 
subgoal pursuits (Williamson 1996). Williamson warns of selective exposure 
to problems, goal distortions, bargaining and coalition formation.  The 
empirical analysis shows the public hospital with a hybrid form of 
organizational decision-making. The formalized hiearchical structure is 
operationally subdivided into decision-making enclaves. Here, 
organizational preferences are enacted by virtue of their stakeholder 
position.   
Any transactional cost assessments are outside the thesis venue.  However, 
the lack of integrated activity planning and goal orientation implies a 
presence of significant resource inefficiencies. This contention is supported 
by analysis completed by SINTEF/UNIMED. According to their reports, the 
average technical hospital efficiency has only marginally improved during 
the 1990s (SAMDATA 2000)232.  In the same period, cost effectiveness 
declined.  Based upon projections made by SINTEF/UNIMED, there is an 
unrealized efficiency potential of approximately NOK 2,5 billion (mrd.)233. 
 
Another implication related to the thesis contentions on leadership 
reification, centers on hospital strategizing.  Mintzberg recognizes the 
challenging nature of articulating and developing cohesive hospital 
objectives. Citing Lindblom (Lindblom 1977), a tenured researcher on 
government policy-making, Mintzberg contends that no-one has yet to 
employ a rational-deductive system for welfare services analysis. It is 
precisely within such complex power systems that planning has experienced 
its most dramatic failures.   
Present-day hegemonic and short-term planning documented in the thesis 
research, serve to impede cost efficiency and austerity objectives.  In 
additon, narrow  planning concepts are also steering strategies away from 
potentially rich and integrated perceptions of what an organization may be 
able to accomplish (Mintzberg 1994).   According to Rumelt (Rumelt, 
Schendel, and Teece 1995), strategy links environmental circumstances and 
organizational behavior to market outcomes. Adjusted for the nature of 
hospitals’ institutionalized legitimacy, profitability may be converted into a 
concept of societal costs.  The sustainability of the public hospital is 
dependent on its relative position as a viable service producing unit. Value 
creation activities are part of an interdependent system in which the costs or 
effectiveness of one activity can be affected by the way others are 
performing (Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece 1994).  To the public hospital, this 
involves the capacity and capabilities of a large number of health 
professional staff, choice of technologies and election of medical field 
                                                 
232 See section 9.5 ”Trender for sykehusenes effektivitet”, p. 125. 
233 Ibid., p. 126. 
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specialties. Detached and hegemonic decision-making precludes strategic 
choices from engaging the broadest range of stakeholder interests. 
The lack of strategic focus on ward priorities leaves the hospital vulnerable 
to operational dysfunctions and disruptions.  Operational discontinuities may 
erupt due to lacking strategies for the recruitment of professional staff.  A 
dysfunctional staff recruitment strategy serves to incapacitate hospital-
internal training and development programs.  Lack of a cohesive medical 
professional strategy precludes the proper scaling of operational goals and 
investment programs. The hospital medical research program may be viewed 
as an integral part of professional staff development and therefore improve 
medicine and treatment regimens. Thus, a hospital strategy pre-empted by 
overall clinical considerations and associated value creations processes, 
serves no directional purpose for viable long-term operations.  
 
Sector governance authorities themselves recognize some dramatic short-
comings in the nation’s public hospital system. The education system 
established to secure the supply of health professionals, is suffering from 
serious flaws234. Sector audits, document a lack of funds and an unsatifactory 
allocation of the same.  Poor quality of post-graduate medical training and 
development receive much critisism in all government white papers over the 
last decade and a half.  Insufficient R&D funding has equally been criticized.  
Medical R&D in public hospitals in Norway is financed through special 
allocations.  While such provisions have increased sharply over the last three 
years, the grants are still relatively small235. The most dramatic 
acknowledgement by the public hospital sector, however, is that no-one can 
account for how- or how much medical research is being conducted in 
Norwegian public hospitals. The Department of public health is able to 
confirm its monetary contributions earmarked for education, special projects 
and medical research. However, there is no cohesive project auditing, neither 
regarding projects financed nor research project outcome.   
In government white papers, concern is expressed at the lack of research 
quality supervision and control.  In an OECD analysis on medical R&D 
articles published in the period between 1996 and 2000, Norway comes out 
behind all the other Nordic countries in terms of articles produced and also 
                                                 
234 See particularly: St meld nr 24: Tilgjengelighet og faglighet.  Om sykehus og 
annen spesialisttjeneste”. 
235 The so-called functional allowances (funksjonstilskudd) are provided generally to 
hospitals with county, regional and university clinic functions.  Sum transferred as 
functional allowances was in 2000 NOK 1.9 bill. (mrd) (SAMDATA 2/01). Medical 
research projects are also financed by Norwegian research Institute (Norsk 
forskningsråd; NFR).  In 2001, the NFR provided NOK 251 mill.  for medical 
research projects. 
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based on comparisons of article citations236. The annual report on Norwegian 
Research and innovation (NIFU 2001) points to the fact that Norwegian 
medical research has not followed the international research trends.  The 
pattern based on research publications, confirms clinical medicine and bio-
medical fields such as neuroscience, biotechnology and molecular biology to 
be directions pursued.   
 
The time-tested taxonomy of separating management from the medical 
professions is inherent in the present logic of all hospital internal stakeholder 
groups.  However, the stakeholder groups represented by the two major 
health professions proclaim recognition of the need for organizational 
changes.  Change needs perceived by the informants point in the direction of 
change management and/or innovation style decision-making processes.  
However, the cognitive logic representative of executive and operations 
management does not show an equally strong recognition of the need to 
challenge the singular focus on an administrative and neo-classical industrial 
logic of the present form of governance.  A present governance rationale of 
“institutional logic”237 precedes a possible transition to a paradigm of 
“compliance logic”238.  Whether one will see a paradigmatic change towards 
“strategic management” 239 and a leadership of “innovation and radical 
change”240, depends largely on the discourse on welfare state prescriptions.  
As expressed by March and Olsen “Meaningful political equality cannot be  
viewed simply as a problem of aggregating interests but requires attention to 
the shaping of citizen preferences” (March and Olsen 1989 p. 143).  In the 
continued development of a formula for a welfare state regime, one best 
heeds the call of Starr:  “The dream was that reason would liberate humanity 
from scarcity and the caprices of nature, ignorance and superstition, tyranny, 
and not least of all, the diseases of body and spirit.  But the dream of reason 
did not take power into account” (Starr 1982 p. 3).  
 
The governance model of reaching societal agreements through the politics 
of consensus and stabilization, has rested on a public sector capable of 
securing common resources, rights and duties (Guldbrandsen et al. 2002).  In 
his analysis of powerful societal elites, Guldbrandsen points to the flaws 
inherent in national governance consensus models. Within the national 
principles of pluralism are conflicts of vested interests that remain 
unexposed.  It is believed that the thesis project has served to expose some of 
these conflicts and their implications. 
                                                 
236 NIFU, ”Det norske forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet – statistikk og indikatorer 
2001”, section 4.1.2 ”Siteringshyppighet”, p.p. 162-163; figure 4.1.2., and figure 
4.1.3, p.p. 162-163. 
237 See table no. 50: “Governance paradigms in Norwegian public hospitals”. 
238 Ibid. 
239 See illustration no. 23: “Decision-making processes and leadership styles”. 
240 Ibid. 
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